# THE PROCEEDINGS
# of
# The South Carolina Historical Association
# 1982



W. Calvin Smith
Valdis O. Lumans
Editors

University of South Carolina at Aiken
The South Carolina Historical Association

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# THE PROCEEDINGS of The South Carolina Historical Association 1982

## CONTENTS

It is the policy of the South Carolina Historical Association to publish all papers presented at the Annual Meeting. The editors of **The Proceedings** disclaim any responsibility for the scholarship, statement of fact and opinion, and the conclusions of the contributors.

# MINUTES

# South Carolina Historical Association

# Annual Meeting - 1982

The Fifty-second Annual Meeting of the Association met at Lander College in Greenwood, South Carolina, on Saturday, April 3, 1982, in conjunction with the South Carolina Political Science Association. Some seventy-five members and friends of the Association were present.

After registration and coffee in the Jackson Library, two sessions convened at 10:00 A.M. In the South Carolina session Rodger Stroup, S.C. Museum Commission, presided as two papers were presented: "Lucy Pickens--First lady of the South Carolina Confederacy" by Emily Bull, USC-Aiken, and "Did the Lady of Cofitachique Live in Camden, South Carolina?" by Charles W. Bright, Midlands Technical College. John B. Edmunds, USC-Spartanburg, commented vigorously on the papers.

A second session on the Ancient World met simultaneously Victor H. Mattews, Anderson College, presented "The Symbiotic Relationship Between King and Bureacracy in Ancient Mesopotamia," and Elizabeth Carney, Clemson, presented "Olympias, Would-Be Ruler." Ralph Mathisen, University of South Carolina, responded.

After a break two additional sessions convened at 11:15 A.M. The Modern European session was chaired by Joel Cleland, Lander. Saadallah A.S. Hallaba, USC-Sumter, presented "Hitler and Zionism: The Haavara Agreement of 1933," and Valdis O. Lumans, USC-Aiken, presented "Nazi Racial Doctrine and Policy: An Interpretation." Birdsall Viault, Winthrop commented.

A Southeren United States session was chaired by L. Wayne Jordan, College of Charleston. Marcia Synott, University of South Carolina, read "Replacing 'Sambo': Could White Immigrants Solve the Southern Labor Problem?" and Arnold Shankman, Winthrop, read "The South Carolina Council for the Common Good." Alan Schaffer, Clemson, responded.

The joint lunch session convened in the Grier Center at 1:00 P.M., Bob Hall, Director of the Institute of Southern Studies, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and Editor, **Southern Exposure**, spoke on "Sunbelt Glitter: Fact or Fantasy?"

After lunch President John B. Edmunds, USC-Spartanburg, convened the business meeting. He announced that the 1983 meetings would be held at Newberry College. Secretary-Treasurer A.V. Huff, Jr., Furman, presented the financial report and submitted the following slate of officers:

President: Walter B. Edgar (University of South Carolina)
Vice President: M. Foster Farley (Newberry)
Secretary-Treasurer: A.V. Huff, Jr., (Furman)
Editors of the **Proceedings**: Calvin Smith and Valdis O. Lumans (USC-Aiken)
Executive Committee: Joseph T. Stukes (Francis Marion)

They were elected unanimously. Incoming President Edgar adjourned the session.

At a South Carolina session at 2:30 P.M. in the Jackson Library Ken Donovan, staff historian at Fortress Louisbourg in Nova Scotia, presented a paper on "John Saunders: A Loyalist Captain in South Carolina, 1780-1782." Robert S. Lambert, Clemson, presided and commented.

At the conclusion of the afternoon session the Association adjourned to Barret House, the home of former Congessman William Jennings Bryan Dorn. Mr. Dorn hosted a reception for the two associations to the delight of all.

A.V. Huff, Jr.
Secretary-Treasurer

# LUCY PICKENS:
# FIRST LADY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONFEDERACY

**Emily L. Bull**

In Willowbrook Cemetary in Edgefield, South Carolina, amid tumbled-over crosses and rusted iron fences, is a neatly kept square containing the remains of Governor Francis W. Pickens and his family. In the corner, two rows from Pickens, lies his third wife, Lucy Holcombe Pickens, the tame inscription on her concrete slab betraying the legends that live after her:

> THIS STONE IS ERECTED TO THE MEMORY OF A BEATIFUL AND GRACIOUS LADY OF THE OLD SOUTH. SHE WAS THE WIFE OF FRANCIS WILKINSON PICKENS, THE WAR GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA FOR 1860-1863. Beautiful in person, cultured in mind, patriotic in spirit, she was loved by all who knew her.

The legends say that Lucy, the beautiful daughter of a Texas family, was taken to White Sulpher Springs, Virginia, the elite resort, by her ambitious mother in persuit of a husband. A widower, Colonel Pickens, had brought his two daughters there for a vacation and was enchanted by Lucy. She agreed to marry him if he would get himself appointed ambassador to Russia, and, as a friend of President Buchanan, he did so. They were married in Texas and traveled to Russia, where the young Mrs. Pickens so charmed the czar that she was moved into the Winter Palace at the Romanoff Court. Whispers even hint that her daughter born there was the czar's child.

When the South Carolina secession fever ran high, Pickens brought his wife and child home and was promptly elected governor. As popular in South Carolina as she had been in Russia, Mrs. Pickens had a regiment named in her honor, and her picture chosen for the Confederate hundred-dollar bill. After her husband's death in 1869 she lived another 30 years at their home, Edgewood, just north of Edgefield, where she entertained beautifully, despite the financial devastation of the South.

"The gossip will confirm the stories about her," said South Carolina author Elizabeth Boatwright Coker, who heard many of these tales in Edgefield years ago.[1] But most of the legends are false, and, with the gossip dispelled, Lucy Pickens emerges all the more fascinating. She was all the things her tombstone attributes to her and more. She was a talented writer and an energetic citizen of the South and the nation.

Lucy Petway Hunt Halcombe was born June 11, 1832, in LaGrange, Tennessee, an aristocratic but very small town in Fayette County, situated about six miles north of the Mississippi line and about fifty miles from Memphis and the Mississippi River.

She was the second of five children of Beverly LaFayette and Eugenia Dorthea Vaughn Hunt Halcombe.

Her Halcombe grandparents had been large landowners, owned fine race horses and had been known for their hospitality in Mecklenburg County, Virginia. But as farming declined there, they had to move with their son and two daughters and husbands to Fayette County. Grandmother Halcombe, a beautiful woman who was descended from Austrian royalty, adored Lucy. "There was never a sweeter child," she would say as she petted her.[3]

Lucy's mother wanted her two daughters to have an education so that they could be independent--forward thinking for the period. They attended LaGrange Female Academy and in the late 1840s went to the Moravian school in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Numerous letters of this period attest to Lucy's growing popularity.[4]

Beverly Holcombe, Lucy's six-foot-tall father,[5] had prospered in Tennessee until he signed a bad loan for a friend and was forced in the late 1840's to move to Marshall, Texas, for a fresh start. The friend later recovered his finances and repaid Holcombe, who consequently in 1848 began construction of a large brick home surrounded with Greek Revival columns.[6]

The elegance of the Holcombe girls' early lives, despite the family's financial setbacks in Virginia and Tennessee, is evident by the jewelry seen in pictures of Lucy and her older sister, Anna Eliza; by silver in Lucy's possession bearing her mother's initials;[7] and by the education the girls received. The family traveled up and down the Mississippi, frequently going to New Orleans, the nearest center of culture. From there they would send a bit of elegance, such as a rosewood piano, home to Texas.[8]

Lucy's mother kept a diary in which, when Lucy was 17, she wrote of being at the legislature meeting in Jackson, Mississippi, with her daughters "where all join me in thinking and expressing their admiration for two of the loveliest of their sex."[9] That entry adds credence to what has been considered a romanticized version of Lucy's and her daughter's lives by General George F. Alford in a Chicago newspaper.[10] Alford said when Lucy was visiting the family of Governor John A. Quitman[11] in Mississippi, "she captivated the entire state legislature and when she departed for New Orleans, the General Assembly adjourned and went with her. What he meant, a family history explains,[12] was that so many young Mississippi legislators escorted her to the dock when she departed for New Orleans that a quorum could not be found.

A love letter to her confirms she did visit with kinsmen in "Jackson or Vicksburg" and she did go from there to New Orleans,[13] accompanied by her mother and probably her sister.[14] The letter attests to her captivating charms in her

seventeenth year, but does not indicate that she returned affection for the mysterious source of the letter, a friend of her father's and, thus, perhaps older than she.

There are numerous references to Lucy being, "The rose of Texas,"[15] the "reining belle of the South, known in New York and all the way from Washington to New Orleans."[16] Occasionally she has been said to be the subject of the song "The Yellow Rose of Texas." It was written for minstrels prior to the Civil War and was very popular with the North and the South during the conflict. It is apt to have been played in honor to Lucy, but only the initials of the writer, "J.K.," remain, and its inspiration is unknown.[17]

Lucy had numerous admirers and suitors, including General Alford, who admitted he left Texas for California with the hope of striking gold and returning to marry Lucy. But apparently her heart was reserved for a "Lt. Crittenden," who was killed in an effort to free Cuba from Spain. While Lucy was in Jackson her family friends, Governor Quitman, entertained Narcisco Lopez and Jose Ambrosio Gonzales at the Governor's Mansion.[18] It is probable that Lucy met Lopez, who wanted Quitman's help in freeing Cuba from Spanish rule. Mississippians wanted Cuba freed with the hope that it would be another pro-slavery vote in Congress.

An effort to free Cuba by Lopez in the spring of 1850 was aborted; but on August 3, 1851, Lopez sailed from New Orleans again, convinced the time was right to lead a revolt. The Cuban uprising failed to materialize, however. A Col. William L. Crittenden of Kentucky and fifty other southern volunteers were captured August 13, tried and executed in Havana September 1. Nearly half of Lopez's 162 supporters sent to Spain as prisoners were Americans. The effort in Cuba set off anti-Spanish riots in New Orleans, and the Spanish consulate was wrecked. The American prisoners were not released until the United States provided Spain with $25,000 for restoring the consulate.[19]

Family tradition says that "Lt. Crittenden" was killed in this aborted Lopez effort. Nothing more than this is known about him. In her grief Lucy wrote a romance, **The Free Flag of Cuba: or The Martyrdom of Lopez. A Tale of the Liberating Expedition of 1851,** under the pen name of H.M. Hardiman, which was published at family expense.[20] Her phrases are beautifully descriptive and confirm her education in the classics and talent. As an example, in reference to Lopez's corpse, whe wrote:

> Like the marble triumph of some sculptor's skill, he lay in the silent majesty of death. Hard, indeed, must have been the heart that could have looked unmoved on the still death-beauty of the form. The gory stains had been removed, he lay calm and serene as though life had sighed itself away at his mother's breast . . .

Perhaps in a call to arms to avenge her lost love, she asked, "Shall it (American blood on Cuban soil) call in vain for vengeance?"

A fading critique is penciled in the margin of the copy of her work at South Caroliniana Library, written by someone who seemed to know her personally:

> The plot is beautifully simple and worked out with great power. There is brilliant purpose in the writer of this romance.

And on another page, referring to a line, "The Creoles have never deserted me," the critic wrote: "Great, but merited compliment de la N. Orleans worthy of Lopez--and of you."

Her descendants have believed this to be her only literary effort except for letters from Russia published in the Memphis **Eagle and Enquirer**, but a note found in Edgefield to "Miss Pickens" refers to her gloomy tragedy of Gonzalvo, suggesting that she never forgot this sadness and wrote more about it. (Gonzales, Lopez's partner, came to South Carolina and indeed had a gloomy life. His son was founder of **The State** newspaper.) Perhaps because the critique was unfavorable, she destroyed the manuscript.

Regardless of the male attention--perhaps because her grief for Crittenden--it was not until the age of twenty-six, in 1858, that Lucy married the twice-widowed, 53-year-old Francis W. Pickens, a planter and congressman of South Carolina. Pickens first felt the enchantment of Lucy when he took his daughters to vacation at the fashionable White Sulpher Springs resort in Virginia. Legend says Lucy's mother was ambitious for her and "felt that Pickens, though much older, would be a suitable match. Lucy, ambitious herself, and wishing to make a good, socially correct marriage, was impressed yet hesitant about tying herself down at an early age to such an 'old man'."[21] Eugenia Holcombe's ambitious attitude came across in several articles, even though family correspondence indicates that Lucy's parents did not favor the marriage at first.[22] Pickens did not waste any time, once struck by Lucy's charm; he wrote her father for permission to marry while at the resort.

"Tall, willowy, with titian hair said to resemble a woof of sunbeans spinning out like a flower at the ends, with eyes to shade that two men could never agree upon,"[23] is the penned portrait of Lucy in this period. She was "master of every situation she met," creating a sensation when she entered the room. No wonder, that in addition to writing her politics and national issues, Pickens wrote her, "Forgive me, forgive me it. I tremble for I love you madly, wildly, blindly . . ."[23] There is no conclusive proof of Lucy's feelings for Pickens at that point in her life, although she must have considered him dearly later in their marriage. She had lost Crittenden and perhaps considered him a stepping stone to a different sort of life.

She demanded, according to Edgefield stories, that Pickens get himself appointed ambassador to Russia, if she was to become his bride. He went immediately to his friend, President Buchanan, and did so. Family sources believe, however, only that she expressed an interest in travel, and he willingly obliged. Her uncommon love for her mother and home would seem to contradict such a suggestion on her part, but this conflict of desires might be attributed to impetuous youth. There is good reason to believe that Pickens wanted to do everything he could to please her, even though he had refused earlier offers of ambassadorships to France and England.

They were married April 25, 1858, at the Holcombe family home in Marshall, "Wyalucing". The town's leading citizens entertained the couple the following evening with a reception at the Adkins House, the largest place in Marshall. The new Mrs. Pickens did not, as legend says, come to Pickens' plantation in Edgefield to train their servants before going to Russia. Instead, the newlyweds sailed out of New York on the steamer "Persia" and were only one day from Liverpool by May 28.

From London Lucy reported to the Memphis newspaper that the English royalty did not go out in finer style than she and her husband did, only "with greater display" of servants.[25] In that same city on her first birthday away from her family her writing gives a clue about Picken's adoration of her:

> The first thing (I saw) when I opened my eyes this morning was a beautiful basket of hot-house flowers, half hid in them a box containing earrings, breast-pin and a bracelet of wrought gold, with bunches of violets enamled on them, with a diamond in each violet.[26]

Still in London in June, they went to an exhibition of paintings, saw Kean in Macbeth; heard Dickens read, which inspired a knowledgeable critique from her; and attended a service at Westminister Abbey.[27]

From London the Pickenses went to France. Lucy was far more enchanted by Paris than she had been by London. She visited the Louvre and other places of interest, continuing to take advantage of the culture wherever she was. Although she was bothered by shopping and bills, she relished the gowns of Paris. At great length she described the dress she would wear to be received by Napoleon: "a blue silk lace with three-point lace flounces over which a long train of lace is worn, looped with diamond sprigs, jewels of the same--breastpin, earrings and bracelet."[28]

After a stop in Prussia they arrived in St. Petersburg on July 6. Their first introduction to the czar was to have been on a Sunday at Peterhof, Nicholas' favorite summer palace thirty miles away. But because it was Sunday, a day for worship, so

Lucy felt, Ambassador Pickens attended alone. Several weeks had passed before Lucy met the czar at Peterhof. According to her correspondence, the food was beyond imagination, and the music was by the son of the great Strauss. For dinner she chose a gown with two skirts of white tulle, puffs of whitetulle and lemon silk and stripes of black velvet. She wore satin slippers embroidered with gold, which showed when she sat in the drawing room with her feet resting on a silk pillow. After a merry gathering there she went to her room to rest and re-dress for the ball in white moire satin and lillies of the valley.

Under the watchful eye of her husband she attracted much attention from Czar Alexander II, thirty-eight and restless, and whose passion for his wife was fading. He was good-natured, charming, and attractive, but also a bit timid and sensitive.[30] His interest in Lucy assured her the entire court's attention. He singled her out for dances, called her to stand above the ballroom on the platform reserved for the royal family and insisted they converse in French. Attesting his good nature, when Lucy apologetically said her French was not of the quality required for royalty, Alexander said he had no doubt that her republican tongue could not speak the language required by royalty. The half-hour conversation with a foreigner was heretofore an unheard-of event.[31] In a letter to her sister Lucy acknowledged that she passed for a "great beauty at Court" and that the emperor and grand dukes danced with her but not other ministers' wives. Their virtue, however, did not please her. She wrote:

> In a society like this, where the existence of virtue is not believed in by men, mine has not been a position free from incidents but I have conducted myself with such prudence that my husband tells me he loves me more for my dignity and goodness, than for my beauty and intellect. I mention it only to you (her sister) (in that) I have endeavored to fulfill the duties which I owed to my position to society, but I would shrink from giving my mind, soul and body to worldly pleasures and gratifications as the people around me do.[32]

Learning of her pregnancy, the czar moved her into an apartment in the Winter Palace which provided a view of the frozen Neva River's ice skaters to amuse her.[33] His attentions have been misconstrued by some to imply that the czar might have fathered the child. The timing of the Pickenses' arrival in Russia, however, makes that impossible. There is nothing in her correspondence to indicate that the Pickenses' daughter was not a full-term baby, and she was born on March 14, 1859, which puts the conception in London or Paris. On July 2 from Prussia, Lucy wrote her mother that she was "sick this morning and in much pain."[34] They did not arrive in Russia until July 6, eight months before their daughter's arrival, and it was several weeks before she even met the czar.[35] The czar is said to have had her features carved in marble, but it was Pickens who suggested she have this done. Pickens had a similar bust of himself carved.[36]

When Lucy had been as young as seven her mother had noted that Lucy seemed strangely devoted to her.[37] Letters from Russia express Lucy's profound grief at not being able to see her mother, distress at not hearing from her mother or sister, and her recall of memories of home. She obtained a promise from Pickens to live in Texas at one point, but she wrote a bitter letter after he did not allow her to go to her mother, whom she believed to be ill. She was ready to leave him and her child and sail the dangerous Baltic Sea to see about her mother when Pickens became ill; hence she stayed in Russia.[38]

In the same letter she exposes her dislike for the idea of living at Edgewood "in the midst of all the children, grandchildren and relations of No. 1 and No. 2 (his first and second wives)". Although she later apologized for the letter, Lucy had revealed some of the difficulties of step-mothering. His daughters by his second marriage, Rebecca and Jennie, had accompanied them to Russia. The latter had been only twelve when Francis and Lucy married, and there was a mutual bond of love between them. Jennie even called Lucy "Mama". But Lucy was not fond of Rebecca, who married Pickens' secretary, James C. Bacon, while in Russia.

Pickens apparently had a good rapport with Lucy's family, however. Using affectionate terms, he wrote to them asking for preserves and bought gifts for them. He was generous to them as well as to Lucy. When he spent forty dollars for a lace handkerchief for Lucy, she thought it was foolish, but was gracious enough not to tell him so.[39]

Lucy faced her motherhood more with the attitude of a modern mother than that of a Victorian shrinking violet, not fearing the pain and wanting to nurse her child. Her doctor said she was so popular and would want to go out that nursing her child, therefore, would not do. He said she was "nature's model" and predicted things would go well.[40] Sometime after her seventh month, when she was still going out a great deal, Pickens did write her family that she had been ill, but evidently the birth was not remarkably difficult.[41] The child was nursed by a Russian wet-nurse, Mumka, who, contrary to legend, remained in Russia when the Pickenses returned home. Although Lucy had written she would be greatly disappointed if she did not have a son, she seemed to take great pride in her daughter.

The baptism of their child has been greatly romanticized. Lucy preferred to wait until their return and let the Presbyterian minister adored by her family do the honors, but she was concerned about traveling the treacherous seas without the infant having been received into the Kingdom of God. In mid-August, 1860, she was considering having her christened when they reached England.[42] Nevertheless, the child was baptized before they left Russia. Legends say it occured in the company of diplomats from all foreign nations in the Russian capital, and that the czarina named her "Douschka", meaning "Little Darling" during the ceremony, the name which stuck with her.[43] She had been "Eugenia Dorothea Holcombe Pickens", at

her birth,[44] but her tombstone bears the name,"Frances Eugenia Olga Neva. . .", the latter two names apparently belonging to Russian Godmothers.

Besides mothering her child in Russia, Lucy continued to study French and took voice lessons from Mon. Rubini, studying Italian music.[45] Although she seemed to enjoy staying abroad, she disliked the Europeans' complete disregard for anything but rank and fortune. Both her republicanism and liberated view of womanhood caused her disdain for the nobility's disregard for women of lesser social status, regardless of their wit or charms.[46]

The Russian sojourn ended as the North-South conflict loomed in America. Pickens had stayed in contact with friends in South Carolina and, knowing of growing sentiment against the government, he resigned his post in Russia and traveled home in the fall of 1860. He wanted to cool the "hot-heads" and prevent war. Both he and President Buchanan were willing to maintain the status quo, although South Carolina, under the newly elected Governor Pickens' leadership, seceded from the Union in December, 1860.

Evidently, when Pickens felt the call to return to South Carolina and lead his state, his promise to Lucy to live in Texas was erased. Lucy's mother came to Edgewood to visit when they were settled, and later Lucy visited her in Texas.[47] But primarily Lucy was by her husband's side. "Francis and Lucy were so much a part of a team that it is difficult to think of one without the other . . . Lucy Pickens was of great comfort to her husband through these trials. In all the councils of state held at Edgewood, she was an active participant, recognized by the men as a woman of unusual intelligence. She was an inspiration to her husband, the South Carolina people and the soldiers in battle."[48] Pickens believed in confiding in his wife and not sheltering her from the truth. While Lucy may have played a role in the war, there is nothing to substantiate a printed legend that says the match that lighted the first cannon fired in the war was held by Douschka.

Public service was distasteful to Pickens, and he had a reputation for being a "wind bag" who enjoyed speaking and writing, for being bombastic, verbose and loud with a cold personality,[49] although an Edgefield friend's biography disagrees.[50] But if any of his charms were lacking, Lucy made up for them. The chattering Mary Boykin Chesnut, at her first meeting with Lucy, observed:

> Met the lovely Lucy Holcombe, now Mrs. Governor Pickens, last night at the Issac Haynes's. Old Pick had a better wig. I saw Miles begging in dumb show for three violets she had in her breastpin. She is silly and affected, looking for love into the eyes of the men at every glance.[51]

Mrs. Chestnut's writing suggests that Lucy was not intimate, but rather someone

on a pedestal to be sought after and observed. The feeling is apparent even in Edgefield stories in this era. Mrs. Chestnut confirms that Lucy was a "lovely and charming hostess" and some of their entertainments were embellished with Russian culture. After an 1862 party for wounded Wade Hamton, Mrs. Chestnut wrote:

> For us, they have never put the servants in Russian livery . . . but I must confess, the Russian tea and champagne always set before us left nothing to be desired.[52]

Both Mrs. Chestnut and the men of thier day recognized Lucy as clever. She drew on her study of history to defend an attack on herself and other ladies "lolling in their landaus": "Why not? General Washington attended the Assembly Balls and wanted everything done that could be done to amuse his soldiers and comfort and refresh them, and give them new strength for the fray."[53]

As the governor's wife, Mrs. Pickens was protected from hardships other southern women endured, enjoying bacon and hominy for breakfast, cornbread and milk and sasafras tea for supper.[54] In the records of the United Daughters of The Confederacy there are no references to her sewing cartridge bags or rolling bandages as others did. Enduring only the hardships of having no escort, she and other leaders' wives were attending concerts in Columbia.[55]

A woodcut in the February, 1861, **Harper's Weekly** depicts her reviewing the Holcombe Legion named in her honor. The soldiers loved her. Hers was the only woman's portrait selected to adorn the Confederacy currency, and when the hundred-dollar bills bearing her profile were no longer legal tender, they were put in gift decorations and distributed as souvenirs at a convention of veterans.[56]

The Pickenses retired to their 2,250-acre plantation,[57] "Edgewood," just north of Edgefield village in 1863 when Francis, fading in popularity, had decided not to seek another term. The plantation house had been built in 1832 as the home of Pickens' first youthful bride, a place "where ladies spoke French and danced candlelight polkas." There were great pantries, mahogany furniture and an English garden with mazes and statuary tucked away among its camellias and boxwoods. A wide vista through the avenue of cedars provided "a clear glimpse of horsemen or carriages as they turned away from the public road more than half-a-mile away (Center Springs Road). On festive occasions, red bonfires of fat pine guided the welcome guests through its dark length."[58]

The original house was moved to Aiken in the 1920s and enhanced with handsome woodwork and other changes, but the front porch, with its arched entablature over Roman columns, appears to be identical to the home as it stood in Edgefield. From the memory of the one who lived there, the description was of "far-flung proportions" and a front porch high above the ground, extending in full length of the house:

> The dining room and perhaps the other of the reception rooms were papered in rich, red paper, having in the dining room a wide plate rail where art objects and china were displayed . . . The library was separated from the large parlor by a carved archway, and French doors also led into a small, but very beautiful study panelled with blond and red mahogany. Opening from this study was the bedroom in which Gov. Pickens died.[59]

The library contained about a thousand volumes of books, from **Locke's Essays** to **Life of Jefferson**, from **Shakespeare's Works** to **Mrs. Browning's Poems** . The parlor furnishings included a piano, marble-topped tables, mirrors, two sofas, six chairs, the marble busts, chandeliers, a brass fender, portraits of the czar and a variety of porcelains, paintings, and candelabrum. Her jewelry was itemized in an impressive 55-item list.[60]

The Pickenses attended the Episcopal Church in the village where Lucy was confirmed on March 29, 1868. In Russia she had taken a great interest in the religious ceremonies; and her letters attest to her belief in God. Francis was a pillar of the church, serving as vestry chairman and paying the rector's salary during the impoverished years of the war and afterward. His death on January 25, 1869, was almost the death of the church.[61]

After Pickens' death Lucy converted Edgewood into the "most attractive home of Upper South Carolina. Her hospitality was widely known; visitors from far and wide sought the honor of her acquaintance."[62] At thirty-six her compelling eyes and attractive features were not dimmed by the black of her widow's attire. Her pictures illustrate her love of jewelry; her writing, and her pleasure at fine gowns from Paris, but she never appeared ostentatious.

Lucy was sad to know her widowed mother had to take in boarders in post-war years as she, herself, struggled to overcome the deprivation. Having lost all Pickens' property but Edgewood, in 1871 she made a trip with her step-son-in-law, Judge Bacon, to sell some jewelry in an effort to secure Edgewood and help her family.[63] In 1866 she had advanced her husband $13,900 from properties, presumably jewelry, sold in New York.[64] Legend says the czar sent a jewel each year, and these were sold to sustain the family; but this is likely, since by 1865 the czar was separated from his wife and in love with Catherine.

Douschka, calling her mother "Mamaska" in Russian tradition, was an independent spirit, by her own admission a natural flirt like her mother and very responsive to her mother's wishes. She is heralded as the "Joan of Arc" of local history, having led a band of Red Shirts to frighten blacks away from the polls, which assured the election of Wade Hampton and closed the chapter on South Carolina

Reconstruction. Lucy, while not active politically, surely applauded this election of a military hero she had entertained in her finest days.

Evidently the sale of jewels in England was successful because Edgewood remained in Lucy's possesion until her death, and in the fall of 1881 she gave a wedding for Douschka, who married Dr. George Dugas of Augusta, Georgia. Douschka later moved from Augusta back to Edgewood with their children and ran the farm. Her husband came on weekends.

Despite an earlier dread of having to contend with Pickens' kin and those of wives Number One and Number Two, Lucy felt enough compassion for his second wife, buried at the childhood home of his first wife, that she had servants move her to Pickens's side at Willowbrook.[65] Her cousin, Confederate Brigadier General Beverly Holcombe Robertson, lived with her for some time after the war, as did her brother, John T. H. Holcombe, and a Major Kirkland "who came for tea and stayed thirty years."

She continued to be active in causes she considered important. In 1866 she was appointed second Vice Regent of Mount Vernon's Ladies' Association for the state of South Carolina, although she did not become active until 1876. She served for many years as Chairman of the Garden and Greenhouse Committee.[66] She founded the Maxie Gregg Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy and in her last years organized a fund drive to place a monument to the Confederate dead in Edgefield's town square.

Lucy was sixty-one when she buried her daughter and found herself with two grand-daughters to raise. She was grief-striken by her loss. A biography of Pickens, published during Lucy's lifetime, describes her:

> The graceful and accomplished mistress who presided over all this lovely scene and whose smile was wont in happier days to light up as with magic the long galleries . . . still remains--chastened, and in her widow's weeds.[67]

On August 8, 1899, after being ill for several weeks, the "uncrowned queen of the Southern Confederate States" died at Edgewood of a blood clot. Lucy Pickens' obituary calls her "one of the most famous women of the South, and one whose name will live in history."[68] Yet, like a good romance, read and laid aside, she has been nearly forgotten, her life cut into the yellowed clippings scattered here and there in attics and library stacks. These remnants of her life are like a challenging jigsaw puzzle. When put together, they yield the true picture of Lucy Pickens. It is a picture of utter enchantment, embodying all the elements of the romantic myths of the Old South.

[1] Personal interview with Elizabeth Boatwright Coker, Ridge Spring, S.C., May 1981. Mrs. Coker spent a great deal of time in Edgefield listening to stories told by Mamie Tillman and others which included tales of Lucy Pickens. She borrowed from these for her book, **India Allen.**

[2] Jack Thorndike Greer, **Leaves From a Family Album (Holcombe and Greer)** (Tyler, Texas: n.p., 1975), p. 51. Her year of birth on this page is in error. See page xi.

[3] **Ibid.**, p. xt, p. 12, p. 1, p. 3.

[4] **Ibid.**, p. 18, p. 51, p. 24, p. 51.

[5] **Ibid.**, p. 15.

[6] **Ibid.**, pp.9-10.

[7] Edgefield County, S.C., Probate Judge's Office, Estate of Lucy H. Pickens, Box 127, Packet 5429. This includes a complete inventory of her estate at her death in 1899, including a list of silver items with a total value (silver was approxiamately $.45 per ounce then) of $2,360.50. In addition, at his death in 1869, Pickens had requested that $500 worth of flat siver be given to each of two daughters and a granddaughter. (His will is filed in Edgefield County, Box 97, Packet 3921.) Although slavery had been abolished, he left 132 slaves to his daughters and granddaughter. At her death Lucy also left fifty-five items or sets of jewelry valued at $2,360.50, the greatest of which were a pear-shaped diamond valued at $800 and diamond earrings valued at $750.

[8] Telephone interview with Jane Judge Greer, Tyler, Texas, July 12, 1981. She edited her late husband's book, **Leaves From a Family Album.**

[9] Greer, p. 25.

[10] Monroe Pickens, **Cousin Monroe's History of the Pickens Family.** (Easley, S.C.: Rev. ed. Kate Archer Day, 1951), pp. 62-67. A reference to the article by H.D. Allen, **The Nusmismatist**, No. 7 (July, 1918), says it was published in the **New York Herald**, Feb. 22, 1903.

[11] Telephone interview with Jane Judge Greer, Tyler, Texas, August 11, 1981, acknowledged that Quitman was a family friend.

[12] Anna Holcombe Smith, "Highlights On The Life Of Lucy P. Halcombe," unpublished manuscript in the possesion of Jane Judge Greer, Tyler, Texas.

[13] John K. Aull, **Augusta Herald**, second article.

[14] Greer, p. 25.

[15] David James Harkness, "Heroines of The Blue And Gray, A Civil War Centennial Program Manual", **The University of Tennesse Newsletter**, No. 4, (August, 1960), 7.

[16] John K. Aull, **Augusta Herald**, (no date) 1930, second of four articles in Sunday editions.

[17] Davis Ewen, **American Popular Songs From Revolutionary War To The Present** (New York : Random House, 1966), p 452.

[18] John Edmond Gonzales, "Flush Times, Depression, War and Comprimise," in **A History of Mississippi** (Hattiesburg, Miss.: University and College Press of Mississippi, 1973), p. 304.

[19] Richard B. Morris, ed., **Enclycopedia Of American History** (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 256.

[20] Lucy Pickens, **The Free Flag of Cuba: Or, The Martydom of Lopez. A Tale Of The Liberating Expedition Of 1851** (New York : Dewitt and Davenport, 1855). A portion of the book is at South Caroliniana Library, Columbia. It was given by her family which means it had been Lucy's copy.

[21] Kathleen Lewis Sloan, "South Carolina's Patriot Lady," **The State and The Columbia Record Magazine**, March 5, 1961.

[22] Greer Interview. July 12, 1981.

[23] Kathleen Lewis, "A Woman Called Lucy," **The State Magazine**, November 2, 1952.

[24] Greer, p. 52.

[25] **Ibid.**, p. 63.

[26] **Ibid.**, p. 64.

[27] **Ibid.**, p. 64.

[28] **Ibid.**, pp. 66-67.

[29] **Ibid.**, pp. 67-71.

[30] Edward Crankshaw, **The Shadow Of The Winter Palace** (New York: The Viking Press, 1976). p. 201.

[31] **Ibid.**, p. 77.

[32] **Ibid.**, p. 89.

[33] **Ibid.**, p. 78.

[34] **Ibid.**, p. 73.

[35] **Ibid.**, p 68.

[36] Greer, p. 79. The busts are on display at the South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S.C., and are listed as part of the living room accessories at the time of Lucy's death, Edgefield County Probate Judge's Records.

[37] **Ibid.**, p. 16.

[38] **Ibid.**, pp. 81-83.

[39] **Ibid.**, p. 75.

[40] **Ibid.**, p. 87.

[41] **Ibid.**, p. 77.

[42] **Ibid.**, p. 98.

[43] Pickens, **Cousin Monroe's History Of The Pickens Family.** p. 64.

[44] Greer, p. 81.

[45] **Ibid.**, p. 94.

[46] **Ibid.**, p. 85.

[47] Lucy Frances Dugas to Emily L. Bull, July 23, 1981. Lucy's visit to Marshall is also recorded in the **Southwestern Journal** (n.d.), noting that Mrs. Pickens was unchanged after her stay in Russia and citing her loveliness, "facinating manner" and "individuality of character".

[48] Sloan, "South Carolina's Patriot Lady."

[49] Edward J. Keel, "Francis Wilkenson Pickens, Governor Of South Carolina, 1860-1862," unpublished manuscript, South Caroliniana Library.

[50] General LeRoy F. Youmans, **Francis W. Pickens Of South Carolina** (Charleston, S.C.: The News Job Presss, n.d.), p. 19.

[51] Ben Ames Williams, ed., **Mary Boykin Chestnut, A Diary From Dixie** (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), p. 32.

[52] **Ibid.**, p. 257.

[53] **Ibid.**, p. 211.

[54] "In The Back Country Of South Carolina, 1862-64," **Carolina South**, a diary in South Caroliniana Library, Columbia.

[55] Williams, ed., Mary Boykin Chestnut, p. 233.

[56] H.D. Allen, "The Paper Money Of The Confederate States," **The Numismatist**,No. 7, (July 1918), 288-289.

[57] Map in possesion of Tom Greneker, Edgewood, Edgefield, S.C.

[58] Francis Butler Simkins, (Charleston) **News And Courier**, 1923.

[59] Sallie Simkins, description on file in Edgefield County Library. Mrs. Simkins was the housekeeper at Edgewood and mother of Francis Butler Simkins.

[60] Edgefield County, S.C., Probate Judge's Office, Estate of Lucy H. Pickens, Box 127, Packet 5429.

[61] Untitled journal of Trinity Episcopal Church, entries 1865-1869, Edgefield County Library, Edgefield, S.C.

[62] Simkins, (Charleston) **News And Courier**, 1923.

[63] Lucy Pickens to her sister, Anna Greer, August 8, 1881, in possesion of Jane Judge Greer, Tyler, Texas.

[64] Edgefield County Probate Box 97, Packet 3921, F. W. Pickens Will.

[65] Aull, **Augusta Herald**, first article.

[66] John H, Rodehamel, archivist, Mount Vernon, to Emily L. Bull, August 10, 1981.

[67] Youmans, p. 19.

[68] Belle Walsh, "Mrs. F. W. Pickens Dead," (Charleston) **News And Courier**, August 9, 1899.

# DID THE LADY OF COFITACHEQUI LIVE IN CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA?

**Charles W. Bright**

Only God and the Indians know how to pronounce correctly an Indian name recorded and pronounced in several different ways by the Spanish in 1540 and later translated into English. Inquiries made concerning correct pronunciation included a University of Georgia Anthropologist, a University of South Carolina Archeologist and a University of South Carolina Spanish Professor--none of whom agreed. The word was not included in any available dictionary.

Previous interest in this topic was renewed in the summer of 1980, when the magazine, **Early Man**, reported the discovery of a Spanish document from the 1560s never before translated. It contains clues about the location of the home town of The Lady of Cofitachequi.

There seems to be little doubt that De Soto met her in South Carolina--but where in South Carolina? Was it near Columbia, Camden, Aiken, historic Manchester in Sumter County, or just on a river? De Soto, a Spanish explorer, is famous because in 1541 he became the first white man to cross the Mississippi River. Born in Barcarota, Spain, he came to the New World when he was about nineteen. He accompanied Pizzaro in his conquest of Peru and acquired his share of plundered gold. While Governor of Cuba in 1538, he decided to explore Florida, which had been reported to be a land of gold and perhaps silver. Little did he know that the gold would turn out to be copper and the silver to be mica.

De Soto landed at Tampa Bay with about 600 men in May, 1539, and moved toward an Indian town called Appalache. It is worthwhile metioning that, by error, this Appalache is the source of the name of the Appalachian Mountains. Thereafter, De Soto crossed Georgia to the Savannah River and entered South Carolina, where he met an Indian ruler whom he called "The Lady of Cofitachequi". As De Soto looked accross the river, he saw four canoes approaching, one of which contained an Indian woman who gave him an appropriate greeting. This was a relative of the ruler of Cofitachequi who was prudent enough to remain on her side of the river while she made an estimate of the situation. Later, she crossed over to meet De Soto. She traveled in a large canoe which had an awning over the stern, a mat on the bottom and two large cushions. She was an attractive woman about thirty-five, brown of skin, well formed and appropriately clothed. Her house in Talimeco, the principal town, was large, high, broad and decorated with handsome mats. This was reported by Ranjel, De Soto's secretary, who spelled the word **Cofitachequi**.[1] It is similarly spelled in the majority of other sources.

The title of a female ruler of a number of Indian towns or villages or areas was

the Queen.[2] Don't be surprised that a woman was an Indian ruler. There is evidence that American Indian women had more rights than did European women of the same and later centuries. Among the Natchez women only the oldest male born of the sister of the nation's ruler could succeed him at his death--not the ruler's oldest son. Among the Iroquois descent was traced on the mother's side; a matriarch ruled each longhouse--a residence for 50 or more persons. When a couple married, it was the husband who moved; women owned the house, belongings and fields--to the extent that Indians believed in land ownership.[3]

The Southeastern Indian women sometimes played a man's role. Nancy Ward, an eighteenth century Cherokee woman, fought like a man in battle, and the men gave her the title of "war woman" or "beloved woman." She spoke in Cherokee councils and, in 1781, conducted negotiations with an invading American Army. Years before, Little Carpenter, her uncle, while on a visit to Charleston, found no women present among the representatives of the British Colonists. When Little Carpenter asked whether it was not true that "White men as well as Red were born of Women," he left the British stammering for an answer.[4]

We know that De Soto was in the midst of a group of Indians known as Mound Builders. The National Geographic Society reports:

> "Who were the Mound Builders? Survivors of sunken Atlantis, some said. Egyptians and Pheonicians wandering far from home, ventured others. The real story is just as intriguing, and it does concern sophisticated people. Not a mythical super race, but American Indians--ancestors of the Creeks, Cherokees, Natchez and others who first greeted the White Man."[5]

The Burial Mound Period started shortly after 100 B.C., when a new wave of people entered the lower Mississippi Valley from the west and spread north and east.[6] They merged with the Archaic Indians already in the area. Sometime around 800 A.D. the Burial Mound culture was displaced by a group of round-headed people from the southwest who practiced skull deformation. The bow and arrow replaced the spear, and the Temple Mound period started. This included a pattern of life called Mississippian, which had Middle American influences. A highly ritualistic religion, the Southern Cult arose sometime in the 14th century. Mulberry Plantation, Camden, South Carolina, is considered to have been one of its centers.[7]

In South Carolina the Indians along the lower Santee and Peedee Rivers were apparently round-headed and practiced skull-deformation similar to the Waxhaw Indians. There is no historical evidence of head-deformation among the Creeks or the Cherokees, but archeological evidence is that their ancestors followed the practice.[8] Available sources have made no mention of head-deformation among the

Cofitachequi Indians. However, since they have not been positively identified, nothing can be made of this one way or the other. There are good indications though that they belonged to the Peedee-Santee River Culture.

As early as 1521 the South Carolina Indians told Gordillo that they knew their land by the name "Chicora."[9] Chicora and Cofitachequi may have been Indian towns located in the vicinity of Columbia, Camden or historic Manchester. Cofitachequi also seems to have been an Indian Province or Confederacy. Pending the availability of new information, it is believed that the Cofitachequi Indians can be identified as Temple Moundbuilders, ruled by a Queen in the Province of Cofitachequi, in the Land of Chicora, located in the Piedmont and Atlantic Slope areas of South Carolina. This group of Indians was around for at least another 150 years as Dr. Henry Woodward, the mentor of early Charleston, made an alliance with their Emperor in 1671.

Various references describe the society in which the Lady of Cofitachequi lived. Charles Hudson states in his history of **The Southeastern Indians** that Cofitachequi was one of the most impressive Indian societies De Soto encountered. The Indians gave De Soto and his party gifts of "well tanned skins, 'blankets', strips of venison, dry wafers, and a large quantity of ' very good salt'." They were attired in "usual leggings and moccasins . . ." and wore "matchcoats made of 'sable'and' wildcat (probably cougar) skins." Hudson adds that the "Spaniards found beads, rosaries, and Biscayan axes" which were thought to have been transported inland from "Ayllon's ill-fated colony."[10]

Talimeco, the religious center of the society, Hudson indicates, is purported to have contained "five hundred houses built on a bluff overlooking a gorge of a river." Its main temple (100 feet long and 40 feet wide) was situated on a high mound. It had "a lofty roof covered with finely made cane mats . . . decorated inside and out with large conch shells and strings of freshwater pearls." Inside the large entrance doors were rows of large, life-like wooden statues--six pairs in all. "The first pair carried maces with diamond-shaped heads, reminiscent of the 'batons' depictd in Southeastern Ceremonial Complex motifs. The second pair held wooden 'broadswords'; the third, . . . clubs made of two parts connected with a swivel; the fourth, . . . 'battle axes'; the fifth, . . . bows and arrows; and the sixth, . . . pikes with copper spear points." Resting on low benches along the walls were " carved wooden chests containing the remains of dead notables." Also in the room were "breast-like corselets and headpeices made of raw-hide, round and oval-shaped shields, chests filled with pearls, and bundles of furs and skins." Eight small annexes surrounded the temple. In them were a variety of weapons and shields--many "decorated with strands of pearls, strips of colored leather, or with strips of copper."[11]

An article appearing in a 1969 edition of the **National Geographic Society** tends

to verify Hudson's account of De Soto's meeting with the Lady of Cofitachequi and makes reference to a museum at Etowah, Georgia wherein:

> A silhouette suggests a great temple such as might have topped the mounds at Etowah. De Soto had visited a similar structure . . . in the provence of Cofitachequi . . . 'Now this temple was large, being more than a hundred feet in length and forty in width' . . . In the mortuary temple . . . he saw wooden chests containing bodies, and a yard above each of them was a statue carved from wood and placed on a pedestal against the wall. This was a personal likeness of the man or woman within the chest and was made at the age he or she had attained at death. De Soto also met the lovely mistress, of the province of Cofitachequi. She presented him with a large strand of pearls as thick as hazelnuts which encircled her neck three times and fell to her thighs . . . De Soto bestowed upon her a Spanish ring of gold, set with a ruby."[12]

Pearls by the thousand are known to have been plucked from river mussels, drilled and used as clothing decorations or strung around the throat. There is evidence that diving may have been a respected occupation among the Mound Builders. The economic power and trade relations of inland Moundbuilding Indians should not be underestimated. Cahokia, along the Mississippi River, had conchshell beads from the Gulf of Mexico, rolled sheets of copper from Lake Superior and mica from North Carolina. Areas of dotted circles, where wooden poles may have been used for observations of the sun--perhaps in connection with a definition of a calendar year.[13]

Historians have never agreed on the location of Cofitachequi. Reports which seem to favor the Savannah River location include: D. D. Wallace, who said Cofitachequi was probably at Silver Bluff, Aiken County, South Carolina, thirteen miles from the present Augusta;[14] Henry Savage, who stated, that most say De Soto traveled along the Indian path from the coast to the mountains between Saluda and the Savannah;[15] and Herd, who seems absolutely convinced that Cofitachequi was at Silver Bluff.[16]

The site of Silver Bluff in Aiken County, South Carolina, may indicate that they were Creek Indians. One source, **Indians and Artifacts in the Southeast,** indicates that in the time of De Soto Cofitachequi seems to have been either Kasihta or Coweta, both Creek Indian towns.[17] Herd seems to support this position by saying that the Indian boy whom De Soto had used as a guide and interpreter in lower Georgia and Florida could speak the language of the Cofitachequi Indians.[18]

Reports which favor the Columbia, South Carolina, location include that of

Henry Savage, who remarked that others say the town of the Lady of Cofitachequi was on the Congaree where Columbia now stands, and from there De Soto marched up the Broad River to the mountains. Also in 1566 Pardo traveled the banks of the Congaree River, where in later years the Indian trading post known as The Congarees was located.[19] Bert W. Bierer cites two fellow historians who placed Cofitachequi in the Congarees in the vicinity of the old Indian trading area near Thom's Creek near Cayce, South Carolina.[20]

The site of Thom's Creek as the possible location of Cofitachequi may indicate that they were Congaree Indians. Bierer states that the Congaree Indians were located on the Congaree River, centered in the neighborhood of Columbia, South Carolina.[21] Stephen G. Baker said that Lawson, in 1701, found the Congarees located on the Wateree River at about the location of Cotachico on the Matthews map of 1685, near greater Camden. Lawson found no other Indians there. The Congarees are the most likely descendants of the Cofitachequi Indians of 1670. There is no evidence that they were all in the area known historically as The Congarees until well into the 18th century.[22]

Those who favor the Camden, South Carolina, location are Charles Hudson and associates at the University of Georgia. Hudson states that in November, 1566, Pardo left Santa Elena and traveled approximately 100 miles to Guiamae (De Soto's Aymay) and, a few miles farther, found Cofitachequi.[23] The Summer, 1980, edition of **Early Man** (an archeology magazine) refers to a previously unknown Pardo document discovered in the North Carolina Archives in the 1950s, now being translated at the University of Georgia. This document is an official report on journeys inland by Captain Juan Pardo, then a resident of Santa Elena, a Spanish town located at Paris Island, South Carolina, from 1566 to 1587--once the capital of Spanish Florida Territory. This ancient town is now being excavated by archeologists from the University of South Carolina. This report mentions the building of at least five inland forts, and locates Cofitachequi in the vicinity of Camden, South Carolina--considered to be the location of several Mississippian period (1000-1400 A.D.) sites.[24] Gascoyne's 1682 map of The Country Carolina shows Cofitachequi at the headquarters of the Santee River. The Stuarts of the National Geographic Society said;

> "We decided to visit the Indian Mounds on Mulberry Plantation . . . near Camden. The Wateree River over the years has eaten into the large mound until the place has dissolved. Pottery fragments found were from the 16th and 17th centuries. An engraved map from **Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley** printed in the 1840s shows ten mounds in the Camden Area surrounded by an earth enbankment."[25]

Bierer refers to "Maps of the Camden Area" which show Taylor's Mounds, "a circle of nine with a large one (12 to 15 feet high) in the center, to be surrounded by a low enbankment." There, Bierer, recalls arrowheads, axes, urns, marine shells and human bones have been found. Of the Mounds, he says:

> "Harrison's is the highest in position of any on the river, 480 feet in circumference at the base, 15 feet high and a level area of 120 feet in circumference at the surface. A mound near Mound Creek is the largest on the river--500 feet in circumference at the base, 225 feet in circumference at the surface, 34 feet high and slightly oblong. An urn with cover was discovered which holds 46 quarts. Contents include a number of large shell beads about the size and shape of nutmegs. An old Indian villiage is nearby. An Indian Trail is across the river."[26]

Any of these sizable mounds was large enough to accommodate the temple De Soto saw in 1540.

The area of Camden, South Carolina, as the possible location of Cofitachequi could indicate that its people were Wateree Indians. Their most historic location places them on the Wateree River below the present Camden, South Carolina. However, Douglas Brown's **The Catawba Indians** places them in the upper Yadkin area in Pardo's time--the 1560s.[27] This may be connected with a general movement inland about 1550--reversed about 100 or more years later. Baker indicates that no known documentary evidence places the Waterees near Camden in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.[28]

The available information about exactly which group of Indians lived in what specific area during the time of De Soto and Pardo is so incomplete that it is not now possible to identify positively the Indians of Cofitachequi. If agreement is ever reached on the exact location of Cofitachequi, it is possible that extensive excavation might positively identify them.

The University of South Carolina has partially excavated a mound located on Mulberry Plantation at Camden; so far no Spanish artifacts have been found. Did the Lady of Cofitachequi live in or near Camden? The issue is not settled. It is hoped that a book to be published--based on Captain Juan Pardo's rediscovered document--by Professor Charles Hudson and associates at the University of Georgia--will decide the issue once and for all. A reconstructed Indian Mound, such as the one at Etowah, Georgia, would be a boon to South Carolina. Professor Hudson wrote a letter dated August 4, 1981: "We do not believe that we have evidence that Cofitachequi was near Camden."[29]

In connection with Professor Hudson's statement, mention must be made of what is probably the most detailed study ever made concerning the location of Cofitachequi--350 pages, plus, by Steven Baker as a part of a Master's Degree requirement at the University of South Carolina. In part, Mr. Baker's study indicates: (1) Cofitachequi was at the confluence of the Wateree and Congaree Rivers. (2) This was where De Soto was taken across the river by the Lady of Cofitachequi. (3) De Soto visited the temple in the "Lady's" own town of Talimeco--one long league (5 miles) from where the army was located. (4) Talimeco, with an estimate 500 houses, was on an eminence overlooking a gorge of a river. The most likely location for this is on the high sand ridges overlooking the confluence of the Wateree-Congaree Rivers at the south end of the High Hills of the Santee. This would be in Sumter, near historic Manchester. (5) Lawson's description of the Santee Indians fits the historical description of the Cofitachequi Indians. Lawson located them near the area where De Soto crossed and where they had long lived. (6) The High Hills of Santee have had significant Indian occupations similar to those in the Camden area. (7) De Soto traveled up the East bank of the Wateree River to Ilapi which was 12 leagues (or 30 miles) above Cofitachequi. This would be near Camden. (8) Camden, alone, may have been the geographic focus of Cofitachequi in the late 17th century. And (9) a large chiefdom once centered Cofitachequi and extended from the coast to the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains and from the valley of the Savannah River to that of the Peedee River.[30]

It could be that Professor Hudson's findings will finally pinpoint Cofitachequi--possibly between Camden and the confluence of the Congaree-Wateree Rivers on the east side of the Wateree. Anyone trying to solve a problem like this should keep in mind a statement by James Mooney: "War, pestilence, whiskey and systematic slave hunts had nearly exterminated the aboriginal occupants of the Carolinas before anybody had thought them of sufficent importance to ask who they were, how they lived, or what were their beliefs and opinions."[31]

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[1] Don E. Herd, Jr., The South Carolina Upcountry (Greenwood, S.C.: The Attic Press, 1971), p. 7.

[2] Bert W. Bierer, **Indians and Artifacts in the Southeast** (Columbia, S.C.: The State Printing Company, 1979), p. 477.

[3] Wallace Chafe, David Damas and Vine Deloria, Jr., et al, **The World of the American Indian** (Washington: National Geographic Society, 1974), pp. 102-104.

[4] Charles Hudson, **The Southeastern Indians** (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), p. 269.

[5] "Mounds, Riddles from the Past," **The National Geographic Society** (Washington, December, 1972); p. 787.

[6] George E. Stuart and Gene Stuart, **Discovering Man's Past in the America's** (Washington: National Geographic Society, 1969), p. 135.

[7] Matthew W. Stirling, **Indians of the America's** (Washington: National Geographic Society, 1955), pp. 66-67.

[8] Charles Hudson, **The Catawba Nation** (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1970), pp. 16-27.

[9] Paul Quattlebaum, **The Land Called Chicora** (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956), p. 21.

[10] Hudson, **The Southeastern Indians**, p. 109.

[11] Hudson, **The Southeastern Indians**, p. 111.

[12] George E. Stuart and Gene Stuart, p. 140.

[13] George E. Stuart, **Clues to America's Past** (Washington: National Geographic Society, 1976), p. 68.

[14] D.D. Wallace, **South Carolina, A Short History, 1525-1947** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1951), p. 16.

[15] Henry Savage, Jr. **The Santee, River of the Carolinas** (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956), p. 36.

[16] Herd, p. 6.

[17] Bierer, **Indians and Artifacts in the Southeast**, p. 93, Section II.

[18] Herd, pp. 6-7.

[19] Savage, p. 136.

[20] Bert W. Bierer, **Discovering South Carolina**, p. 31.

[21] Bierer, **Indians and Artifacts in the Southeast**, p. 93, Section II.

[22] Steven G. Baker, "Cofitachequi: Fair Province of South Carolina," Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of South Carolina 1974, pp. 45-48.

[23] Hudson, **The Southeastern Indians**, p. 117.

[24] "Juan Pardos' Legacy to Modern Archeology," **Early Man Magazine**, (Summer, 1980), p. 22.

[25] George E. Stuart and Gene Stuart, p. 10.

[26] Bierer, **Discovering South Carolina**, pp. 41-45.

[27] Douglas Brown, **The Catawba Indians** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1966), p. 192.

[28] Baker, p. 48.

[29] Charles Hudson, Letter of August 4, 1981.

[30] Baker, Appendix V, pp. 16-17.

[31] Bierer, **Discovering South Carolina**, p. 7.

# THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KING AND BUREAUCRACY AT MARI

**Victor H. Matthews**

The process involved in the formation of a centralized government in ancient Mesopotamia, like that in late medieval Europe, was dependent upon the effective utilization of the royal bureaucracy. This specialized group of officials managed the wide-ranging affairs of the riverine civilizations of Babylonia and Assyria. While they were not as sophisticated as modern diplomats, they did face many of the same problems: touchy negotiations with neighboring kingdoms, trade agreements, military recruitment, and espionage.

The royal archives discovered at Mari in Northern Syria (dating to c. 1800 B.C.) demonstrate just how important a well-run bureaucracy could be to the monarch.[1] A king who could command the loyalty of his provincial officials and depend on them to handle local matters with dispatch would sit more securely on his throne. Clearly, a symbiotic relationship existed between these two integral parts of government.

A great deal can be told about a government and its workings by examining the political situation faced by the monarchs. The basic political structure of the Mari region can best be described as feudal. There were a number of small kingdoms, loosely allied to each other.[2] Each kingdom in turn had vassal states which served them in a constant series of petty wars. An assessment of this situation is provided in a letter to the king of Mari, Zinri-Lim:

> There is no king who, of himself, is the strongest. Ten or fifteen kings follow Hammurabi of Babylon, the same number follow, Rim-Sin of Larsa, the same number follow Ibal-pi-El of Esnunn, the same number follow Amut-pi-il of Qatanum, twenty kings follow Yarim-Lim of Yamhad.[3]

Within this precarious balance of power the Mari kings had to strive to maintain their position--shifting alliances back and forth, arranging diplomtic marriages, and keeping order within their own territory. The kingdom also had to weather changes in the ruling dynasty three times in sixty years.[4]

The kings of Mari maintained a high visibility, traveling regularly throughout the kingdom.[5] They constantly sent and received reports from governors, military personnel, and fellow rulers.[6] The region which they claimed as their domain contained a mixed population of urban dwellers and pastoral nomadic tribes. Collectively, they formed what has been described as a dimorphic society (i.e., one in which there is the double process of interaction between nomad and sedentary and between tribe and state).[7]

Administering such a diverse region necessitated the use of a variety of groups and officials. For example, the royal family was often put into positions of authority. The Assyrian king, Samsi-Addu, used his two sons to help govern his kingdom. Each ruled territory as governors for their father, probably as a means of gaining experience for when they would succeed him. The younger son, Yasmah-Addu, served as a regent in Mari. However, his performance was not always up to his father's expectations, and in several letters we find harsh reprimands and demands that he shape up his administration.[8]

Zimri-Lim, the Amorite king who reclaimed Mari from the Assyrians, also engaged in royal nepotism. His many wives and daughters served as advisors[9] and proxies at sacrifices as well as managers of the royal household while he was away from Mari.[10] His chief wife, Sibtu, appears to have held particularly important supervisory status in both mundane as well as cultic tasks.[11] In ARM X 128 she escorts the sacred image of the god Hisametum to the city of Hisamta for a seasonal fesitval and sacrifice.

Additional evidence of her importance is shown in the fact that so many of her husband's officials and allies apparently found it necessary to send her progress reports on their work in additon to the usual courtesy notices. One example of this is found in **ARM X** 157 in which Hali-hadun, a provincial governor presently engaged in a diplomatic mission, outlines his negotiations for the queen. He assures her that progress is being made and makes it clear that it is his efforts which are the primary reason for the establishment of "good relations"[12] between two tribal groups and a troublesome ally named Qarni-Lim. Undoubtedly, Hali-hadun hoped to influence the queen as a means to future advancement within the government.[13]

Most of the details of government on the local level were handled by an assortment of career officials like Hali-hadun. The kingdom was divided into territorial units called **halsum** or **matum**.[14] The governors of each province varied in authority and responsibility according to a complex formula based on proximity to the capitol, make up of the population,[15] strategic position, and economic importance.[16]

The kings of Mari knew the importance of maintaining continuity and loyalty within this bureaucratic structure. In a letter to Yasmah-Addu (**ARM I** 61: 27-33), Samsi-Addu strongly urges his son to quickly replace a household official who had died:

> If a bureaucrat does not give orders for a few days, would the position not be neglected? Why did you not appoint on that very same day someone to that position?[17]

Zimri-Lim shows how much the loyalty of his administrators meant to him in an apologetic letter to a woman named Malik-Akka. He tells her that he has had to

delay sending her a servant[18] because every war captive taken in campaigns since his return to power has had to be given to his bureaucrats.

The primary function of the district governor was to keep order and keep the king informed of even the smallest detail. A typical message of this type is found in **ARM** XIV 36, a letter from the governor of Sagarattum, Yaqqim-Addu:

> To Sunuhhurahalu, speak! Thus says Yaqqim-Addu, your friend. (5) On the day which I have had this tablet sent to you, the asses of the messenger of the Yamhadians arrived at Dur-Yahdun-Lim. (10) Zu-Hatni ( . . . ). Tommorrow they will receive their feeding. I had not written to (15) Habdu-Malik concerning this announcement. On another matter 30 truffles have been collected and I have requisitioned them as supplies for the king. I have had nine truffles sent as your portion. (20) This is only a small number, but I have not taken advantage of you.

A variety of items are detailed here. Probably the messenger of the Yamhadians is mentioned first because the king must be constantly aware of the movements of foreign nationals.[19] The governor is careful to note his solicitousness in caring for the animals of this messenger, since diplomatic gaffes must always be avoided. Yaqqim-Addu also demonstrates his wisdom by noting that he has passed on this information to both the king and to a fellow provincial official, Habdu-Malik.[20]

A post scriptum is added in the letter concerning the sending of truffles for the king's table. An exact count is given and careful attention is exercised to show that one third of them have been reckoned as the share of the bureaucrat addressed in the text. This man, Sunuhhurahalu, was a very powerful palace official. He apparently served as the "personal secretary"[21] of the king and thus was in a position to aid his friends.[22] As a matter of discretion, it is unlikely that the bribe and gratuity in question would have been mentioned when the letter was read to the king.

These communications often contain self-serving statements as well as criticisms of fellow administrators. Thus in **ARM** V 65, Asqudum, a palace official who served both the Assyrians and Zimri-Lim, reports on various activitites to Yasmah-Addu.[23] The organization of the letter shows his intent. First, he points out the failure of a fellow, perhaps rival, official named Zunan to conduct extispicies. Then, in great detail, he describes his own dutiful performance of this important function. Finally, he attempts to further ingratiate himself by passing on the news of a particularly favorable extispicy:

> The left side of the "finger" (of the liver) was split, the middle "finger" of the lungs was bent toward the right: a

sign predicting fame. Rejoice my lord![24]

The Mari bureaucracy, of course, did more than seek ways to undermine each other. There is ample evidence in the archive to demonstrate their real worth to the monarchy. Each official had everyday tasks which required his attention. Here are selections from a few letters describing typical matters to be tended to:

> I have gathered working men of the district and the men of Terqa for labor on the canal of Mari. (**ARM** III 6: 5-7)

> I have inspected the Haneans of the encampment and I have assigned 2,000 men who are going on the campaign with Yasmah-Addu. (**ARM** VI 42: 5-6)

> I have visited the dam, and all is well. The upper sluice gate of stone that you made is letting water through. (**ARM** VI 1: 10-14)[25]

> I have not been negligent in gathering into Terqa the rent-grain of my district and the grain from (the fields of) the palace. (**ARM** III 17: 27-31)

Such diligence is admirable. However, it is the extraordinary bits of service which demonstrate the administrator's true loyalty and concern for his monarch. A good example of this type of service is found in a letter from Yasim-Sumu, one of a group of factotum officials, to the king's personal secretary, Sunuhhrahalu.[26] The subject is the proposed year-date.

Apparently, a memo had been sent to all provincial officials that the current year would be named in honor of the king's dedication of a throne to the god Dagan. Yasim-Sumu tactfully points out that the throne has not yet been presented and he suggests an alternative year-name: "The year in which Zimri-Lin went to the aid of Babylonia, (and) for a second time (marches) against the country of Larsa." His aim seems to be to save the king some official embarrassment as well as to appear the dutiful servant.

In another case (**ARM** III 8), the governor of Terqa, Kibri-Dagan, attempts in a diplomatic way to refuse an order from the king when he feels it is ill-timed and could hurt productivity in his area:

> My lord has sent me an order to go to Mari to appear before the junior **ugbabtum** priestess.[27] I have to direct work here and the field on which I am directing work is in actual danger; in fact, the (situation at the) field is difficult and

> troublesome. If I stay here myself right now I can certainly keep the entire crew together, but once I have dropped the work and have left, the crew will disperse, the well be abandoned, and the country of my lord will be in dire need of irrigation water.
>
> May my lord go without any worry and kiss the feet of the god Dagan who loves him, while I get the work done here. I just cannot posibly leave.[28]

Since it was impossible for the king to know everything that was going on in the various sections of his realm, it is probable that he was unaware of Kibri-Dagan's predicament. Zimri-Lim's well-known piety toward the god Dagan could have also led him to assume that his governor would drop whatever he was doing to consult the priestess.[29]

Such simple, blind obedience to orders might seem desirabe to the king at first glance. However, it is the bureaucrat who can think on his own that is truly a useful servant. Kibri-Dagan did not refuse his lord. Instead, he presented a reasonable argument for why he should delay his departure for Mari. He cited commonly understood labor difficulties, probable dire consequences of delay in completing his present task and the obvious need for his presence to insure success on this project.[30] The king might have found fault with his devotion to the gods, but certainly not in his attention to the kingdom's economic welfare.[31]

In addition to the urban-based administrative responsibilities, the provincial governors and the officials who served them also had to deal with the activities of several large, semi-nomadic tribal groups. The Mari dynasts managed to subdue the autonomous tribal chiefs through open warfare and a "divide and conquer" stratagem.[32] This latter tactic was implemented by ignoring "the Jaminite kings and dealing directly with the **sugagum** chiefs."[33]

The use by the central government of local tribe leaders like the **sugagu** was beneficial to both parties. These leaders served as a conduit between the tribe and the state.[34] The special status given them by the government provided them with even greater influence over their individual tribal groups than might otherwise have been the case. Their elevation to positions of responsibility also aided the government's attempts to drive a wedge between the tribe and the traditional tribal elite. Thus, the tribal chiefs could form a controllable link which would allow for communication and resolution of differences in a manner easier than if the tribes retained complete autonomy.[35]

The government official who had the greatest degree of responsibility and interaction with tribal activites as they affected the policies of the state was the

**merhum.**[36] In terms of the authority structure in the provinces, this official would direct the efforts of the **sugagu** as well as other governement servants. One text which illustrates some of the duties of the **merhum** is **ARM** XIV 86: 17-27:

> . . . The men (sagbu) whom Ibal-pi-El, the **merhum,** has appointed as guards over the pasturage encampment of my lord, saw the Uprapeans driving away their flocks.[37] This information, I (Yaqqim-Addu) heard from my retainers, and I have written to my lord. Also I have sent the men of the **bazahatum** for a distance of two double miles to block (the Uprapeans') passage.[38]

From this report it can be surmised that the **merhum** held prime responsibility for the happenings in his section of the pastureland **(nawum).**[39] He could delegate some of his authority to various levels of the district's police forces, thereby keeping illegal activity to a minimum. He also was under the surveillance and possibly the supervision of the provincial governor.[40]

In the Mari kingdom there was a well defined governmental chain of command drawn from the **merhum,** or provincial governor, through the **sugagu** and down to the individual tribal member.[41] This channeling of instructions and the resulting mediation of conflicts through an administrative hierarchy allowed vested interests and varied social units to become more equalized. Additionally, the buffer, which the mediator-official provided, eliminated many of the clashes between tribe and state which would otherwise have occured because of differing social traditions and practices.[42]

The Mari texts document the various capacities of service performed by the **sugagum.** These include bureacratic, judicial, and military roles. His responsibilities also covered the recruitment from the tribal groups of men to engage in various work projects and for service in the military.[43] This authority and heightened status also carried with them a price. The **sugagum** must have often felt pressured by the need to perform his duties quickly and efficiently. In addition, personal ties to the family and tribe might at times have necessitated making hard decisions. In one instance, **ARM**XIV 46: 6-10, Yaqqim-Addu describes a **sugagum** who chose to relinquish his office:

> . . . Ahamnuta spoke to me in this manner: "This office of **sugagum** of Dur-Yahdun-Lim I cannot exercise, (thus) I have resigned. (Therefore) one (who has the right to be named) should be named."

Such a decision, while rare in the texts,[44] is understandable considering the language contained in several letters from the provincial governors to the **sugagu:**

> Whoever among you who does not seize any man from your villages who leaves for the Upper Country and does not bring him to me, most assuredly, you shall not (be allowed to) live! (**ARM** II 92: 14-18).

> Heaven forbid that the **sugagu** will (attempt to) make the excuse that, "The Haneans are scattered from the villages (with) not one among the Haneans (still) existing in the district." (**ARM** XIV 80: 16-20).

The system of administration that ruled the Mari region was complex and not always as efficient as its monarchs desired. Due to the fact that there existed several levels of authority and numerous management units, it is not surprising to find that corruption and mistakes did occur. However, even in a case where a crime, such as embezzlement, had taken place, the government was usually willing to settle for a lesser punishment rather than lose the services of a trained administrator.[45] Thus, Idin-Sin, who had apparently been caught red-handed, was told if he would repay double the amount of silver missing, he could have his position back.[46]

Leniency in this case may seem unusual, but a slap on the wrist meant continuity of administration, and his dismissal would have necessitated training a replacement. The evidence seems to indicate that Mari was hard-pressed to maintain a sufficient number of officials who had both the ability to carry out orders and to read and write.[47]

In the face of what must have seemed at times an impossible task, some officials did try to police areas outside their juridiction and thereby cut through the layers of red tape. In one instance Bahdi-Lim wrote directly to the king in hope of breaking a supply deadlock (**ARM** VI 39):

> I checked on the members of the (royal) household; of 400 members only 100 men are provided with garments while 300 are without garments. I questioned Bali-Erah and Mukannisum on account of the men without garments, and Mukannisum answered me as follows: "This is not my duty, Bali-Erah has to give them garments." And, Bali-Erah answered me as follows: "I provided garments for 100, the balance Mukannism has to provide with garments."[48] This is what they answered me.
>
> It so happens that Sidqi-epuh is now in the presence of my lord.[49] My lord should instruct Sidqi-epuh (what to do) and he should give me the necessary orders to provide the members of the household with garments.[50]

Perhaps a text like this is the best way to sum up a discussion of the symbiotic relationship between the king and his officials. Here two supply personnel have become obsessed with the importance of their position and are thus playing the age-old game of "pass the buck" to avoid taking responsibility for an obvious mistake. However, this all too familiar situation does have a solution: A higher ranking supervisor recognizes what has happened and takes the initiative to end the problem by going to the center of authority, the king.

Note that Bahdi-Lim does not take any action on his own. He merely presents the facts of the problem and the testimony of those officials involved. He then suggests a possible course of action (i.e., the introduction of a neutral, high ranking party, who can mediate between them). This suggestion leaves the decision and the solution up to the king's judgement. The fact that Bahdi-Lim felt he could do this demonstrates the effectiveness and general healthiness of communication in the Mari bureaucratic structure.

It is this type of collective activity, reaching from one level to the next, which shows the useful symbiotic arrangement which made the Mari kingdom prosperous and relatively stable in the 18th centuy B.C. The complexities of administration required varied talents and dispositions. By maintaining an efficient bureaucratic structure, the kings of Mari retained their autonomy for sixty years until the ambitions and armies of Hammurabi of Babylon absorbed them c. 1758 B.C.

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[1] Mari, Tell Hariri, is located on the right bank of the Euphrates River in northern Syria, 25 kilometers north of the Iraqi border.

[2] J. M. Munn-Rankin, "Diplomacy in Western Asia in the Early Second Millenium B.C.," **Iraq** 18 (1956), 74.

[3] G. Dossin, "Les archives epistolaires du palais de Mari," **Syria** 19 (1938), 117-118.

[4] See Munn-Rankin for a more complete discussion of the changes in rulership at Mari. J. Sasson, "Biographical Notices on Some Royal Ladies from Mari," **Journal of Cuneiform Studies**, 25 (1973), 62, in citing **ARM** II 119:10', points out the realignment of alliances as rulers change.

[5] M. Anbar, "La region au sud du district de Mari," **Israel Oriental Studies**, 5 (1975), 1-17, describes the geopolitical nature of the realm and points out itinerary routes. **ARM** XIV 55: 19-23 provides a good example of the advance work that went into a royal visit.

[6] J. Sasson, "Some Comments on Archive Keeping at Mari," **Iraq**, 34 (1972), 55-67, documents the complexities of the archives created to handle royal correspondence.

[7] M. B. Rowton, "Enclosed Nomadism," **Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient**, 17 (1974), 1-30 nad "Dimorphic Structure and the Tribal Elite," **Studia Instituti Anthropos**, 28 (1976), 219-257.

[8] In **ARM** I 61 and 73 he charges his son with immaturity and in **ARM** IV 11: 21-23 compares him unfavorably with his brother, Isme-Dagan.

[9] A. Malamat, "The Correspondence of Sibtu, Queen of Mari," **Orientalia**, 40 (1971), 81 describes the activites of this chief wife of Zimri-Lin and complete confidence which he placed her.

[10] B. F. Batto, **Studies on Women at Mari** (Baltimore: 1974), pp. 10-13, cites several texts from **ARM** X detailing Sibtu's duties in maintaining the harem and supervising the workers in the textile workshops.

[11] **Ibid.**, p. 18. Batto points out that Sibtus cultic activities are analogous to those performed by provincial governors like Kibri-Dagan in **ARM** XIII 111.

[12] Malamat, p. 81, discusses this text in detail.

[13] Batto, pp. 15-16, make it clear from other texts (**ARM** X 152, 155, 158) that the good will of the queen was desirable for ambitious bureaucrats. ARM XIV 81: 1-16 shows how a falling out with a queen cost Yaqqim-Addu, governor of Sagaratum, a land grant. On this see J. D. Safren, "New Evidence for the Title of the Provincial Governor at Mari," **Hebrew Union College Annual**, 50 (1979), 5-8.

[14] A. Marzal, "The Provincial Governor at Mari: His Title and Appointment," **Journal of Near Eastern Studies**, 30 (1971), 187.

[15] One official title, **madarum**, seems to be outside the normal bureaucratic order. It was applied to "vassal rulers of small city states." Rowton, "Dimphoric Strucutre and the Tribal Elite," p. 245, n. 104.

[16] Marzal, "The Provincial Governor," p. 197, states that the title **merhum**, when applied to certain governors, gave then a higher status than those named as **sapitum**. Safren, pp. 10-11, citing **ARM** XIV 98:11, disputes this distinction of authority. See also J. Sasson, "Treatment of Criminals at Mari," **JESHO**, 20 (1977), 102, n. 29.

[17] Sasson, "Archive Keeping," p. 63.

[18] Batto, **Women**, pp. 111-112, discusses this text, **ARM** X 140.

[19] A. L. Oppenheim, "The Archives of the Palace of Mari, II," **JNES**, 13 (1954), 147, details the protocol involving in describing the arriving groups.

[20] M. Birot, **Archives royales de Mari, XI: Textes administratifs de la salle 5 du palais** (Paris: 1960), p. 253, for mention of this official. Another example of information sharing is found in Marzal, "The Provincial Governor," p. 199.

[21] Sasson, "Archive Keeping," p. 57.

[22] **ARM** X 79: 5-14 contains a plea by one of Zimri-Lin's daughters to this man. She asks him to intercede for her with her father in order to escape a dull existence in the provinces.

[23] G. Dossin, **Archives royales de Mari, V: Correspondence de Yasmah-Addu**. (Paris: 1952), p. 137, cites **ARM** II 96-99 to show this official's double service.

[24] See A. L. Oppenheim, **Letters from Mesopotamia**, (Chicago: 1967), pp. 99-100.

[25] Oppenheim, "Archives II," pp. 146-147, dicusses the construction and properties of these irrigation channels.

[26] J. Bottero, M. Birot, M.L. Burke, J.R. Kupper, and A. Finet, **Archives royales de Mari, XIII: Textes divers**, (Paris: 1964), p. 47.

[27] Batto, **Woman**, pp. 79-88, explains the cultic importance of the **ugbatum** priestess. Possibly Kibri-Dagan was summoned to see her to discuss the rebuilding of her house (**ARM** III 84:10, 20ff.)--a duty Zimri-Lin's piety would have made a high priority.

[28] Oppenheim, **Letters**, p. 104.

[29] Batto, **Women**, p. 89, n. 10, lists many examples of his devotion, including the building of temples and the attention to regular sacrifices. See my discussion of the importance of religion to rulership in "Government Involvement in the Religion of the Mari Kingdom," **Revue d'Assyriologie**, 72 (1978), 129-133.

[30] **ARMT** XIII 39, **ARM** XIV 48 and 80 for discussion of similar attempts by officials to insure efficient usage of agriculture equipment and labor personnel.

[31] **ARM** XIV 54. Sasson, "Criminals," p. 100, n. 24, points out another official who does carry out his king's orders without question, but who does supply the king with additional evidence bearing on the case under investigation.

[32] G. Dossin, "L'inscription de foundation de Yahdun-Lim, roi de Mari," **Syria**, 32 (1955), 1-28.

[33] Rowton, "Dimphoric Structure and the Tribal Elite," p. 248.

[34] See my discussion of this official in **Pastoral Nomadism in the Mari Kningdom, 1830-1760 B.C.** (Cambridge, Mass.: American Schools of Oriental Research Dissertation Series, 3, 1978), 139-146. The most recent study on this topic is P. Talon, "La taxe, **sugagutum** a Mari," **RA**, 73 (1979), 143-151.

[35] F. Barth, **A Tribe of the Kamseh Confederacy: The Basseri Nomads of South Persia**, (Oslo: 1961), p. 77, points up similar arrangements made with modern tribal groups.

[36] G. Dossin, "Le **madarum** dans les 'Archives royales de Mari,' " **Recontre assyriologique internationale**, 18 (1972), 56, and Rowton, "Dimphoric Structure and the Tribal Elite," p. 245.

[37] M. Anbar, "Les **sakbu** et les **bazahatum** a Mari--une mise au point," **Ugarit Forschugen**, 7 (1975), 592, uses this text as an argument for differentiating the groups within the state police force.

[38] J. MacDonald, "The Identification of the **Bazahatum** in the Mari Letters," **RA**, 69 (1975), 145, describes these men as a "sort of state secret police," who were moved about according to royal command as need required.

[39] For discussion of this term, see A. Malamat, "Mari and the Bible," **Journal of the American Oriental Society**, 82 (1962), 146, J.T. Luke, "Pastoralism and Politics in the Mari Period," Dissertation , p. 100, n. 107, and D.O. Edzard, "Altbabylonisch **nawum**," **Zeitschrift fur Assyriologie**, 53 (1959), 168-173.

[40] I agree with Sasson, "Criminals," p. 102, n. 29, that Marzal, "The Provincial Governor," p. 202, is wrong in saying the **merhum** is a higher grade official than the **sapitum**. It seems clear that Yaqqim-Addu is Ibal-pi-El's superior here.

[41] W.G. Irons, "Variation in Political Stratification Among the Yomut Turkmen," **Anthropological Quarterly**, 44 (1971), 151, describes an analogous arrangement in which the Iranian government appointed an official from the sedentary population called a **sarkardeh**. He then dealt with the tribal chiefs, known as **saqlau**, as needed.

[42] A.S. Gilbert, "Modern Nomads and Prehistoric Pastoralists: the Limits of Analogy," **Journal of the Ancient Near Eastern Society of Columbia University**, 7 (1975), 68-69.

[43] Rowton, "Dimphoric Structure and the Tribal Elite," pp. 244-245.

[44] **ARM** I 119 and V 24 report the position of **sugagum** changing hands only on the death of the previous officeholder.

[45] G. Dossin, "Archives de Sumu-Iamam, Roi de Mari," **RA**, 64 (1970), 41, A. 12. See also **ARM** X 90 which also mentions this case.

[46] Sasson, "Archive Keeping," p. 62.

[47] **Ibid.**, p. 63, describes an incident in **Arm** X 82 in which eight officials were sent to the archive to retrieve a tablet. He suggest that so many were needed because of rampant illiteracy in the Mari bureaucracy.

[48] **ARMT** XIII 1:xiv:65 mentions Mukannisum as in charge of female weavers and thus might be expected to be able to supply the needed garments.

[49] Cf. **ARM** X 160 and B.F. Batto, **Women**, 32, n. 41, for this high ranking official.

[50] Oppenheim, **Letters**, p. 107.

# OLYMPIAS, WOULD-BE RULER

**Elizabeth Carney**

Scholarship has long neglected Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great and best known of the wives of Philip II of Macedonia. Despite the recent boom in studies of the reigns of her husband and son, no consistent evaluation of her policies and political aims has ever been attempted, and Grace Macurdy's brief and occasionally sensitive biographical essay is now dated.[1]

The scholarly neglect is not accidental. The extraordinary hostility of virtually all extant sources to Olympias makes analysis of her career difficult. It is traditional to blame this hostility on an ancient smear campaign waged by Cassander, Olympias' final enemy and the man responsible for her death. Other, less recognized factors are at work as well. As Macurdy realized,[2] our sources tend to react more negatively to violence and murder engineered by Olympias than they do to similar acts of mayhem or murder committed by her husband or son. In addition, ancient sources blame Olympias rather than Alexander for reprehensible actions which cannot plausibly be supposed to have been committed without, at the least, her son's acquiescence. Olympias makes a more acceptable "heavy" than Alexander.

Too often, after at best a cursory recognition of the bias of our sources, modern scholarship has then proceeded to accept them fairly uncritically.[3] Similarly, scholarship has mirrored the obssession of the ancient sources with the colorful personality of Olympias and failed to ask important questions. Olympias has, oddly, become a stock figure of melodrama, somehow laughable in a gruesome sort of way, certainly not a political figure to be taken seriously.

Olympias' career was a kind of watershed. Before her, royal Macedonian women were virtually invisible; while after her, in the Hellenistic period, queens appear as powerful political figures, co-rulers, and regents. Although Macurdy was the first to notice this,[4] she attributed the difference to Olympias' powerful personality. But Olympias' personal drive was not the only reason for the expanding role of royal Macedonian women. Macedonian kingship, rapidly changing under Philip and Alexander, had much to do with this change too.

I shall begin my analysis of Olympias' political career by considering the public position of the women of the royal family of Macedonia. Although Greek writers may call Olympias **Basilissa** (queen), she appears in inscriptions with no title, as "Olympias," much as do Macedonian kings.[5] The only indication of any quasi-official role for royal Macedonian women is the tendency for many royal brides to change their names upon marriage; Olympias herself seems to have done so. In many cases, though not that of Olympias, the name appears to have dynastic significance.[6] Aside from this mere hint at a public role, the women of the royal family appear in our sources only in terms of their marriages and occasional references to domestic tasks.[7]

We know that Philip and Alexander practiced polygamy, and probably so did earlier kings. But was there a chief wife, an official consort? Although many scholars have argued that only some of the seven women connected to Philip whom Satyrus (ap. Ath. 557b-d) mentions were wives, and others merely concubines, and that he had only one chief wife at a time, neither Satyrus himself nor other evidences supports such an arguement.[9] Yet this conclusion need not mean that all seven women had equal importance in Philip's eyes or at court, but only that their legal situation did not determine their status. (Misunderstanding has arisen because Greek sources expected monogamy and imposed that expectation on their reading of Macedonain court life.)[10] Giallombardo has argued persuasively that the appropriate model for Macedonain marriage is archaic, and thus polygamous;[11] in this, as in so many other ways, Macedonia was backward, at least by Greek standards. In such a marriage, the amount of time (honor, public recognition) determined a wife's status, and in this determination the major concern was fertility and the production of male heirs, although the social and political standing of the woman's family may have also have signified.[12]

Olympias brought to this nebulous position of royal wife a powerful personality. She was devoted to several cults, but especially that of Dionysus (Plu. **Alex**, 2; Athen. 13.560, 14.659), as her son would be. Disallowing the most obviously hostile remarks of the sources, it seems fair to say that Olympias was an unusually determined person, vengeful, ruthless, devoted to her son's success, a better dynast then politician. It is not an accident that his list of characteristics would suit her son as well as herself. Olympias did not, however, have Alexander's arena.[13]

Her public career begins when she, a daughter of the king of the Molossians, was married to Philip in 357. The marriage was clearly a political alliance arranged by Philip and Olympias' uncle, then king of the Molossians (her father had died), and intended to tie these two nothern semi-Hellenic kingdoms together, primarily against the Illyrian menace.[14] The marriage was Philip's first move toward turning the Molossian kingdom into a puppet state.

Alexander was born about a year after the marriage. Since Philip's only other son Arrhidaeus was mentally defective, Alexander must have begun to be treated as heir quite early, and Olympias as the mother of the heir. While it is doubtless true that Olympias' status and importance at court was exaggerated by later writers who assumed she was Philip's only legitimate wife and whose views were colored by the later career of her son,[15] Olympias, as mother of the heir, probably was in a rough sort of way the most important of Philip's many women. Her status may have varied from one period to another as she jockeyed for postion with the other wives, but the growing importance of her son was a constant.

There is no evidence to support any conclusion that Olympias had political influence with her husband. Philip removed her brother Alexander from Arybbas'

control and later placed her brother on the Molossian throne, having driven Arybbas out. It is often assumed that Philip's sponsorship of Olympias' brother was through her efforts,[16] but such a supposition reverses Philip's priorities: Philip married Olympias because he was interested in Molossia, not the reverse.

On the other hand, she may well have exercised considerable influence in the matter of her son's education. Certainly his early tutors were chosen from her friends and relatives; perhaps she herself chose them. Scholars tend to picture her as an overindulgent mother, but Alexander's tough northern tutors were not generally indulgent.[17] No evidence supports the suggestion that Philip sent Alexander off to study at Mieza in order to remove him from the influence of his mother.[18] Such an assumption arises from reading later events back into the years before 337.

Similarly, some have assumed that relations between Olympias and Philip deteriorated over years,[19]but little evidence supports this conclusion. There is only a passage in Plutarch (Alex. $^{9}$.3) which speaks of the troubles of Philip's womens' quarters and says that Olympias made these worse, thanks to her ill temper, by urging on a disagreement between father and son. Since this remark is followed by Plutarch's account of the marriage to Cleopatra, there is no reason to assume any great passage of time, even if he is correct. Until after the battle of Chaeronia Alexander was clearly Philip's heir and Olympias enjoyed the prestige of being mother of the heir.

Then Philip, busy with preparations for the joint Graeco-Macedonian invasion of the Persian Empire, took his last wife Cleopatra, a Macedonian aristocrat.[20] This marriage was different. It is clear that both Alexander and Olympias felt threatened, but it is not clear why they felt threatened. According to Plutarch (**Alex.** 9.4-5) and Satyrus (**ap.** Athen. 12.577d-e), at the wedding feast Cleopatra's guardian insulted Alexander by implying that he was not Philip's legitimate heir and by suggesting that Cleopatra would provide such. Alexander and Olympias then left Macedonia together.[21] We know that Alexander was, at least officially, reconciled to his father and that he returned to Macedonia, but we do not know whether Olympias returned before Philip's death.[22] Olympias spent her time in exile with her brother in Molossia and according to Justin (9.7.7) she tried to get her brother to invade Macedonia to punish Philip.

Many have seen Philip's next move, the marriage of his daughter by Olympias, Cleopatra, to Olympias' brother, as an attempt to re-establish the alliance, or at least smooth over troubles.[23] At the public festivities celebrating this marriage Philip was struck down by one of his own bodyguards, Pausanias. Pausanias did have a personal grievance against Philip, but many ancient and modern writers have assumed that he was only a tool, and that behind him were more important figures, possibly Olympias, or Olympias and Alexander.[24] Certainly the result of the asassination was Alexander's immediate succession to the throne, just in time to lead the great invasion himself.

There is absolutly no consensus about this tangled series of events. The murder of Philip is probably the most popular who-done-it in ancient history. The discovery of a tomb believed to be that of Philip only deepens the mystery, a mystery I shall not attempt to solve in this brief space. Instead, I shall content myself with making a few suggestions about Olympias and the plausible limits of her role in all of this. It seems impossible to deny that in some ways Alexander felt his succession to be threatened by the wedding to Cleopatra. Some see his reconciliation with his father as genuine, others see it as a hollow public gesture, but something about the last marriage caused problems, whether temporary or long-lasting.[25] Alexander took his mother back to Molossia, clearly because he felt her status, her time, was jeopardized. As we have seen, Olympias' time depended on her son's, not on any ranking other than that. If Olympias' time was denied, then so was Alexander's. Justin (9.7.2) says that Philip repudiated Olympias; whether this is true or not,[26] or whether Philip questioned her fidelity, probably does not matter. It signifies that we do not even know whether Olympias returned to Macedonia; she was no longer important. The suggestion that Philip treated Olympias in the way he did because he wished her to curtail her influence is untenable.[27] She had influence only with her son, and embarassing her in a public way would hardly lose her son's allegiance. As for the murder itself, I will only say that I do not think that Olympias could have acted alone. Olympias and Alexander necessarily functioned as one political unit until he took the throne. Possibly one could have been more actively involved with the asassination and the other merely accessory after the fact, but Olympias cannot have acted without Alexander's cooperation. The risk would be too great.[28]

Whatever their involvement in Philip's death, mother and son benefitted by it. Olympias played an expanded political role during her son's reign, which is to say relatively little: she had had virtually no political influence with her husband. Our sources tell us regularly about Olympias' involvement with political intrigue after 336, but they do not really tell us that she had much political influence over her son, but rather that she tried to. Perhaps part of Olympias' greater prominence results from the fact that Alexander did not marry until 327, and he married only eastern princesses who produced no heir in his lifetime.

Alexander's reign began with a more or less traditional purge of rival claimants of the throne. Tradition blames Alexander for the elimination of Cleopatra's family in general (Just. 11.5.1), but attributes the killing of Cleopatra and her daughter to Olympias (Just. 9.7.12; much exaggerated in Paus. 8.7.7). Plutarch (**Alex.** 10.4) says that Alexander was annoyed with Olympias for treating Cleopatra badly , but, in fact, she could not safely have been allowed to live. All these deaths are part of the same purge.

Although Alexander left for Asia in 334 and never saw his mother again, ancient sources preserve fragments of what would appear to have been a voluminous correspondence between mother and son. It is doubtful how genuine any or all of these

snippets of correspondence are; certainly each letter must be considered individually.

There are numerous references to a fued between Olympias and Antipater which caused both of them to send letters to Alexander accusing the other (Arr. 7.12.5-7; Diod. 18.118.1; Just. 12. 14.1-3; Plut. **Alex**.39.7). There is little evidence as to her exact charges, but later events certainly suggest very strongly that Olympias felt that she, rather than Antipater, ought to be regent in Alexander's absence.[29] If the regency was what Olympias wanted--unprecedented in a woman--Alexander did not give it to her. When, in the last year of his life, he tried to replace Antipater, he meant Craterus not Olympias to succeed him (Arr. 7.12.4). The decision to remove Antipater, however, both Diodorus (18.118.1) and Arrian (7.12.5-7) attributed to the gradual effects of Olympias' complaints.

Olympias also attacked other figures at court, with mixed results. Diodorus (17.114.3) says that she attacked Hephaestion, Alexander's closest associate, with so little effect that Hephaestion dared to write back to scold her. Curtius (7.1.10-14, 36-40) says that she made some sort of accusation against Amyntas, son of Andromenes, which, along with his family's association with Philotas, caused him to be tried. He was, however, acquitted. In the matter of the arrest of Lycestian Alexander she may have had more influence; Diodorus (17.32.1-2) makes his arrest primarily a matter of Olympias' warning to her son, but of course, our sources differ on this matter.[30]

Not enough attention has been paid to why Olympias so regularly tried to intervene in political affairs. Personal jealousy may have been a factor with Hephaestion,[31] and rivalry with Antipater might even explain her charges against his son-in-law, Lyncestian Alexander, but only in part. In so far as we know what her objections to these various figures were, they seem centered around threats to Alexander's power and Olympias' suspicions about others as possible rivals to her son. Even her objections to Hephaestion may have had a political side as well: she felt no one should outshine Alexander.

In the year 331 Olympias began to do more than attempt to influence events through her son. In that year she moved back to the homeland of Molossia. There she seemed to have succeeded in what she failed to do in Macedonia; apparently she became or acted as regent. (Her brother Alexander had died in campaign in Italy.) She may have begun as co-regent with her daughter Cleopatra for Cleopatra's son, but Cleopatra soon went back to Macedonia. Diodorus (18.49.4) says that Olympias fled Macedonia because of her quarrels with Antipater, but it may be mistaken to assume that she was driven out by the regent.[32] Olympias certainly did not best Antipater, but she may have withdrawn to Epirus in order to rule there. Whether her daughter returned to Macedonia because of her disputes with Olympias or because Olympias wanted her to watch Antipater can only be a matter of surmise.[33]

In any case, something unusual had happened: a woman was regent, partly because of her Epirote royal blood (more of course, than her daughter's) and partly because Macedonian domination of the area made the return of the obvious male heirs, Arrybas' family, unacceptable.[34] An unusual amount of central power exercised by an unusually powerful Macedonian family made a female regency possible, and Olympias' personal drive for power made it plausible. Her son seems to have accepted her new role.

For Olympias, as for all the other successors of Alexander, everything changed with her son's death. Initially the situation looked grim: in the confusion after Alexander's death in 323, Antipater became the kingpin of power politics and Antipater was Olympias' greatest enemy. With Anitpater's approval and probable contrivance, the collateral branch of the Molossian royal family returned from exile and Olympias was no longer regent.[35] Oddly enough, the new king, Aecides, son of Arybbus, seems to have done exactly what Olympias wanted him to, so the change in power was superficial rather than real.

Reunited with her daughter, Olympias' policy in the years after 323 was two fold: never-ending opposition to the family of Anitpater, whom she seems to have blamed for her son's death (Diod. 19.11.8), and a consistent attempt to keep her part of the royal family (Cleopatra and her grandson, Alexander IV) in control of as much of her son's old empire as possible. She promoted Cleopatra's marriage with several of the successors and opposed Philip's other son, Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice (Philip's granddaughter) were eliminated because of Olympias' efforts and Aecides' help (Diod. 19.11.1-9), but Olympias was unable to oppose Cassander with success. Surrounded and besieged, she surrendered, and Cassander arranged her death at the hands of the relatives whom she had killed (Diod. 19.35, 49-51; Just. 14.6.6-12; Plaus. 9.7.2).

In many ways Olympias' career is a series of pathetic failures. Again and again Antipater and his son defeated her. Briefly she held something like royal power in Molossia and perhaps Macedonia near the end of her life, but she lacked secure military support, and her autocratic manner tended to alienate supporters. Nonetheless, she was the first royal woman to attempt to acquire real political power and manage to remain a contender until she died. Clearly, her remarkable character, iron-willed but undisciplined, is partially responsible for her unusual career and her unusual ambitions.

But equally responsible for Olympias' career was the rapidly changing nature of Macedonain kingship. Prior to Philip kingship in Macedonia had been weak, the king standing out only a little from the rest of the aristocracy and often the victim of violence by marauding barbarians or aristocratic cabals. Philip built a central state and a successful war machine, which his son Alexander used to conquer the Persian Empire. Philip, and much more Alexander, were moving quite rapidly toward a

more absolute kingship, influenced by eastern models. Philip may very well have been assasinated because of these innovations; Alexander struggled against aristocratic oppostion to futher innovation throughout his reign. Inevitably these changes in the nature of monarchy affected Olympias, and in some degree, other royal women as well.

As the royal family became more powerful and separate, so did all its members, women as well as men. Royal blood, that of Philip and Alexander, came to matter a great deal, particularly granted the increasing scarcity of male successors. This phenomenon exlains the political stuggles surrounding Cleopatra, Olympias' daughter, and her efforts to marry one of the successors. Similarly, Diodorus tells us that a Macedonian army once changed sides in favor of Olympias (19.11.2) out of respect for her, and that when Cassander wished to kill her (19.51.2-5), he feared to put her in front of an assembly, lest the Macedonian change their minds because of Philip and Alexander. Indeed, according to Diodorus (19.51.5) the soldiers sent to kill her refused to do so because of her rank, and the relatives of her victims did the deed instead. It is no accident that Cassander was quick to marry Thessalonice, one of Philip's daughters by another wife.[37]

Whether another factor influenced the growing status of royal women, particularly Olympias, is more difficult to determine. Alexander borrowed consciously from Persian monarchy and in some degree from Egyptian. Possibly the increasing power and status of royal women may owe something to foreign influence as well. Certainly Curtius remarks about Alexander's intention to deify Olympias upon her death (Curt. 9.6.26; 10.5.30) are suggestive, if they are to be believed. Alexander's probable flirtation with deification and known interest in divine sonship could only serve to elevate his mother's status.[38]

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[1] G.M. Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queen** (Baltimore: 1932), pp. 22-45. See also H. Berve, **Das Alexanderreich**, 2 vols. (Munich: 1926), pp. 283-88; R. Schneider, Olympias, **Die Mutter Alexander des Grossen** (Zwickau: 1886), unavailable to me; H. Strasburger, "Olympias 5," **RE** 18, No. 1 (1939), 177-182.

[2] Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 45.

[3] For instance, P. Green, **Alexander of Macedon** (Hammondsworth: 1974), p. 107, justifies his acceptance of other stories by accepting the extremely dubious tale about Olympias roasting Cleopatra and her baby (Paus. 8.7.5). R. Lane Fox, **Alexander the Great** (London: 1973), p. 475 accepts a story about Olympias' cannibalism. Strasburger, p. 179, is doubtful about any source's accuracy before the death of Alexander; his position is extreme, but a heathly corrective.

[4] Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 44. See also G.H. Macurdy, "Queen Eurydice and the Evidence for Woman Power in Early Macedonia," **AJP** 48 (1927), 210-14. However, see Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, pp. 48-52, for a discussion of other women connected to Philip who also sought power: Cyane, Philip's Illyrian wife who supposedly went into battle (Polyaenus 8.50; Duris **ap.** Athen. 13.560f.) and Eurydice, their daughter and the wife of Philip-Arrhidaeus, the later arch-enemy of Olympias.

[5] Ditt. Syll.[3] I, 352. See B. Keill, "Von Delphischen Rechnungswesen," **Hermes**, 37 (1902), 5llff.. R.M. Errington, "Macedonian 'Royal Style' and its Historical Signifigance," **JHS**, 94 (1974), 20-37, **passim**., concludes that Greek writers called the king this, but the kings themselves did not begin to use this title until the period of the Successors. On the term "Basilissa," see: G.H. Macurdy, "Basilinna and Basilissa, the alleged Title of the 'Queen Archon' at Athens," **AJP**, 49 (1928), 276ff..

[6] See A.B. Bosworth, **A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander**, Vol. 1 (Oxford: 1980), pp. 282-283, for reference to other royal women. Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 24, suggests that the name "Eurydice" had dynastic significance, and A.M.P. Giallombardo, " 'Diritto' Matrimonoiale, Ereditario E Dinastico Nella Macedonia Di Filippo II," **RSA**, 6-7 (1976-77), p. 86, argues that a woman who has taken the name "Eurydice" must be a legitimate consort of the king.

[7] N.G.L.Hammond, **History of Macedonia** II (Oxford: 1979), p. 154. Macurdy, "Eurydice," p. 201, suggests that royal Macedonain had more influence than Greek women, but no political power.

[8] Satyrus **ap**. Athen 557b-d. See J.R. Fears, "Pausanias, The Assasin of Philip II", **Athenaeum**, 53 (1975), 126, on polygamy as a traditional pursuit.

[9] K.J. Beloch, **Griechische Geschichte** III.2[2] (Berlin and Leipzig: 1923), p. 68, makes a distiction between wives and concubines and is followed by Bervem p. 283; Green, p. 515, n. 26; Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 25. For persuasive arguements against this view see J.R. Ellis, **Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism** (London: 1976), pp. 213-214, 254, n. 96 and Giallombardo, **passim**.

[10] Hammond, p. 154.

[11] Giallombardo, p. 96 and N.G.L. Hammond, "The Philiaids and the Chersonese," **CQ**, 6 (1956), 3, n. 12 compares archaic aristocratic marriage and Macedonian. See J.P. Varnant, "Le Marriage en Grece arcaique," **PP** 28, (1973), p. 58ff.. Giallombardom p. 109, argues that it is part of the generally archaic social structure of Macedonia.

[12] Ellis, **Philip**, p. 254, n. 96; Giallombardo, p. 96.

[13] Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 28.

[14] N.G.L. Hammond, **Epirus** (Oxford: 1967), p. 533; Ellis, **Philip**, p. 61.

[15] Ellis, **Philip**, p. 212, 254.

[16] Berve, II, 283; Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 26. **Contra** G.T. Griffith, **History of Macedonia** (Oxford: 1979), p. 306. See R.M. Errington, "Arybbus the Molossian," **GRBS**, 16 (1975), 41-50, for a persuasive argument that Philip put his brother-in-law on the throne much earlier than supposed, soon after the marriage to Olympias.

[17] See Berve, II, 235-6, for Leonidas, a relative of Olympias (Plu. **Alex**. 5.4) and Lysimachus, Berve, II, 241. See also Athen. 435a.

[18] Green, p. 35; Ellis, **Philip**, p. 161.

[19] Fears, p. 126; Griffith, **HofM**, p. 667; J.R. Hamilton, "Alexander's Early Life," **G&R**, 12 (1965), p. 117. Green, p. 40, rejects the assumption.

[20] See Ellis, **Philip**, pp. 210-211 and n. 4, p. 302 for a discussion of dating problems.

[21] Some have taken Attalus' remark that Alexander was not in some sense legitimate to refer to the fact that he was not pure Macedonian (so A.B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," **CQ**, 21 (1971), 104; J. R. Hamilton, **Plutarch, Alexander** (Oxford: 1969) p. 24), but Ellis, **Philip**, p. 215 rightly points out that Philip himself was not.

[22] Only Plutarch (**Mor.** 179c) offers confirmation for her presence. Ellis, **Philip**, p. 217; Giallobardo, p. 109; Green, 104, 524, n. 63 think Olympias was back in Macedonia for her daughter's wedding. E. Badian, "The Death of Philip II," **Phoenix**, 17 (1963), p. 249; Griffith, **HofM**, p. 685; Hamilton, **Plutarch**, p. 28, think she was not.

[23] Badian, 246, rejected by Ellis, **Philip**, 219, 304, n. 32, and Macurdy **Hellenistic Queens**, pp 30-31, who view the wedding as essentially positive for Olympias, and possibly her work.

[24] See Badian, **passim**, Bosworth, Philip II, **passim**, Ellis, **Philip**, 211-27; Fears, **passim**; Griffith, pp. 675-698; N.G.L. Hammond, " 'Philip's Tomb' in Historical Context," **GRBS**, 19 (1978), 331-50, for most recent discussions of this controversy.

[25] Ellis, **Philip**, p. 226, doubts that there was any serious enstrangement; see also Griffith, p. 687.

[26] Fears, p. 126, and Green, p. 82, accepts the idea that Olympias as divorced, while Ellis, p. 212, and Giallombardo, p. 104, reject it.

[27] Fears, 126ff.

[28] **Conra** Ellis, **Philip**, p. 213, who says, "in the end her son was really her husband's." The opposite would seem to be the case: Olympias had only Alexander, but Philip already had one son and might have more.

[29] Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 310; Berve, II, 285-6.

[30] On Lyncestian Alexander, see Bosworth, **Arrian**, p. 164, and E. Carney, "Alexander the Lyncestian: the Disloyal Opposition," **GRBS**, 21 (1980), 23-33.

[31] So Green, p. 465. Lane Fox, p. 147, suggests that jealousy of Antipater may have made Olympias accuse his son-in-law.

[32] Berve, II, 286; Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 33, assume she was essentially driven out. On the dual regency of Cleopatra and Olympias, see discussion and references in Hammond, **Eirus**, p. 558. Whether Olympias arrived before or after her brother's death might have made some difference. Only Livy 8.24.17 would suggest that she did.

[33] Berve, II, 287; Hamilton, **Plutarch**, p. 190; Strasburger, p. 180, all assume mother and daughter quarrelled; Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 34 thinks Olympias sent her daughter. Hammond, **Epirus**, 559 doesn't believe Ceopatra left.

[34] G.N. Cross, Epirus, **A Study in Greek Constitutional Development** (Cambridge: 1932). See also **RE** 5, 2 (1905) 2727, which suggests that Alexander acquiesced.

[35] Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, p. 38 thinks that Aecides came to power through Antipater's help, to oppose Olympias, whereas Hammond, **Epirus**, p. 561, more plausibly thinks that Olympias recalled him, to some kind of joint rule. Aecides' subsequent behavior supports the latter view.

[36] See discussions in Macurdy, **Hellenistic Queens**, 36f and Strasburger, 180f.

[37] Giallombardo, p. 90.

[38] Berve, II 286-7, believes that Olympias supported Alexander's divine sonship (though he admits that the letter mentioned in Plut, **Alex.** 27.5 is of dubious authenticity) and accepts the statements in Curtius about Alexander's intention to deify Olympias. Strasburger, p. 180, rightly urges caution.

# HITLER AND THE ZIONIST CONNECTION IN RETROSPECT

**Saadallah A. S. Hallaba**

## FOREWARD:

In 1869 when the Suez Canal was opened the activities of Theodor Herzl and the Zionist movement were also first started under the auspices of Bismark and William II. Zionism would develop in three stages, serving in turn three world powers which got interested in the mastery of the Near East, since they were striving to exert an absolute control over Europe. These three powers were the German Empire, the British Empire, and the United States. The three corresponding figureheads of the Zionist movement were Theodor Herzl, who cooperated with William II and thus in 1898 welcomed him to Jerusalem; Chaim Weizmann, the Foreign Office liegeman; and David Ben Gourion, the Washington agent.

Contemporary historical studies have certainly stressed the obvious relationship between the Zionist promoters and the Anglo-Saxons. Yet, these studies make no mention of the deeply-involved and long-lasting cooperative effort made by Germany and Zionism. Indeed, this cooperation, as decided by William II and Bismark, continued with their successors, Hitler and Federal Germany.

Thus, by linking quite logically anti-Semitism and Zionism, Hitler signed, as early as 1933, an important agreeement, called the Haavara Agreement, with the leaders of world Zionism. This agreement was renewed and later extended to Bucharest and Warsaw by the accord reached with Weizman in 1937 at the Zionist Congress held in Evian, France. It provided for the displacement of about four million Jews from Central Europe to Palestine. On February 1, 1939, a confidential agreement was finally reached by Hitler and Roosevelt, called the Rublee-Wohlthat Memorandum, according to which Jews would be allowed to leave Germany for Palestine, provided Zionist committees throughout the world would strive to promote German exports. Moreover, Berlin would agree to pay back a Zionist loan amounting to one billion and a half marks at four percent. Despite war threats and inflamed reactions from London, Hitler-Zionist cooperation did not stop. Two representatives from the Jerusalem Agency settled down in Berlin, and convoys of German Jews organized by these representatives were bound for Palestine under the Gestapo protection.

After the German defeat the United States tried to take over the German ambitions in Europe as well as in the East. This study emphasizes the importance of this cooperation between Hitler and Zionism.

## HITLER AND ZIONISM

The National Socialist leaders, at the start of their political careers, had a friendly attitude toward international Judaism. Since they wanted to make the Jews leave Germany, they quite naturally had Palestine in mind. It happened that the Zionists themselves were ready "to free Germany from its Jews". And since this was a top objective, Hitler would accept--as he was well known to be very pragmatic--to palter with his own beliefs and teachings.

At the Wilhelmstrasse, the German Foreign Office, it was believed that this category of Jews (at the front of which stood the Zionists) who refused assimilation and would prefer to see all Jews reunited in a national homeland, had chosen objectives which were the nearest those actually persued by German policy as regards the Jews.[1] The only Jews with whom various organizations of the Third Reich--especially the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economy--would establish good working relationship were indeed the Zionists.

The first official agreement between the Hitler government and the Palestine Jews was reached as early as May,1933. Although this agreement was apparently basically technical, it did have some political significance. The boycott day of April 1, 1933, and, to a still greater extent, the laws promulgated during the same month, prompted thousands of Jews to leave their own country. However, restrictive immigration laws in most European countries as well as in the United States were already at that time quite stringent. But they were certainly less severe for those immigrants who could prove they were wealthy. Yet, since foreign currancy laws limited the export of foreign monies from Germany, those who could afford to leave the Reich were compelled to abandon most of their funds. Thus, as early as 1933 many were trapped. The wealthy, who could fairly easily get a visa from foreign consulates, hesitated to leave Germany and abandoning most of their funds. The poor people, whom nothing retained in Germany, could hardly get a visa.

Palestine was no exception. The British authorities governing this territory as a result of the mandate given them by the Allies and the League of Nations had indeed worked out for the Jews an immigration plan, according to which only the immigrants acknowledged as capitalists were admitted without any restriction--that is to say, those who had at least one thousand pounds sterling.

Despite foreign currency regulations in force in Germany, the authorities, according to instructions from Hitler, did not refuse to Jews emigrating to Palestine the right to take with them one thousand pounds sterling. This was intended to urge them to emigrate, and more specially to urge them to leave for Palestine. Yet, for the very wealthy Jews who wanted to emigrate to Palestine, an allowance of one thousand pounds sterling was not a satisfactory solution. Indeed, several thousand of Jews in the German Jewish community (which amounted in 1933 to over half a

million persons) had funds to over one thousand pounds sterling. As they could not take all their money, they kept putting off their departure. These delays were neither in their best interests nor in those of the German govenment.

This complicated problem gave to a Palestine Jew, Sam Cohen, the director of the colonization company Ha'notea, a clever idea which would lead to the signature of the Haavara agreement. In April, 1933, Sam Cohen was received by the German Consul in Jerusalem, Heinrich Wolff. Cohen proposed that he could switch from Czechoslovakia to Germany his order for agricultural equipment and building materials.

Wolff expressed his surprise, but Cohen then explained to him that purchases of Ha'notea in Germany could very well be financed from funds from which Jews planning to emigrate were not allowed to transfer to a foreign country. After their arrival in Palestine, the emigrants would cash in pounds sterling the corresponding value of marks which they would have paid to a frozen account in Berlin.[2] In fact, it was a clearing transfer. Germany would have to pay any currency and the emigrants would not have to lose their funds. Wolff fully understood that the Ha'notea firm had a two fold interest. On the one hand, the company would not have to pay for its own purchase in a foreign currancy; on the other hand, Ha'notea would urge wealthy Jews to emigrate to Palestine. At the same time Wolff saw the numerous advantages which the Reich government would get from such a deal: doing away with a major hindrance for emigration; getting more orders for German industrial firms which were under economic stress; and above all, countering the boycotting of German products.

The deal got organized in less than one month, and once its principle was accepted by the Germans, things went fast. Sam Cohen went to Berlin, where he was welcomed by two high officials of the German Ministry of Economy, Hans Hartenstein and Joachim von Heinz. On May 19, 1933, a letter from the Economy Ministry addressed to the Ha'notea firm officially confirmed the agreement just concluded.[3] According to this agreement the Palestine firm agreed to purchase from Germany the equipment it had been ordering until then from Czechoslovakia, it being understood that these materials would be reserved for the Ha'notea firm and could not consequently be sold. The deal amounted to one million reichmarks.

Obviously those responsible in Germany for the World Zionist Organization--who were not opposed to the principle of such an agreement--were not enthusiastic at all, because this deal had been made with a private firm with limited scope. They feared that the Ha'notea firm did not have sufficient funds in order to carry out properly a deal whose political importance outdid its commercial interests.

Werner Senator, of the German Zionist Federation, and George Landauer, of the Jewish Agency, then started negotiations with the German Foreign Office and

Ministry of Economy about the agreement concluded with the Ha'notea firm.[4] At Jerusalem Haim Arlsoroff, in charge of foreign relations in the Jewish Agency, asked Sam Cohen to place the whole deal under the patronage of the Organization.[5] Meanwhile, Sam Cohen went once more to Germnay, where he had definitely made new friends. He succeeded in improving significantly the conditions of his first agreement with the German Government.

The replacing on June 29, 1933, of Alfred Hugenburg by Karl Schmitt as German Minister of Economy did not change at all the liberal policy adopted for emigrants wanting to leave for Palestine. It was true that in the meantime Consul General Wolff had again endeavored to convince the Berlin authorities that anything done in favor of German exports to Palestine would broaden the already wide gap for boycotting German products.

These arguments were so effective that the new agreement with Cohen amounted to three million marks. Moreover, the Ha'notea firm was no longer compelled to purchase equipment solely for its own colonization projects. Henceforward, it could act as an importer for the Palestine market. Sam Cohen even obtained the right for Jews, who were not planning to settle down soon in Palestine, but who evidently expressed their will "to contribute for the building up of Palestine and get ready a homeland for them," to deposit their funds on the frozen account of the Ha'notea firm. This formula, which could hardly be more Zionist, was reported in the letter dated July 19, 1933, addressed to Sam Cohen by the German Ministry of Economy.[6]

From the wording of this letter it was clear that the German authorities wanted Sam Cohen to establish good connections with the Zionist Organization. Indeed, the Minister of Economy stressed the fact that he learned with pleasure about the forthcoming setting up of Ha'notea branch at the Berlin Headquarters of the Zionist Organization, which had been established in 1897 during the first Zionist convention in Bale. This organization was officially recognized in most European and American countries and had branches in all important capitals, and, quite naturally, in Berlin.

Yet, the German delegates of this Organization continued to distrust initiatives made by Sam Cohen. They therefore continued to convince the Berlin authorities to let an official Zionist organization control this agreement. Upon the insistance of George Landauer, Hans Hartenstein, a high official of the Ministry of Economy,[7] decided to put off executing the recent agreement made with Sam Cohen and asked for more information to the German Consul in Jerusalem.[8] The Germans, who evidently wanted to conclude this agreement quickly, finally took the initiative to convene a meeting attended by all Jews interested in this deal. The meeting was opened on August 7 in the offices of the Minstry of Economy. Present on the Jewish side were: Cohen and Machnes representing the Ha'notea firm; delegates of

the German Zionist Federation and two officials who specially came from Palestine; Hoofien, the Director of Anglo-Palestinian Bank whose interests were closely linked to those of the Zionist Organizaion; and Ruppin, a sociologist and specialist in the colonization of Jews in Palestine.[9]

The specifications of the agreement reached by this meeting were the following. Sam Cohen agreed to consider as null and void all agreements previous to August 7. A fiduciary firm would be established under the management of Hoofien and under the care of the Anglo-Palestinian Bank. This firm would have to manage the Jewish interests and to negotiate with German exporters and industrial firms. The deal still amounted to three million reichsmarks with the possibility of renewal. Two procedures were forseen: one for those Jews wanting to emigrate immediately, and the other for those who wanted to emigrate later. An exchange of official letters enforced the decisions thus reached.[10]

The agreement and all the transactions connected with it would be known as the Haavara Agreement (a Hebrew word meaning transfer) and which would also be the official name of the fiduciary firm (Haavara Trust and Transfer), whose headquarters were in Palestine. The firm which would be specially established as its representative in Berlin, would be named **Paltreu** (Palastina-Treuhandstelle zur Baratung deutscher Juden). "The first Hoofien agreement on Haavara as reported a few months later by a high official of the Wilhelmstrasse, had far more important political reactions than economic consequences."[11]

What were these political backlashes? On August 21, 1933, the 18th Zionist Congress opened in Prague, the first meeting since Hitler seized power. The situation of the Jews in Germany was evidently the central theme of the discussions and debates. Hoofien and Ruppin had come directly from Berlin to Prague. A large number of delagates reproached Hoofien and Cohen, two top negotiators, for having acted in collusion with the devil by undermining, with Haavara Agreement, the fight of the Jews against the racial policy of the Reich. Impassioned discussion followed. But a motion for the actual partlcipation of the organization in boycotting efforts of Germany was not adopted. The Wilhemstrasse was satisfied that the Haavara Agreement "had strengthened the position of the moderate majority among the delagates."[12]

Despite the first difficulties, due especially to certain reserves made by Hoofien, both firms, whose constitution had been provided by the agreement, were founded. The part played by Sam Cohen became progressively insignificant, for, in spite of the credit he enjoyed in Berlin and with the Consul General Wolffe, the Zionist leaders unusually kept him off.[13] On the other hand, the German authorities definitely preferred direct conversations with officials of the Zionist Organization and the Anglo-Palestinian Bank.[14] The agreement for the amount of three million reichsmarks was quickly inadequate. It was therefore renewed on February 13,

1934.[15] The cooperation within the Haavara framework between the Zionist Organization and the Berlin government was becoming plain routine. In spite of an increasing opposition among the National Socialists for the enforcement of an agreement which would undoubtedly favor the work done by Zionists in Palestine, and despite some complication due to more strict regulations on currency control, the Haavara Agreement would periodically be renewed. Only when World War II broke out did this agreement come to an end.

## HITLER AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

When the German authorities signed in August, 1933, the Haavara agreement, they aimed simultaneously at two objectives: destroy the boycott organized against Germany by the Jews in various foreign countries, and make it easier for the Jews in Germany to leave for Palestine.

Yet, Berlin increasingly considered the second objective to be more important. One the one hand, the consequences of the Jewish Boycott had considerably weakened, whereas, on the other hand, the expatriation of Jews had become one of the major objectives of the home policy of the National Socialist regime. But the Zionists were the only ones among the Jews to propose a positive solution for the Jewish problem in Germany and especially the only ones able to implement this solution. The Haavara Agreement had given them the means. It was amazing to see both the Minister of Interior and that of Economy cooperate to help the enforcement of the Haavara Agreement and the development of the Zionist Organization activites in Germany!

As early as in 1934 the Wilhemstrasse ordered to this effect the Reich administration to break off completely with all Jewish organizations in foreign countries. However, the relations with the Zionist organization were fully maintained. In spite of the hostility expressed by the Referat Deutschland (a special department responsible for Jewish affairs at the Wilhemstrasse), the leaders of German Zionism were allowed to continue relations with their colleagues through the world.

Thus, the Haavara organization progressively acquired an outstanding position, even with preferential rights, for the German-Palestinian trade. Exports of oranges to Germany were made through Haavara agencies. The 19th Zionist Congress, sponsored by the Zionist leaders of Germany and meeting in Lucerne from August 20 to September 3, 1935, decided to place the whole Haavara system under the direct control of the Zionist executive committee. The activities done until then by the Anglo-Palestinian Bank were consequently transferred to this committee. In 1933 the Haavara transfers amounted to 1.254,956,marks. In 1937 they reached the value of 31,407,501 marks.[16]

The Zionist organization was authorized to open in Germany professional and

agricultural training centers for all those who wished to emigrate and who wanted some training in order to start a new life in the Middle East. Hebrew courses were offered in several towns. The Zionist paper, the **Judische Rundschau**, gave to thousands of Jewish homes the hope of a better life. The Ministry of the Interior allowed a delegation of German Zionists to take part in the 19th Zionist Congress.[17] "There is no reason," wrote Bulow-Schwante to the Ministry of the Interior, "to impede with administration measures the Zionist activites in Germany, for Zionism is not inconsistent with the National Socialist program whose objective is to make the Jews leave progessively Germany."[18]

In connection with the emigration to Palestine that had been caused by the Haavara Agreement the Zionists established even their own Palestine Shipping Company, which brough the German passenger ship **Hoenstien** and renamed it **Tel Aviv**. This ship made its first trip from the German port of Bremerhaven to Haifa at the beginning of 1935. The Captain of the ship, Leidig, was a registered member of the Nazi party.[19] On this trip, the ship bore on its stern the Hebrew letters of the new name **Tel Aviv**, while from the mast fluttered the swastika. "A combination of metaphyical absurdity," wrote one of the passengers later.

However, there were in Germany some groups strongly opposed to what they called support given by the Reich for the notion of national independence as extolled by the Zionists. The most important of these groups was the **Auslandorganisation** (AO). This agency of the National Socialist Party had been founded in 1930 under the name of **Auslandsabteilung der National-socialistische Duetsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP)** in order to organize National Socialist party groups in German communities living in foreign countries. Since October, 1933, it came under the direct control of Rudolf Hess, in February, 1934, it received the rank of **Gau Ausland** as well as the title of **Auslandorganisation**. Its director, Ernst Bohle, got at the same time the rank of **Gauleiter**. On January 30, 1937, Bohle was appointed Chief of the AO at the Wilhelmstrasse and, soon after, he obtained the crowned title of Secretary of State.

All questions related to the German colony in Palestine were naturally within the authority of the AO. Yet, these Germans (the vast majority of whom earned their living by working on their farms) had always been hostile to the Haavara Agreement.[20] Walter Dohle, who in 1935 had replaced Wolff as chief of the German General Consulate in Jerusalem, had completely shared their viewpoint and had become inturn an unyielding opponent of the Haavara.[21]

When the AO defended the interests of the Germans in Palestine, as early as 1934 it had opposed the Haavara Agreement.[22] Since it did not have much influence, it could not impose its viewpoints on those of both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Economy.

During 1936, however, the **Referat Dueschland** had a policy appreciably nearer that of Dohle and AO. From that time, the AO, supported by the dynamic Referat, used its ever-increasing authority against what it considered to be a strengthening of the Palestine Jews to the prejudice of the Germans and Arabs.

However, until the end of 1936 Berlin did not have to take any decision on the Jewish-Arab conflict. The policy adopted towards Zionism and therefore towards Haavra, far from reflecting a stand of the German foreign policy, was only the consquences of the objectives pursued by the home policy of the Reich. But the development of the situation in Palestine soon forced the German government to take a definite stand as regards its foreign policy.

## THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT HAAVARA

Only after the outbreak of the Palestinian Arab rebellion of April, 1936, did the first difference of opinion set in amongst the various German institutions about the usefulness of continuing the Haavara transfers. The Foreign office now realized that the de facto support for the Zionist policy would alienate Arabs against Hitler's Germany--a prospect that was not in the interest of the Nazi Reich. Dohle, the German Consul General in Jerusalem, declared in an extensive memorandum dated March 22, 1937, that "through our promotion of Jewish immigration . . . the position that was again captured by the Germans . . . would come to grief."[23]

This was how between 1933 and 1937, 172,000 Jews, settled in Palestine, had emigrated from Germany. In 1935 only, this country under mandate had recorded 65,000 immigrants. This sudden immigration alarmed the Arab population, which was the majority in Palestine. They feared they would soon become the minority.[24]

In taking this stand Dohle was naturally not moved by concern for the Arabs as much as he was anxious about the political interests of Nazi Germany. He added that Germany need "not to worry unduly about the sympathies of Palestinian Arabs regarding Germany, since what is required is not even a question of an active Arab policy so much as the need to avoid the conspicuous promotion lent to the building of the Jewish national home."[25] Dohle feared "that the Arab mood might turn around and that we might be accused of actively participating in the fight against them."[26]

Dohle's fears were shared by other Nazi authorities. Thus the Office for Foreign Trade at the AO of the Nazi Party stated in all frankness: "Politically, the Haavara Transfer means giving valuable support to the establishment of a Jewish national home with the help of German capital."[27]

Owing to these facts, the Referat Duetschland, holding the opinion that a Jewish State in Palestine, if it was ever founded, "would strengthen to a very great extent

Jewish influence throughout the world," proposed on January 3, 1937, that the following points be examined:

a. Whether it was still appropriate to urge the German Jews to emigrate to Palestine.

b. Whether the time had to come to explain to the British government that Germany did not wish that a Jewish state be founded in Palestine.[28]

This initiative had a lot of importance since therefrom a procedure would be developed which will lead the Wilhelmstrasse to declare that the founding of a Jewish State was not in conformity wiht the interests of the Reich.

The first person to adopt this policy of the Referat was Ernst von Weizsacker, Chief of the Political Department and future Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs. While Weizsacker defined the policy which Germany should adopt in the immediate future, he recalled that the main objective of the Reich was still the emigration of the Jews. Nevertheless, Germany should no longer urge the Jews to go only to Palestine, for it was in the German interest that the Jews be dispersed throughout the world rather than helping them, even indirectly, to achieve their national ambitions.

In May, 1937, the Referat Dueschland started the procedure to abolish the Haavara; this procedure forced Reich Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Nuerath, to take a formal stand against the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. A circular letter from Bulow-Schwante warned all German missions that the new official policy of the Reich must be followed. And the Referat lost no time to drive the final onslaught against the Haavara.

At first the Referat had to fight some opposition in the Department of Economic Affairs which, as it operated from within the Wilhemstrasse, was of the opinion that the agreement concluded with the Zionists should be maintained.[29] Thus, on June 11, 1937, Bulow-Schwante sent a memorandum to the Division of Economic Affairs urging it to respect instructions given by Neurath and views expressed by the AO. He demanded that the necessary measures be taken after consulting the Ministry of Economy, in order to "revise the Haavara agreement or abolish it."[30] The Referat, as pointed out by Bulow-Schwante, felt that it was possible to increase considerably the emigration of Jews not so much by simplifying administrative procedures--which would even in some instances entail some sacrifice as regards foreign currencies--but by making imperative the need for emigration which the Jews themselves felt. This could be achieved by means of law much more strict for the Jews, for instance, by making them pay a special income tax which would automatically force the Jews to emigrate of their own free will.[31]

By thus proceeding methodically, Bulow-Schwante sent to the Ministry of the Interior the circular letter which he had addressed on June 22 to German missions in foreign countries. But that Ministry did not even care to give a reply in writing. On July 8 Hering, the assistant of the Secretary of State Stuckart confirmed to the assistant of Bulow-Schwante that the Ministry of the Interior had definitely decided to continue its policy of emigration as in the past. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to make some amendments or had any objection to bring forward, it would be up to the Foreign Office Minister to take this initiative if calling a meeting which would examine this problem.[32] As could be expected, the Wilhelmstrasse organized a meeting on July 29, at which the participants expressed their readiness to modify in depth the means of implementing the Haavara Agreement. The Ministry of Economy and the Economic Division of the Wilhelmstrasse dared not reject the arguments put forward by the Referat and the AO. More specially, an agreement was reached about taking away from various organizations the privilege they enjoyed, forcing the Arabs and the Germans living in Palestine to use the Jewish Society for their commercial deals with Germany. From the exclusive economic standpoint, as pointed out by even an official of currency control, "The Haavara dealings were not interesting for Germany, since they did not bring any foreign currancy into the country."[33]

However, this meeting ended without any positive result, but the representative of the Ministry of the Interior made a statement that excited a lot of interest: "Some time ago when this question had been presented to the Fuhrer," said the official from the Ministry of the Interior, "the Fuhrer had decided that the emigration of Jews should be directed towards Palestine." "It was out of the question," he concluded, "to solve the problem put forward by the Haavara by simply taking measures which would, in the future, prevent the Jews from emigrating to Palestine."[34]

During another meeting which was called on September 21, Hering rectified the statements made by his colleague. The Fuhrer had not made a decision on the specific problem of emigration to Palestine, he said. His orders were only meant to urge in general the emigration of Jews.[35] "On the basis of this fact," Hering added, "the Haavara proved interesting to the Ministry of the Interior only to the extent it can make as many Jews as possible leave Germany." If his Ministry was assured that the rhythm of departures would not slow down as a consequence of restrictions imposed to Haavara activities, he would see no objection to the revision of this agreement.

A new plan was then worked out by the Referat and the Ministry of the Interior, according to which the wealthy Jews would be retained in Germany and the others would be expelled. Thus, the Haavara would lie down on its own when there were no longer wealthy Jews wanting to emigrate. The winding up of the Haavara would be another advantage for the Reich.

Upon the intiative of the Ministry of the Interior another meeting was called to discuss, in the presence of an official of the Wilhelmstrasse, the importance of the new laws that had been promulgated to force the Jews to emigrate.[36] In order to promote this new policy Hering could then announce clearly that according to the Ministry of the Interior the Haavara Agency was no longer deemed to be of any use.[37] The Ministry of the Economy found itself henceforward completely isolated for taking the defense of the Haavara. Yet, on October 9, it was still explicitly admitted that "it was necessary to continue strongly urging the emigration of the Jews from Germany; that pressure was also valid for their emigration to Palestine, as long as decisions to the contrary had not been taken."[38]

For its part, the Currency Control Office, in spite of the recent stand of the Ministry of the Interior, sent again to the Four-Year Plan Agency of Herman Goering a lengthy memorandum in which are explained all the advantages that Germany could get from Haavara as regards economy and emigration.[39]

At that time, Otto von Hentig's intervention started. Since July, 1937, he had replaced Pilger as the Director of the Middle-East Department (POL. VII), he had been endeavoring several times to calm down the Anti-Zionism of the **Referat Deutschland**. Since he did not believe that a Jewish State could be established in Palestine in the forseeable future,[40] he did not think that the Haavara was likely to speed up the founding of such a state. In agreement with officials of the Ministry of the Economy, he had striven to delay as much as possible the implementation of restricive measures contemplated against the Haavara.[41]

It seemed that with this objective in mind Otto von Hentig had strongly insisted that the complete Haavara record should be submitted to Hitler. Most likely Hentig had been convinced that the Fuhrer, fighting relentlessly so that the Reich should become **Judenrein** that is, free from Jews, would order the evacuation of Jews to any country, including Palestine, and would consequently decide that the Haavara should be able to continue its activities. The Director of POL. VII would not feel any regret that he had taken the defense of the Haavara since, as a result of a conversaiton with Alfred Rosenberg, Chief of **Aussenpolitisches Amt** (the Foreign Office of the National Socialist Party), on the policy that should adopt towards Jews, Hitler decided that the "emigration of German Jews would continue to be encouraged by all possible means."[42]

On December 17, 1937, a memorandum of State Secretary Stuckart of the Reich Ministry of the Interior stated that since the beginning of the Arab rebellion in Palestine, "the advantages of the Haavara procedure have been dwindling while the disadvantages were increasing."[43] Stuckart was of the opinion that if the establishment of a Jewish state was unavoidable then "everything that would promote the growth of such a state should be refrained from." The Stuckart declared clearly: "There is no doubt that the Haavara procedure has made the greatest contribution

to the tremendously rapid building of Palestine (i.e. the Zionist colonies)."[44]

The fears of these officials (which contradicted the views of the SS and the Gestapo) were finally brought before Hitler. The Fuhrer, as reported in a memorandum of the Political Trade Department of the Foreign Office, dated January 27, 1938, decided that the Haavara procedure should be continued.[45] This positive stand taken by Hiter vis-a-vis the stregthening of the Zionists colonization of Palestine remained unchanged in spite of complaints emanating from the Foreign Office and the **Auslandorganisation** of the Nazi Party about the rising hostility of the Palestinians towards Germany.

During a press conference called at the Air Force Ministry on November 12, 1938, Goering ordered to speed up the emigration of the Jews by all possible means. Yet he stated at the same conference that there was no objection that steps be taken in favor of foreign organizations which were interested in this problem.[46]

Thus, according to the agreement made between Germany and the Evian Committee[47] with the support of Goering, Berlin was committed on February 1. 1939, to continue the Haavara deal.[48] On July 5, 1939, the Paltreu Agency (which represented in Berlin the Haavara Headquarters in Tel-Aviv) asked that the amount of the transfers, as previously agreed upon within the framework of the agreement, should be increases by 750,000 marks, to be used until December 31, 1939. On August 12, this request was approved.[49] On August 21, Schumburg, contradicted again by Hentig, did not hesitiate to fight once more a rear-guard battle against their decision.[50]

In spite of the enduring opposition of the **Referat Duetschland**,[51] the Ministry of the Economy granted once more on August 22, 1939, the permit to transfer to Palestine until December 31, 1939, the amount of 1,200,000 marks "for study expenses,"[52] which meant that although Hjalmar Schacht had left the Ministry of the Economy, the policy regards the Haavara deal had not changed at all. In 1939 the Platreu Agency was still employing one hundred and fifty persons.[53] Between January 1, 1938, and September 1, 1939, transfer deals amounted to almost 27,000,000 marks.[54]

From 1933 to 1939 almost 140,000,000 marks were transferred to Palestine within the Haavara Agreement, thus enabling Jewish emigrants to get just over 8,000,000 pounds sterling. During the same period, nearly 50,000 Jews left Hitler's Germany for Palestine.[55]

## CONCLUSION

To question the Zionist connections with German fascism is a taboo in the eyes of the Zionist leaders and their apologists. Yet it is possible to come across authentic

evidence or documents concerning these occurrences. The previous enquiry comprised information gathered about some important aspects of that cooperation. It remains beyond any doubt that Hitler was and remained the sole guarantor of the Haavara transfers, which were only halted in 1941, two years after the outbreak of the Second War.[56] A complete picture will only be possible when the archives (above all those in Israel), in which the documents concerning these events remain locked, are made available for scholarly research.[57]

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[1] Bulow-Schwante's memorandum to all diplomatic missions of the Reich n 83-21/28.2, February 28, 1934. Referat Deutschland, Einstellung des Auslandes zur Judenfrage, Auswartiges Amt (hereinafter referred to as A.A.), Bonn.

[2] Wolff's letter to A.A. n Expf. 1/33, April 25, 1933. Wirtschaft, Deutschpalastinische Devisengelegenheiten, Bd. 1, A.A. Bonn.

[3] Letter n Dev. I 20111/33, May 19, 1933. Ibid.

[4] Prufer's note, n zu W 3474, May 24, 1934: George Landauer's letter to Hartenstein and Schmidt-Roelke (Foreign Office), July 14, 1933. Ibid.

[5] Ludwig Pinner, Vermogenstransfer nach Palastina, in Zwei Welten, Tel-Aviv, Bitaon, 1962, p. 138.

[6] Letter n Dev. I 30293, Ibid. Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereinafter referred to as DGFP) C-I, pp. 661-662.

[7] Hartenstein's letter to Schmidt-Roelke, n Dev. I 3128.33, July 22, 1933, Wirtschaft, Deutschpalastinische Devisenangelegenheiten, Bd. 1, A.A. Bonn.

[8] Ulrich's cable to Wolff n 27, July 24, 1933. Ibid. DGFP C-1, p. 733, n 2.

[9] Scheuerl's letter (Ministry of Economy) to A.A., n Dev. I, 36005/33, August 10, 1933., DGFP C-1, pp. 732-735.

[10] Scheurel's letter to Hoffien, August 10, 1933. Ibid.; Hoofien's letter of August 22, 1933, Ibid., p. 736 n 8.

[11] Baer's letter to the Ministry of Economy n W 1098 of February 17, 1934. Wirtschaft Deutschpalastinische Devisenangelegenheiten, Bd. 3, A.A. Bonn.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Report on a conversation on March 29, 1934 with Ernst Marcus, Director of Paltreu, n 2492, April 3, 1934. Ibid., Bd. 3.

[14] Ritter's cable to Wolff n 11 of March 27, 1934. Ibid.

[15] Scheurl's letter to Paltreu n I 5278, February 13, 1934. Ibid.

[16] Werner Feilchenfeld, Dolf Michealis and Ludwig Pinner, Haavara - Transfer nach Palastina und Einwanderung deutscher Juden, 1933-1939. (Haavara Transfer to Palestine and Immigration of German Jews, 1933-1939) Tubingen, 1973.

[17] Hering's letter to the Zionist Federation of Germany n I A 416/5012, February 1, 1935. Referat Deutschland, Judenkongresse im Ausland, Bd. 1, A.A. Bonn.

[18] Bulow-Schwante's letter to the Ministry of the Interior n zu 83-21 28/8, September 6, 1935. Inland II A/B, Das Judentum in Deutschland, Bd. 3, A.A. Bonn.

[19] Winfried Martini, Hebraisch unterm Hakenkreuz (Hebrew under the Swastika) in Die Welt, Hamburg, January 10, 1975.

[20] Report on a Conference at the Ministry of Economy on the Haavara dated January 22, 1938. Chief Auslandorganisation (hereinafter referred to as AO), Judenstaat, Palastina, Haavara, A.A. Bonn.

[21] Dohle's letter to A.A. n S.A./XV D 1/L/375, January 15, 1936, Pol. VII, Palastina, politische Beziehugen zu Deutschland, A.A. Bonn; also Dohle's letter to A.A. n Polot. 16/37, March 22, 1937. Buro Riechsaussenminister, Palastina, DGFP, D-V, p. 747, n 2.

[22] Schwarz's letter to the Ministry of the Interior n 1023/8 dated January 12, 1938. Chief AO, Judenstaat, Palastina, Haavara, A.A. Bonn.

[23] Dohle's report dated March 22, 1937. The Chief of the Foreign Affairs Organization in the German Foreign Office, Haavara 1938, Series 72, Jewish State, Palestine (Political Archives of the Foreign Office in Bonn; quoted by Heinz Tillman, Deutschlands Araberpolitik in zweiten Weltkrieg (Germany's Arab Policy in the Second World War) Berlin. 1965, p. 63.

[24] **The Refugee Problem** in **"Report of a Survey"**, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1938, pp. 613-614. By 1931 the Jewish population in Palestine had increased from 60,000 in 1919 to 175,000 or 17.7%. Between 1932 and 1938 217,000 Jews entered Palestine, mainly from Poland and Central Europe, and by 1939 the Jews numbered 429,605 out of an estimated population of 1.5 million, i.e., 28%. See Comment n 19, The Middle East, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, January 1977. According to statements from Kennzeichen J., the annual number of Jews leaving Nazi Germany was: **1934**, about 23,000; **1935**, 20,000; **1937**, 23,000; and from January **1938** to September **1939**, 157,000. Despite the efforts of the Zionists; only a part of this total emigrated to Palestine (in **1934**, 37%; in **1935**, 36%, and in **1937**, 10.8%). Feilchenfield and al.op.citstate that the number of German Jews who immigrated to Palestine by way of the Haavara Transfers as being 50,000. The paper **"Tagesspiegel,"** which appears in Berlin estimated the total number of German emigrants to Palestine between 1933 and 140 as being 70,000 (Tagesspiegel, February 15, 1974). According to Zionists statements the immigrants from Germany made up this period round 25% of the total of Jewish immigrants in Palestine. Working out the Haavara Transfers in the context of the social strata of immigration gives an idea of the immigrants to their financial standing. The proportion of immigrants posessing more than a thousand Palestinian pounds increased from 10.3% of all immigrants in the year 1933 to 18.1% in the year 1936, while the number of immigrating Jewish workers sank in the same period from 35.8% to 17.2%. See Dr. T. Canaan, **Conflict in the Land of Peace**, (Jerusalem, 193, p. 41 quoted in Klaus Polkehn's **The Secret Contacts: Zionism and Nazi Germany**, 1933-1941, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. V nos 3&4, Spring/Summer 1976, p. 66.

[25] Heinz Tillman, p. 63.

[26] Heinz Tillman, p. 65.

[27] Memorandum by the Office of the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Organization of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-partei (Nazi Pary), dated June 5, 1937, p. 67.

[28] Hinrich's note n e.o. 83-21 A 9/1. dated January 21, 1937., Inland II A/B, Judenauswanderung -Allg. (Palastinastaat), Bd. 1 a, A.A. Bonn.

[29] Clodius' Note n zu 83-21 A 16/4 dated June 11, 1937. Inland II A.B. Judenauswanderung - Allg. (Palastiniastaat), Bd. 1 a, A.A. Bonn.

[30] Bulow- Schwante's letter to W. and to Kult, n zu 83-21 A 4/6 (227g) dated June 11, 1937., DGFP F. V. p. 749.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Hinrich's note to Schumburg n 83-21 dated July 15, 1937. Inland II A/B Judenauswanderung -Allg. (Palastinastaat), Bd. 1 a, A.A. Bonn.

[33] Report n zu W III SE 7115 dated August 3, 1937. Joined to Benzler's letter n W III SE 7115 dated September 13, 1937. Ha-Pol. Clodius, Palastina, A.A. Bonn.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Riegner's Report n zu W III SE 7661/37 dated September 25, 1937. Ibid.; Schleicher's Report dated September 23, 1937 joined to Bisse's letter to Bohle n 90 292 WS/HE dated September 29, 1937. Chief AO, Judenstate Plastina, Haavara, A.A. Bonn.; Schunburg's Note n zu 83-21 A g 4/10 (427g), Kult., Fragen der Judenpolitik (Auswanderung nach Palastina), Bd. 1, A.A. Bonn.

[36] Schumburg's Note to Chief AO, Pol IX, Pol. V., dated October 6, 1937. Ibid.; Hering's letter n I B 191 g 5012 d dated October 8, 1937, ibid; Hering's letter n I B 191 g 5012 d III dated October 9, 1937., ibid; Schumburg's Note n zu 8321 A g 4/10 (421 d) dated October 11, 1937. Ibid.

[37] Ibid. Schwartz's letter to Chief AO n Batr. n 610 joined to Kraneck's letter to Bohle dated October 27, 1937. Chief AO Jusenstaat Palastina, Haavara, A.A. Bonn.

[38] Ibid. Schwartz's letter to Chief AO.

[39] Utermoehle's letter dated November 15, 1937 in Utermoehle's letter to Hentig n Dev. A 60754 dated December 7, 1937. Pol. VII, Palestina, politische Beziehugrn zu Deutschland, DGFP D-V, p. 722.

[40] Marginal note dated September 17, 1939 on Schumburg's note n zu 83-24, A. 12/8 dated August 21, 1939. Inland II A/B, Grundung eines Palastinastaates, Bd. 2 A.A. Bonn.

[41] Hentig's Note n zu Pol. VII, Jan. 1938, Pol. VII, Palastina, politische Benziehugen zu Deutschland, A.A. Bonn' Ernst Marcus, **The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Questions (1933-1939)**, in Yad Vashem Studies N II, pp. 179-204.

[42] Clodius' Note Assistant Director of the Economic Division at the Wilhelstrasse, in Referat Deutschland n zu 83-24 A g 13/1 (15g), dated Jan. 27, 1938. Pol. VII Palastina, politische zu Duetschland, Bd. 1, DGFP D-V, p. 784. Also Bisse's letter to Bohle n 3396/8 dated February 1, 1938. Chief AO, Jusenstaat Palastina, Haavara, A.A. Bonn.

[43] Kennzeichen J. (Mark J.), Berlin: Helmut Eschwege, 1966, p. 132.

[44] Klaus Polken, p. 68.

[45] Tillman, p. 69.

[46] Woermann's note n 83-24 B 14/11 dated November 14, 1938 in DGFP D-V, pp. 905-906.

[47] The Evian Committee met for the first time in London on August 3, 1938 under the Chairmanship of Lord Winterton, member of the Governemnt of His Majesty George Rublee, a well-known New York

Attorney designated as its Director. Rublee's mission was two-fold: trying to persuade German authorites to put some order in the process of Jewish emigration and to start negotiations with friendly governments of the recipient countries to establissh a long term plan for the settlement of refugees. His efforts culminated on February 1, 1939 in an important agreement known as the Rublee-Wohlthat Agreement contained in a "strictly confidential memorandum" which was transmitted to President Roosevelt. It engaged the Reich's responsibility to work unilateraly an emigration plan of 600,000 Jews towards Palestine. New York Times, February 14, 1939, in DGFP D-V, p. 926, n 2. Also Rublee's letter to Wohlthat of February 3, 1939. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter referred to as FRUS) 1939 - II, pp. 77-81; Inland II A/B, Judenauswanderung - Alleg., Bd. 1., A.A. Bonn. Also Achile's Memorandum to Roosevelt dated April 28, 1939, ibid., p. 105.

[48] Ibid. Hull's cable to Taylor and Rublee n 104 dated February 8, 1939, FRUS 1939 - II pp. 84-87.

[49] Paltreu's letter to the Ministry of Economy, July 5, 1939, Inland II A/B, Frundung eines Palastinastaates, Bd. 2, A.A. Bonn. Also Landwehr's letter to Paltreu n V Dev. 4 30626/39 dated August 12, 1939., Ibid.

[50] Schumburg's note to W., Pol. VII, n zu 83-24 A 12/8, August 21, 1939. Ibid., also Hentig's marginal note of September 17, 1939. Ibid.

[51] Marwede's letter to A.A. n V Dev. 3/1535/39 of February 9, 1939. Ibid., Bd. 1. also Hinrich's letter to the Ministry of Economy n zu 83-24 A 9/2, February 27, 1939. Ibid.

[52] Marwede's letter to Paltreu n V Dev. 4/27723/39, August 22, 1939. Ibid.

[53] Ludwig Pinner, pp. 156-157.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] The emigration of Jews from Germany was only prohibited in 1941 by order of SS Chief Himmler; see Leon Poliakov and Joseph Wulff, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden (**The Third Reich and the Jews**), Berlin 1955, p. 89. Klaus Polkehn, p. 69.

[57] In the book Das Leben der Juden Duetschland in Jahre 1933 (**Life of the Jews in Germany in 1933**) by Kurt-Jacob Ball-Kaduri (Frankfurt am Main, 1963) are cited, among others, the following "unpublished sources" which are kept in the Yad-Vashem Archives in Jerusalem:

"**Contributions to the history of the Haavara Transfers**" by Dr. Leo David (YWA 01/277);

"**Negotiations with the Gestapo in Berlin about Emigration 1936-1938**" (YWA 01/130); and

"**Leo Plaut and the Gestapo Chief Diels in Berlin in the Years 1933/34**" (YWA 01/229), all in German.

Klaus Polkehn, p. 55.

# THE NAZI RACIAL DOCTRINE AND POLICIES: AN INTERPRETATION

**Valdis O. Lumans**

National Socialism, a doctrine of hate and intolerance towards non-German peoples, has generated countless studies, and presumably their lessons have not fallen on deaf ears. There was, however, another side of National Socialism, one that did not espouse hatred for others; rather it emphasized an extreme, obsessive concern for the welfare and enhancement of the German people or nation--the **Volk**. Once one distills the conglomoration of ideas, attitudes, prejudices, and individual philosophies that consituted the Nazi idealogy, one is left with an obsessive concern for the spiritual and biological purification, regeneration and preservation of the German **Volk**. All other features and attributes of National Socialism, such as anti-modernism, anti-liberalism, anti-Marxism, anti-capitalism, and even anti-Semitism, revolved around the focal point of the **Volk**.

This preoccupation with the **Volk**, although relatively neglected by many historians, who have traditionally focused on the more sensational diabolical features of National Socialism, was indeed a crucial element of this movement. One may even argue that this "positive" aspect of National Socialism--"positive" only insofar as promoting something, and not working for its destruction--rather than its "negative" features, preeminently the physical eradication of those deemed racially inferior, was the central, essential precept of this doctrine. This all-consuming concern for the **Volk** was the most attractive and most appealing component of National Socialism, one which Hitler and other Nazis publicized and exploited to the fullest. This element of Nazism won more adherents and sympathizers for the Nazi cause than did anti-Semitism or any other of the "antis" in the Nazi idealogical arsenal. All deeds and misdeeds of the Third Reich could be traced to this preoccupation with the **Volk**. The end of unemployment, the cessation of political violence and conflict, and the never-ending patriotic celebrations honoring and promoting the unity and greatness of the German people were all manifestations of this obsession.

When discussing the Nazi years with Germans who had lived through them, one so frequently encounters an explanation for supporting the Nazi cause that runs something like this: "Yes, it was terrible what the Nazis did to the Jews, BUT they did so many good things for us Germans." It was this side of National Socialism, its professed preoccupation with German welfare, rather than the destruction of Jews and other non-Germans, which for the average German was the essence of National Socialism and its most appealing trait. But the "positive" and the "negative" sides of National Socialism were inextricably interconnected. One could not have one without the other. These two sides were inseparable by virture of the Nazi racial doctrine, which divided humanity into two groups: the **Herrenvolk**, those racially and spiritually fit to rule; and the **Untermenschen**, subhumans, who, because of their in-

herent racial inferiority, had to be liquidated or placed in perpetual subjugation to the ruling people. Nazi racists of course included the Germans as well as other Nordic and Germanic peoples in the ruling **Herrenvolk** category. Jews, Blacks, Gypsies, Orientals and Slavs constituted the **Untermenschen** of the world.

Due to their numerical inferiority, the racially superior German people were not assured their ruling status. According to the Nazis, conflict between the two groups would determine ultimate victory. Heinrich Himmler, writing in 1935, postulated that "as long as men live on earth, there would always be a struggle between **Menschen** and **Untermenschen.**"[2] And although the struggle was inevitable, a victory for the Germans was not predestined. The Nazi racists feared above all that the continued mingling of the races and the resulting miscenegation lowered the racial purity of the **Volk**, and if allowd to continue, would lead to its demise. Hitler himself regarded "blood sin" and the pollution of race as "the original sins which would precipitate the end of humanity."[3] But by weeding out the inferior racial elements from the **Volk** and by enhancing selectively the reproductive capacities of the higher quality segments of the **Volk**, the nation as a whole could improve its racial composition and thereby strengthen itself for the imminent struggle. Nazis believed that strict racial segregation could halt and even reverse the trend towards racial degeneration that was leading the **Volk** to its doom.

Out of concern for the racial welfare of the German people Nazi racists advocated complete apartheid. The physical annihilation of those regarded as subhumans exemplified the most extreme form of segregation. Thus the "Final Solution" and the destruction of Jews and others was not an end in itself, but for the Nazis served the ultimate purpose of protecting the racial well-being of the German **Volk.** This fact does not at all detract from the enormity of genocide; indeed, it amplifies the tragedy of it all: In the Nazi scheme of things some peoples and nations had to be destroyed in order for the Germans to survive and thrive.

The reprehensible "negative" features of National Socialism aside, the "positive" preoccupation with the **Volk** and its welfare contained its own innate dangers, both for the non-Germans--who by definition were excluded from the **Volk** and thereby denied the advantages of belonging--and ironically, for the Germans themselves. Nothing demonstrates as clearly the pernicious effects of this doctrine and its consequent policies upon the people it was meant to benefit as the wartime experiences of the German minorities of Europe. And nowhere in practice does the inherent connection between the "positive" and "negative" sides of National Socialism emerge so explicitly.

The members of the German national minority groups, the **Volksdeutsche** (translated as ethnic Germans), lived as citizens of non-German states throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The estimated 10,000,000 **Volksdeutsche** of post-World War I Europe constituted the largest national group living outside its own national

state.[4] Some, such as the Transylvania Saxons of Rumania and the Baltic Germans of Latvia and Estonia, descended from medieval knights, farmers, and merchants who had left an overcrowded Germany to seek their fortunes as pioneers in the East. Others, for instance the Volga Germans of the Soviet Union and the Banat Schwabians of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, had been invited by local rulers to settle and farm lands won from the Turks in the Eighteenth Century. Most, however, including the Germans of Poland, the Memellanders of Lithuania, the South Tyroleans of Italy and the Sudetelanders of Czechoslovakia, constituted national minorities by virtue of the post-war settlement and the accompanying dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the dismemberment of Imperial Germany.

During the immediate post-World War I period many individuals and organizations, both inside the Reich and within the minorities, publicized the real and alleged persecution of the **Volksdeutsche** of Europe at the hands of their non-German governments and agitated for uniting these scattered groups of Germans with the main body of the **Volk** living in Germany. To the dismay of those who promoted the cause of the **Volksdeutsche**, the Weimar government did not share their sentiments. Even though Berlin acknowledged a responsibility for defending the interests of former Reich citizens and provided them with moral, diplomatic and even some material support, it refrained from making any comprehensive claims for all Germans, everywhere.[5]

The German minorities received a more responsive hearing in Berlin after the ascendancy of Adolf Hitler in 1933. After all, the first point of the Nazi Party platform envisioned the unification of all Germans in an exclusively German Reich, and Hitler's ultimate goal called for the creation of a new racial order encompassing all Germans, including the **Volksdeutsche**, who could not be left seperated from the rest of the **Volk** by political, artificial borders.[6]

Besides the general notion of the unity of all Germans, other features of National Socialism were especially appealing to the **Volksdeutsche**. The Nazi denunciation of parliamentary democracy was well-received by many of these people, for representative majority rule doomed the numerically inferior Germans living outside the Reich to perpetual minority status. Another factor favoring National Socialism in winning the hearts and minds of the **Volksdeutsche** was the social composition of the minority groups. The majority of the **Volksdeutsche** belonged to the two groups that provided the Nazis with their staunchest support inside the Reich: the lower middle class and the peasantry, in particular the latter. The predominately rural **Volksdeutsche** appreciated the Nazi advocacy of reuniting German people with the soil, thus restoring to the **Volk** the virtues inherent in the simple peasant life. Even anti-Semitism was understood very well by the **Volksdeutsche**. After all, anti-Semitism was far stronger in the East than in Germany itself, and although Eastern anti-Semitism was economic, cultural and religious rather than racial, the **Volksdeutsche** could readily accept the racial anti-Semitism of the Nazis. Further-

more, the Nazi emphasis on racial segregation simply restated in new terms the cultural and in many instances biological exclusivity practiced by these Germans for generations.

Even though many elements of Nazism appealed to the **Volksdeutsche**, one cannot presume that they all rushed to the Swastika banners of the Fuhrer. Indeed, many of them rejected National Socialism altogether. But as European-wide economic difficulties exacerbated nationality tensions, more and more Germans living in foreign lands associated themselves, if not directly with the Reich and National Socialism, then at least with the local German communities. Gradually, with the financial and diplomatic support of Berlin, pro-Nazis and co-travellers helped establish Nazi influence within the German communities of Europe.[7] The minorities as groups--irrespective of the preferences of individuals, became associated in the minds of non-Germans with Nazi Germany.

Prior to 1933 surprisingly few Nazi notables had displayed any substantial interest in the **Volksdeutsche**, but after the Nazi ascendancy several prominent figures came to realize the potential of the millions of foreign Germans as a source of political power within the Nazi system. A power struggle over the position of intermediary between the Reich and the minorities ensued among several rivals, and out of this contest emerged a victor, Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsfuhrer SS, head of the Schutzstaffel, or SS.[8] The SS, founded as a special body guard for Hitler in the early years of the movement, came under Himmler's leadership in 1929. Himmler diligently labored to increase his personal influence within the Third Reich and to raise the status of his SS. By the end of 1936 Himmler had consolidated all Reich police and internal security agencies under his authority; concurrently he built up a concentration-camp network administered by the SS; and in addition, he won consent from the Fuhrer permitting him to organize armed units within the SS which eventually evolved as the **Waffen SS**, or armed SS. By the late 1930s Himmler was on his way to becoming the second-most powerful figure in the Third Reich. Perhaps most importantly, at least in respect to the **Volksdeutsche**, Himmler was also establishing himself and his SS as the foremost proponents of the Nazi racial doctrines.

Himmler molded the SS as an elite order dedicated to the creed that the future of the German **Volk** depended upon the maintenance of racial purity.[9] The Reichsfuhrer SS was one of the staunchest advocates of the notion of a racial dichotomy of **Herrenvolk** and **Untermenschem**. The Jew became for him the ultimate **Untermensch**, the predestined, mortal enemy of the German **Volk** who would destroy the Germans unless they destroyed the Jew first.[10] He also regarded other races, especially Blacks, Orientals, and Gypsies as dangerous to German racial integrity and was convinced that in the interest of enhancing the Nordic racial components in the **Volk**, these deleterious racial elements would have to be isolated from the collective German bloodstream. But in Himmler's mind the "positive" promotion of the racial health of the **Volk** through racial hygiene and the procreation of

racially valuable German children was far more effective and therefore more important than the eradiction of the harmful influences in achieving the goal of German racial purity. One example of Himmler's priorities is the content of the SS weekly, **Das Schwarze Korps**. This tabloid reserved far more space to photographs and columns featuring German children--usually blond and Nordic in appearance--than to anti-Semitic propaganda. A regular feature in **Das Schwarze Korps** was a column on infant care, as was an honor roll of SS families which had produced more good German blood.[11]

Himmler was also convinced that Germans must abandon the decadent life-style of modern cities and return to working the land as simple but happy and healthy peasants. He believed that only by returning to the soil could they ensure a great future for the **Volk**. Since there was not enough land in Germany for all Germans to farm and commune with, more **Lebensraum**, or living space, would have to be acquired--in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Himmler therefore envisioned creating a new class of soldier-peasants, who would conquer and then cultivate the lands in the East; and the SS would presumably fulfill that mission.

Himmler became interested in the **Volksdeutsche** in the mid-1930's. He no doubt perceived them both as a source of politcal power--which would understandably devolve upon any intermediary between 10,000,000 people and the Reich--as well as a potential manpower pool for the expanding **Waffen SS**. He apparently also recognized their value as a supposedly unadulterated source of German racial stock, which over generations, in some instances even centuries, had maintained cultural and biological segregation. In Himmler's thinking, perhaps these **Volksdeutsche**, the majority being peasants, could provide the human building blocks for the new order in the East.

Wartime circumstances presented Hitler with the opportunity to proceed with the fulfillment of his most cherished goal--the building of a new racial order in the East with the SS serving as the vanguard. What prompted Himmler to take the first steps towards realizing his and the Fuhrer's ultimate goal was the development of a sensitive international situation involving the **Volksdeutsche**. On October 6, 1939, a little more than one month after the German invasion of Poland, Hitler announced before the Reichstag and the world that he intended to remove the Germans from Eastern Europe and resettle them in the Reich and its newly acquired territories. By repatriating these people, the Fuhrer explained, he was unilaterally eliminating the sources of potential conflict in the region.[12]

Hitler's surprise announcement culminated a chain of events that began in August, 1939, with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Agression Pact. A secret clause in the agreement, revised in September, divided much of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence dominated by Germany and the Soviet Union.[13] Germany was allotted Western and Central Poland, while the Soviets would enjoy a free hand in

the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, and Northern Rumania. On September 25 Hitler received notice that Stalin was about to redeem the Fuhrer's promise to allow him his way with the Baltic States.[14] It was presumed that the Soviet leader would shortly tender his claim to the other areas in question. Consequently, in the interest of maintaining good relations with his ally, Hitler decided to relocate those **Volksdeutsche** living in areas designated to fall within the Soviet sphere. He thereby hoped to avoid a situation in which he would be compelled to choose between defending the **Volksdeutsche**--who undoubtedly would clamor for the Reich's intervention as soon as Stalin began sovietizing these territories--and continuing his alliance with the Soviet leader. Hitler still regarded Soviet friendship--or at least neutrality--as essential while he dealt with Poland's western allies. So, a wholesale evacuation of the Germans from the territories in question seemed the most prudent course of action. Although the resettlement could have been construed as a retreat of the German position in Eastern Europe, it was also consistent with Hitler's ultimate goal of uniting all Germans in an exclusively German Reich. A similar, less publicized evacuation was already in progress in the South Tyrol, in consideration of preserving the friendship of Hitler's Italian ally, Mussolini.

It was far easier to announce the evacuation than to accomplish it. The process would involve the transfer and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people, who would have to be fed, housed and cared for throughout each step of the operation, from their homelands to their final placement in the Reich.[15] Himmler, by then the Reich's foremost authority in **Volksdeutsche** affairs, was determined to supervise this momentous task. In a meeting with Hitler, Himmler persuaded the Fuhrer to appoint him **Reichskommissar fur die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV)**--which translates as the Reichs Commisar for the Strengthening of Germandom--and charged him with the responsibility for completing the resettlement operation.[16]

No record exists of the conversation between Himmler and Hitler, but the results of the conference, especially the commission for strengthening Germandom, far exceeded the limited scope of an evacuation. A subsequent Fuhrer decree of October 7 revealed the comprehensive scope of the operation. Not only was Himmler to retrieve all **Volksdeutsche** from the designated lands and resettle them in the Reich, but he was also authorized to eliminate all harmful, alien influences from the German **Volk** and its living space. In addition, he was to plan and execute the settlement of the land assigned for the repatriated Germans.[17] The building of the new order was to commence.

The ideological possibilities presented by the resettlement, no doubt explicitly pointed out by Himmler, must have convinced Hitler that he should reconsider his initial plans for a limited evacuation and commission Himmler with these more ambitious responsibilities. The idea of proceeding with the construction of the new order may not have occurred to Hitler, who, since the outbreak of hostilities, preoc-

cupied himself exclusively with waging war. Himmler presumably had argued that victory on the battlefield had liberated former German territories as well as acquired additional **Lebensraum,** and the hundreds of thousands of **Volksdeutsche** designated for evacuation could populate these areas as the first step in constructing the new order. Furthermore, the SS, which had proven itself under Himmler's leadership as the most steadfast proponent of the racial idea in the Third Reich and had demonstrated its administrative skills through the management of the concentration camps and the reorganization of the Reich's security forces, was capable of assuming the momentous task of building the new order. Hitler must have thought--why not let Himmler make a go of it?

Excepting a few flashes of interest, the supreme war lord, Adolf Hitler, busy with military affairs, granted the leader of the SS a free hand in constructing the new order in the East. Having gained the Fuhrer's confidence, Himmler began organizing the **RKFDV** program. The program, planned and implemented by the various branches of the SS, amounted to the materialization of the Nazi racial idealogy, as conceived by Heinrich Himmler.

The SS assumed responsibility for all three provisions of the **RKFDV** commission. First, it directed most of the evacuation operations involving the **Volksdeutsche,** including their registration, evacuation, housing, feeding and their final placement. These activites could be regarded as "positive," serving the purpose of promoting the welfare of this particular segment of the German **Volk** and thereby contributing to the overall well-being of the entire German nation. In fulfilling the other two responsibilities of the **RKFDV** commission--the elimination of harmful, alien elements from the German **Volk** and its living space, and the planning and settlement of the newly acquired territories--Himmler also turned to his SS. From the moment of the inception of the **RKFDV** program as executed by the SS, the evacuation and settlement of the **Volksdeutsche,** was bound to the most abominable "negative" actions of Nazi Germany.

In order to accomplish the second goal of the **RKFDV** project, the elimination of the allegedly dangerous elements from the German population as well as from the lands set aside for the **Volksdeutsche,** Himmler relied on the SS-controlled German police and other security agencies, such as the infamous **Gestapo.** The concentration camp network was also drawn into this operation to help deal with recalcitrant alien elements who refused to be removed from the German **Volk** or from the lands intended for German resettlement. Eventually the "Final Solution," the most reprehensible action attributed to the Third Reich, was implemented as the ultimate means to achieve this second provision of the **RKFDV** commission. This action, too, was the responsibility of the SS. A practice aimed at fulfilling this second goal and directly related to the resettlement was that of forcibly evicting non-Germans from their homes, farms and businesses to make room for the incoming **Volksdeutsche.** Frequently the same transportation that brought the Germans to

their homes carried away the former occupants.[18] The most tragically ironic example of the intimate connection between the first and second goals of the **RKFDV** commission, and therefore of the "positive" and "negative" aspects of the Nazi racial doctrines, was **Action Reinhardt**. This program entailed distributing the personal belongings of the victims of the extermination camps to resettled **Volksdeutsche** as Christmas presents.

The SS also planned and prepared the new **Lebensraum** for the arriving German residents, thereby fulfilling the third responsibility of the **RKFDV** program. Here, too, the police and the other SS security forces were involved, since the initial step in preparing the land for the new order demanded the removal by deportation of the original population, which consisted of the designated **Untermenschen**, Jews, Poles, Czechs and all others deemed racially inferior to the incoming **Volksdeutsche**.

Thus, the SS, the organizational embodiment of the Nazi racial doctrine, performed both the "negative" and "positive" tasks related to the resettlement of the **Volksdeutsche** and the preparation of the new order. All activities serving these purposes were integral parts of the same comphrehensive **RKFDV** program, which, in the expectations of Himmler and other Nazis, would ensure for the German **Volk** a prosperous and glorious future. The results were, of course, anything but that.

When the **Volksdeutsche** answered the call of the Fuhrer and opted for resettlement, few if any could have imagined the succession of personal hardships that awaited them in the Reich. They first experienced a tedious round of physical, racial, occupational and political examinations that determined their degree of Germanness and consequently their future status in the Third Reich. Those designated as superior Germans were selected for settlement in the East, a fate regarded by the SS as an honor. Those appraised as somewhat lacking in their Germanness, either for racial or political reasons, would remain in Germany to work in the war industry. Ironically, the same examinations and physical standards were applied by the same SS examiners in the evacuation of Poles, Czechs and others to determine the prospects of salvaging an individual for the **Volk**. In short, the same criteria were applied in weeding out undesirables from among those presumed to be members of the **Volk** as in selecting from among the **Untermenschen** the privileged few for inclusion in the German **Volk**.[20]

Resettlers of military age discovered that the "blood and soil" (referring to race and **Lebensraum**) SS doctrine was no mere metaphor, but that they were indeed expected to bleed for the new land. **Waffen SS** recruiters quickly swept up all eligible candidates for the ranks.[21] Others found that their unsettled state of transition from one home to a new one would not be alleviated in the immediate future. The SS officials responsible for the care and housing of the resettlers organized a vast camp network to provide temporary shelter while they waited for final placement. For many **Volksdeutsche** these camps became a permanent way of life, as the promised

resettlement, for one reason or another, never materialized. The resettler camp system provides yet another illustration of the racial dichotomy in practice: The SS administered its consentration camp system for the purpose of isolating racial and political enemies from the German people; but it also managed a camp system for those for whom the racial program was to benefit.

Those **Volksdeutsche** actually settled in the East lived out the war years in an unfamilar, hostile environment. Many fell victims to the vengeance of the dispossessed non-Germans, whose homes, farms and businesses they had accepted. Those that survived the experience of resettlement enjoyed only a fleeting respite before they were on the road again, this time as refugees or expellees, fleeing to the sanctuary of the Reich that had promised them so much. Some fled in advance of the approaching Red Army, others were expelled at the end of the war. The implementation of the doctrine which had envisioned a great future for them had instead led them to utter ruin, at the cost of their homes and in many instances their lives--not to mention the lives of countless people these doctrine considered to be their racial inferiors.

The resettlement operation did not extend to all **Volksdeutche**. Those living in lands not threatened by an imminent Soviet takeover at the time of the inception of the resettlement remained in their homelands. Large communities of Germans therefore lived out the war in Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and the two successors states of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Serbia-Banat. The governments of these states were either willing or reluctant allies of Germany, and the need to relocate the local **Volksdeutsche** did not arise--at least not until the end of the war. In fact, in the long-range plans of the Reich these lands eventually would be integrated into the new order, and at some time in the distant future the local **Volksdeutsche** would provide a nucleus for a Germanized Southeastern Europe.[22] Consequently, the policies of the Reich towards the remaining minorities were formulated in consideration of the same goal as the **RKFDV** program--the creation of the new racial order for the benefit of the German **Volk**.

In the Southeast Himmler and the SS promoted the elite status of the **Volksdeutsche** during the war years and raised them to a privileged position in the midst of non-German populations. Ironically the policies intended to promote the welfare of the privileged elite in the long-run affected them negatively. With the exception of Yugoslavia and Greece, Reich policy regarding the rest of the Southeast and the peoples of the region was relatively benign--at least in comparison to German actions elsewhere. As a result, hatred of the Germans, both Reich and **Volksdeutsche**, as a rule was not as pronounced here as in other parts of Europe. Nevertheless, the exactions demanded by the Reich of the Southeastern regimes as well as the privileged treatment of the **Volksdeutsche** took their toll in the growing resentment towards Germany, and especially towards its most visible exponents, the local German communities. As the German military withdrew from Southeastern

Europe, and as the underpinnings for the privileged position of the **Volksdeutsche** eroded, the simmering indignation erupted with a fury--particularly in Yugoslavia. The **Volksdeutsche** bore the brunt of the hatred their historic maintenance of Germanness and their more recent association with the Reich had generated.

Tragically, many of these pitiable people perceived nothing wrong with having maintained their separateness, nor even with having received privileged treatment, and were at a loss to explain the animosity of their non-German neighbors. They had nurtured their exclusivity, so they believed, out of their love for their own **Volk**, not out of hate for others. But again, as in the Nazi racial scheme, the two attitudes could not be neatly separated, for in practice one seemed to accompany the other, especially during the war years. At least this is what the non-Germans perceived.

Throughout Eastern and Southeastern Europe during the last year of the war and the immediate post-war period the **Volksdeutsche**, resettlers as well as those who had remained in their homelands, suffered grievously for their association with the Reich. The non-Germans attributed to them responsibility for the misdeeds of the Third Reich. In Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslavakia, where the Reich's occupation had been particularly brutal and where the building of the new order had already commenced, all Germans endured the consequences. In these states and others the expulsion of all Germans became official policy.[23] Even more injurious than official action was popular anti-German sentiment, which manifest itself in persecution and countless atrocities against the **Volksdeutsche**.

In conclusion, the Nazi racial doctrine and resulting policies as formulated by Himmler and his SS cohorts had envisioned elevating the German **Volk** to unprecedented heights, an elevation justified in their minds by a presumed racial superiority. But instead of raising the Germans to new prominence and ensuring their future greatness, these schemes has plunged them into abysmal despair and ruin. The **Volksdeutsche** of Europe, along with their fellow Reich Germans, had been taught the lesson of the folly of their obssesive concern for their Germanness and their **Volk**. But one cannot single out for blame that particular generation of Germans for allowing themselves to be seduced by the doctrine of the **Volk**, which, after all, was no more than an exaggerated form of nationalism and superpatriotism, twin nemeses plaguing our own contemporary world. The same mentality as theirs is today responsible for numerous conflicts in far corners of the world, and closer to home, even for the no-less dangerous "we" and "they" distinctions set by the so-called "moral majority."

It is human nature to want the very best for one's own kind and to show a preference for the same. But when exaggerated to the point of arrogance and a conviction in one's own superiortity, this prefernce for one's own kind--as demonstrated by the fate of the **Volksdeutsche**--can lead to devastating results, not only for the excluded, but also for the privileged. Rather than culitivate an intense

awareness of one's own kind, as defined by a common nationality, culture, language or even presumed race, those seeking an identity might better focus on their common human conditions and human identity.

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[1] Valdis O. Lumans, "The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe," Dissertation University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1979.

[2] Heinrich Himmler, quoted in **Der Untermensch** (Berlin: SS Hauptamt 1941), n.p.

[3] Adolf Hitler, **Mein Kampf**, Sentry Edition, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), p. 249.

[4] According to Wilhelm Winkler, **Statistisches Handbuch der europaischen Nationalitaten** (Vienna, Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1931) and **Deutschtum in aller Welt: Bevolkerungsstatistische Tabellen** (Vienna: Verlag Franz Deuticke, 1938), the **Volksdeutsche** living as members of minorities totaled 9,700,000: Czechslovakia, 3.318,445; Poland, 1,190,000; Lithuania-Memelland, 100,000; Alsace-Lorraine, 1,500,00; Belgium, 70,000; Denmark, 30-40,000; Italy, over 200,000; Yugoslavia, 700,000; Hungary, 500,000; Rumania, 750,000; Soviet Union, 1.240,000; Lativa and Estonia, 80,000.

[5] For a thorough discussion of Weimar minority policy, refer to Norbert Krekeler, **Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik: Die Subventionrung der deutschen Minderheit in Polen, 1919-1933** (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973). See also relavent sections in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, **National sozialistische Aussenpolitik, 1933-1938** (Berlin and Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzer Verlag, 1968).

[6] Hitler, **Mein Kampf**, is replete with future plans for the "new order," and how all Germans would be included. However, his attitude towards the **Volksdeutsche** was ambivalent. For instance, in regards to the Baltic Germans of Lativa and Estonia, he became very impatient with their arrogance and talk of titles and former glories. See Hitler, **Secret Conversations with Hitler: The Two Newly-Discovered 1931 Interviews**, ed. by Edouard Calic, trans. by Richard Barry (1968; rpt. New York: John Day Co., 1971), p. 527.

[7] The best work on the subject is Jacobsen, **Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik**. Refer also to Lumans, "The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle," for discussion of this process in each minority group.

[8] In his campaign to win authority in the Reich and influence within the minorities Himmler concentrated his efforts at establishing control over the **Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi)**, the Ethnic German Liaison Office, a Nazi Party Office created in 1935 as the coordinating center for all activites in the Reich related to the **Volksdeutsche**. He achieved his goal by arranging the appointment of one of his most trusted and highest-ranking SS officers, **SS Obergruppenfuhrer** Werner Lorenz, as chief of this agency in January, 1937. Subsequently, step by step, Himmler extended total control over **VoMi** until it was absorbed into his SS empire, and through this organization the head of the SS asserted authority over the minorities.

[9] One can cite countless examples of Himmler's preoccupation with making the SS the racial elite of the Third Reich. For one example, refer to RFSS, Himmler, Anordung A, Nr. 65, December 31, 1931, the order establishing the SS marriage authorization, in R. Walther Darre, **Neudal aus Blut und Boden** (1930; rpt. Berlin and Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1943), p. 228.

[10] Josef Ackermann, **Heinrich Himmler als Ideologue** (Gottengen: Musterschmidt, 1970), pp. 155-59.

[11] This observation does not imply that anti-Semitism was not a theme in **Das Schwarze Korps**. Anti-Semitic articles appeared in virtually every issue. Nonetheless, it is revealing that the overwhelming majority of racially-oriented topics emphasized the biological care of the **Volk**.

[12] Hitler's speech before the Reichstag, October 6, 1939, Document 72, in Dietrich Loeber, **Diktierte Option: Die Umsiedlung der Deutsch-Balten aus Estland und Lettland, 1939-1941** (Neumunster: Karl Wachholz Verlag, 1972), pp. 18-19.

[13] Loeber, Doc. 32, Nichtangriffsvertrag zwischen Deutschland und der UdSSR, August 23, 1939, pp. 35-36; Loeber, Doc. 14, Geheimes Zusatzprotokol zum Nichtangriffsvertrag, pp. 18-19. Another easily accessible source for documents referring to these events is U.S. Department of State, **Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: Series D 1937-1945** (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949-1957), Vol. 7, (hereafter citied as **DGFP**).

[14] Schulenburg in Moscow to Reich Foreign Ministry, Berlin, September 25, 1939, **DGFP, D**, No. 131, p. 130.

[15] Shortly after receiving notification of Stalin's intentions Hitler charged Werner Lorenz, the SS general and director of the **Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle**, with responsibility for organizing and executing the evacuation. When Himmler learned of the appointment of one of his subordinates to direct this project, he was outraged and immediately rushed off to see the Fuhrer. For accounts of these activites, see Transcripts of the United States Tribunals at Nuremberg, Case 8, U.S.A., v. Ulrich Greifelt et al., Lorenz Testimony, pp. 2620-21, National Archives. The exact dates of these conversations are unknown, but occured sometime between September 26 and 28.

[16] Robert Koehl, **RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 49-50.

[17] "Erlass des Fuhrers und Reichskanzlers zur Festigung deutschen Volstums," October 7, 1939, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter cited as BA), R49 25. As far as extensive research has revealed, there is no evidence of even a mention of a comprehensive program of this scope prior to the meeting between Himmler and Hitler in late September, 1939.

[18] "Bericht uber die Umsiedlung und ihre Folgen," undated, National Archives Microfilm, Records of the Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of German Police, T-175/72/2589710-712; Jerzy Skotniki affidavit, No-5257, Prosec. Doc. Book VII, Case 8; Krumey affidavit, Prosec. Doc. Book VIIID, No-5364, Case 8.

[19] Frank to Lublin and Auschwitz camps, September 26, 1942, U.S. Chief Counsel for War Crimes, **Trial of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals** (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949-1953), Vol. 13, Case 11, pp. 256-8 (hereafter cited as **TWC**); RFSS to Pohl, to Lorenz, October 24, 1942, NO-5395, **TWC**, 4, Case 8, pp. 972-73; Pohl, "Bericht uber die bisherige Verwertung von Textil-Alt, material aus der Judenumsiedlung," February 6, 1943, NO-1257, Prosec. Doc. Book XIIIB.

[20] For a discussion of the process, refer to Koehl, "The Duetsche Volksliste in Poland, 1939-1945," **Journal of Central Euorpean Affairs**, 15, No. 4 (1956), 354-66.

[21] Greifelt, RKFDV Memo, January 26, 1940, Documents of the Auslands-Insitut, T-81/288/2411853-857; Altena, VoMi, to all Einsatzfuhrer, October 29, 1940, BA R59 2.

[22] "Die europaische Neuordung in Sudosteuropa," Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Bonn (Politisches Archiv, Auswartiges Amt, hereafter, PA AA), Inland IIg, 239, Bd. 20; and "Die Rolle der deutschen Volksgruppen im Rahmen der europaischen Neuordnug in den sudostlichen Karpathen-Raumen nordlich der Donau," PA AA, Inl. IIg, 239, Bd. 20.

[23] For materials on the treatment of the Germans in Eastern and Southeastern Europe after the War, refer to the series of published documents, **Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa**, edited by Theodor Scheider and published by the Bundesministerium fur Vertriebene, Fluchtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte.

# "REPLACING 'SAMBO': COULD WHITE IMMIGRANTS SOLVE THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE CAROLINAS?"

**Marcia G. Synnott**

From the end of the Civil War until the mid-1920s white southerners periodically proposed various immigration schemes to solve their recurrent labor problems, specifically the difficulties of acquiring and retaining agricultural workers. They hoped that European workers, deflected from other destinations, would replace blacks, who, since emancipation were no longer a "faithful" labor force. Instead of continuing the plantation system, some southerners proposed to rebuild agriculture on the basis of family-sized farms, cultivated by model farmers, especially those brought from the fields, gardens, and vineyards of Europe. Most of their various schemes had little chance of success, however, because the Southeast did not offer the two inducements which immigrants found in the North and the West: high wages and cheap land.

With the exception of businessmen and landowners like Hugh MacRae, David R. Coker, and Richard I. Manning, the proponents of immigration to the Carolinas made no serious study of what prior preparations were necessary, with the consequence that most immigrants left the region within a few years. Not only did immigrants earn meager returns from the lands they had to clear and drain, but they also experienced southern racial prejudices against foreigners--from both blacks and whites. While blacks feared the economic competition of immigrants, whites suspected them of political racialism and softness on racial segregation. Even before the Immigration Quota Acts of the 1920s became fully effective, most southerners realized that white immigrants would not replace "Sambo," given the limited inducements offered.[1]

Nevertheless, the immigration schemes proposed by Benjamin R. Tillman, E. [Ebbie] J. [Julian] Watson, and the members of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission (notably, chairman Richard I. Manning and David R. Coker)--and by North Carolinian Hugh MacRae--should be studied for several reasons. First, they illustrate the efforts made by politicians, state officials, landowners, and businessmen to relieve the South of its dependence on black labor. Second, they reveal the attitudes of southern whites toward both blacks and the foreign-born. Third, their plans are an index to the economic vicissitudes of the region. Finally, they suggest a persistent concern--and hope--for the future of southern, defined as "white," civilization (and show an enthusiasm for ambitious projects, but not for shouldering the cost of implementation). The proposals of Tillman and Watson lacked the careful planning necessary for success, but the recommendations of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission might have worked if the state had been willing to fund them. Of the four, only Hugh MacRae's colonization projects in eastern North Carolina generally succeeded, because he committed his time and personal resources to their achievement. He was not able, however, to secure the

kind of state or federal funding that would have permitted the duplication of his projects in every southern state.

The recruitment of immigrants between 1865 and 1925 waxed and waned with the demand for farm or mill workers. These were four periods in which recruitment efforts were most intense: 1865-67, 1880 to the early 1890s, 1900-08, and 1920-24. During the first period at then end of the Civil War, South Carolina appropriated $10,000 to hire a Commissioner of Immigration, who would open an office in Charleston, advertise the benefits of the state's soil and climate, and send agents to Europe. This hasty postwar scheme, which brought only about 400 immigrants to South Carolina--the largest contingent being 150 Germans from Bremen--has rightly been dismissed as an "immigration craze" stirred up by the pressing need to adjust the southern economy to the fact of emancipations.[2]

Although blacks were fearful that they would "be crowded out" by white immigrants, a concern they voiced at each new scheme, southern landowners were all too willing to exploit their labor. The blacks' lack of mobility and subjugation under Jim Crow laws rendered them more "dependable" than immigrants, many of whom could use ethnic networks to find more favorable employment conditions elsewhere. In fact, the percentage of European immigrants residing in the South declined from 4% in 1870 to 2.8% in 1900. Not until intolerable conditions drove blacks out of the South in the Great Migration, 1890-1930, did southern whites seriously consider launching a movement, as opposed to sporadic efforts, to replace them with European immigrants.[3]

Between 1880 and 1910, in tune with "New South" economic development, most southern states established immigration bureaus and held promotional conventions to advertise opportunities to farmers, mechanics, miners, and factory workers. But it cannot be determined how many of the 860 immigrants that South Carolina's bureau brought in between 1881 and 1886 (at a cost of about $8,900) stayed. At a convention in Richmond in 1893, eight southern governors extended "to the worthy immigrant . . . the hand of welcome . . . without regard to his religion, his politics, or his nativity." Governor Benjamin R. Tillman reassured his listeners that "the foreign citizens of South Carolina are among the best," none of "low character" who would "menace our free insitutions."[4]

Fifteen years later, as a United States Senator, Tillman addressed the South Carolina House of Representatives on "The Negro Problem and Immigration." Because blacks outnumbered whites by 225,000 and were "becoming more and more worthless, more and more uncontrollable, more and more resentful of white supervision," hundreds of thousands of immigrants from northern and western Europe were needed as "white reinforcements." Since Tillman was one-half English and one-fourth each of both German and Irish, he favored these nationalities, but not southern, and eastern Europeans. While Italians " 'from Rome northward' " had

made a favorable enough impression on him, those from Naples were "not the type we would like to have.' " In order to attract the right kind of immigrants, lands had to be drained and the blacks totally subjugated by the repeal of the 15th Amendment, lest they "act as a scarecrow to keep your white Dutchman, or Belgian, or Scotchman, or German away." In rosy colors Tillman painted a South Carolina landscape reclaimed by one hundred thousand energetic Hollanders. "They would turn that wilderness of bog and swamp into a garden," he boasted, "and Charleston would leap forward to her proper place as a great commercial seaport." Although Tillman was warmly applauded for his views, he had offered no pratical suggestions beyond observing that the South needed federal money for reclamation, and that its representatives should vote accordingly. If the federal government was "going to put water on that land," he stated, in reference to irrigation projects in the West, it was "their duty to come down here and take the water off ours."[5]

Since federal assistance for reclamation projects in the South would not be forthcoming until the 1930s, the proponents of immigration had to find other means of attracting hard-working Europeans. From 1904-1908 South Carolina actively sought to recruit European immigrants through its Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Immigration. Because the state's businessmen were eager to employ skilled textile workers, the Cotton Manufactorers' Association contributed funds to Commissioner E.J. Watson's ambitious project to secure immigrants for the two voyages of the **S.S. Wittekind** from Bremen to Charleston. Watson had personally gone to Europe and offered individuals of various nationalities--Austrians, Belgians, Croatians, Dutch, French, Germans, and Hungarians--what amounted to a quasi-alien labor contract in exchange for free passage. Although Commerce and Labor Department Secretary Oscar Straus interpreted the Alien-Contract Law to allow South Carolina to import immigrants, Congress soon closed this loophole by penalizing with deportation any immigrant whose passage had been prepaid, whether by an individual or by a state. The **Wittekind's** arrival on November 4, 1906, with 476 passengers, and again on February 9, 1907, with 121 passengers, made it the first immigrant ship to enter South Carolina since the 1860s.[6]

Watson also persuaded Charles Weintraub, an emigre piano polisher from St. Petersburg then living in New York City, to locate his Incorporative Farming Association of 25 Russian and Jewish families on a 2,200-acre tract near Montmorenci in Aiken County. Due to their inexperience and to unfavorable economic and weather conditions, the socialist colony of Happyville lasted a little more than two years, from December 1905 to May 1908. Understandably discouraged, most of the 54 colonists left the South, as did many of the 2,500 immigrants who came to South Carolina during the early 1900s from the eastern and northwestern United States and from Europe. As of 1920 just one percent of the state's population were foreign-born or the children of foreign-born parents; the foreign-born themselves numbered 6,401.[7]

According to R. Beverly Herbert, whom Watson had hired to recruit immigrants, the newcomers were dissatisfied with the low wages and limited employment opportunities for their particular trades. Moreover, after the initial welcome in Charleston, the immigrants found that they were treated not much better than black laborers and housed in the same type of cabins. Instead of relieving the South's racial problem, the presence of immigrants actually created "a new problem." In 1908 South Carolina dropped immigration recruitment from the work of Watson's department, which henceforth would concentrate on Agriculture, Commerce, and Industries. The state, Herbert observed, would "never have another department of immigration which will do business on a shoe string in the same grand manner as was done by Commissioner E.J. Watson."[8]

Rather than seeking immigrants, said Herbert, South Carolina should try to keep its native-born white citizens from leaving the state by improving education, agriculture and manufacturing. Something had to be done to halt the emigration of agricultural workers (30,000 during the first six months of 1923), who sought jobs in towns, cotton mills, lumber camps, and northern factories. Of the tenants who continued to farm (65% of South Carolina's lands were tenant-operated in 1920), more than one-third moved every year in a hungry search for a better living. Between 1918 and 1922 cotton acreage had declined by almost one million acres because of falling prices, the invasion of the boll weevil, and lack of knowledge about new seeds and sprays.[9]

The region could endure the out-migration of blacks, so southern businessmen and landowners believed, but it could not sustain the loss of white labor without jeopardizing the future of rural civilization. In response to the agricultural depression of the 1920s, both North and South Carolina created Land Settlement Commissions which conferred with each other and investigated projects in other states and foreign countries with the purpose of developing plans to help their own tenant farmers become landowners. Their proposals included yet another immigration scheme. Land, in the form of small homesteads located in planned colonies, would be offered as bait for several hundred skilled farmers from northern Europe, who would serve as models for native-born whites. The work of Hugh MacRae in eastern North Carolina was a convincing demonstration that carefully planned and operated immigrant agricultural colonies could dramatically increase yeilds on old lands through proper cultivation, drainage, and the use of improved seeds and sprays.[10]

MacRae, a mining engineer (Massachestts Institute of Technology, 1885), banker, and president of his family-owned Wilmington Cotton Mills Company, decided in the early 1900s to devote his life to the improvement of southern agriculture. He recognized that the Coastal Plain from Norfolk, Virginia, to Jacksonville, Florida, was suitable for intensive farming of a diversity of early spring and summer vegetables. The produce of this "Great Winter Garden could be shipped to northern cities on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. Using a survey by

soil experts and drainage engineers to indentify the areas most suitable for intensive farming, the Carolina Trucking Development Company, formed by MacRae and other Wilmington businessmen, purchased for $12 an acre or less almost 70,000 acres, mostly Norfolk sandy loam, in six locations in New Hanover and Pender Counties within 40 miles to the north and west of the port city. MacRae was a painstaking developer, in contrast to the politicians and state officials who were usually just promoters. Prior to bringing in immigrant families, the Carolina Trucking Development Company built roads, drained and divided land into ten and twenty acre plots--parts of which were cleared and ploughed--and constructed small houses and outbuildings. Settlers could buy woodland for $30 acre and farm land for $50 to $150 per acre, by putting one-fourth down and paying the balance within five years, or longer, if necessary, at 6% interest rate on the deferred amount. The company provided the newcomers with jobs clearing the land until they could begin farming and then gave them tools, livestock, seed, and fertilizer. The settlers raised not only cash crops--cabbage, carrots, cucumbers, lettuce, snap beans, spinach, squash, strawberries, and later, fortuitously, daffodils, gladioli, irises, and tulip bulbs and flowers--but also a good deal of their own food.[11]

Cooperative ownership of heavy machinery and cooperative marketing organizations reduced costs for the individual farmer and promoted efficiency. Just as an agricultural expert advised the men on farming techniques, so also a social worker helped the women adjust their housekeeping to a new enviornment. The small size of the farms made close-knit communities feasible. Within a year or two MacRae's colonies became communities with one or more churches, a school, and a recreational center, and they contributed to the Americanization of the immigrants. His most successful colonies--Castle Hayne, St. Helena, and Marathon--exemplified the principals he enunciated in a 1908 address on "Bringing Immigrants to the South." "The failure of the **Wittekind** and other experiments," he said, "demonstrated that the immigrants should be directed to agriculture, and from this source the other demands for labor may later be supplied." Using an agricultural metaphor, he warned that "the first immigrants to be brought to the South cannot be broadcasted," but "must be treated with great care, just as one would do with rare plants being brought to a new locality."[12]

MacRae had his failures, however, and learned from them. He decided to bring in Europeans after failing to interest in his projects a trainload of farmers from the western states. Because they lacked familiarity with English, he reasoned, prospective European settlers were less likely to be discouraged by the tales of economic woe told by the local inhabitants. The Carolina Trucking Development Company printed and distributed promotional pamphlets with maps of the farm colonies and price lists for land in the language of the nationality--Dutch, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, or Polish--that it wanted to recruit for a particular colony. The pamphlets explained "How to Own a Truck Farm in the Eastern North Carolina

Colonies" or how to be "King of a Farm rather than the slave to business."[13]

The first colonists brought over in 1905 were seven Italian families from historically crime-free Rovigo in the province of Venetia. At St. Helens, named in honor of the Italian queen, these colonists successfully raised grapes and marketed wine until the North Carolina legislature enacted a prohibition law. Although most of the original colonists left, St. Helena prospered again by 1920, following the settlement of a mixed group of immigrants: Italians, Poles, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Belgians, Danes, Slovaks, Serbs, Germans, and English, many of whom had earlier lived in the northern United States.[14]

Other colonies also prospered from the intermingling of nationalities, which shared agricultural techniques and the common experience of learning English. Indeed, colonies settled by only one nationality or by single men were less likely to succeed than colonies inhabited by families from several nationalities. This lesson was illustrated by the failures of Artesia (Poles), Marathon, (single Greek men), Newberlin (Germans, Hungarians), later renamed Delco, and Van Eeden (Dutch). Marathon succeeded after Polish families settled there and began truck gardening. Within a few years its identity merged into that of neighboring Castle Hayne, MacRae's most successful colony. Located eight miles north of Wilmington on the site of a pre-Revolutionary War plantation, Castle Hayne brought together the horticulture skills of the Dutch (bulbs, flowers, and shrubs) and of the Hungarians, Poles, and Norwegians (vegetables and fruits). This colony appeared to visitors as "a beehive of concentrated, scientifically conducted activity, the direction of it coming within, from the closely co-operating colonists themselves, . . . in every direction health-restoring impulses radiate across the surrounding country." Although some American farmers were among the 600 to 700 settlers in MacRae's colonies, it was doubtful whether most tenant farmers in the region adopted the agricultural practices of the immigrants. After raising their one crop cash--cotton or tobacco--native-born farmers perferred to " 'sit on the front porch,' " rather than working year-round cultivating a diversity of crops.[15]

Nevertheless, MacRae optimistically believed that the immigration of European farmers would either solve or at least minimize the race problem, by making "the negro incidental instead of the controlling factor" in the southern labor force. While the South still depended on the black laborer, the Great Migration provided, he argued, "the one great opportunity that we have had, and in fact the necessity for replacing him with something better." "Where the population consists of seventy-five negroes to twenty-five whites," he said, "there our Anglo-Saxon civilization in the end is doomed ultimately to decay." The solution was to dilute the black population by a two-way process: the emigration of blacks to other sections of the United States and the immigration of Europeans to the South. To be sure, "a small proportion of negroes," not more than 25%, could find "a place of usefulness and social progress" in a society whose standards were defined by southern whites.

MacRae hired black laborers on a daily wage (at twice the going rate of $1.00) to ditch, clear, and fence land, but would not sell them lots in his farm colonies. All deeds contained a clause which would "forever prevent the land from passing to a negro," no exceptions made. The Carolina Trucking Development Company was anxious to counteract the unfavorable publicity given the South by steamship and railroad agents who distributed maps labeling the region as the "Country of the Black Man." Although MacRae had put aside his Anglo-Saxon prejudices to the extent that he would recruit skilled farmers of any European nationaltiy, he was unwilling to include in his "human engineering" projects blacks, whom he viewed as "unreliable," unskilled, and possessing more brawn than brains.[16]

Having invested heavily in his farm colonies, on which he made some profit, MacRae realized that no private individual had the resources to apply his concept on the scale required for the agricultural rejuvenation of the South. In 1923 he tried to persuade the North Carolina legislature to fund the Land Loan bill introduced by state Senator D.F. Giles. But North Carolina did not have the money to finance adequately a Farm Land Board authorized to undertake land settlement. Thereafter MacRae directed his efforts to securing federal assistance for reclamation and land settlement projects in the southern states.[17]

Meeting in Columbia during January 1923, concerned citizens and representatives of colleges, cotton manufacturers, chambers of commerce, newspapers and railroads organized the South Carolina Land Settlement Association and elected officers: as president, former Governor Richard I. Manning; as a vice-president, David R. Coker, the Hartsville pioneer seed and plant breeder; and as secretary W.H. Mills, professor of rural social science at the Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina. Two months later, in March, the South Carolina General Assembly empowered Governor Thomas G. Mcleod to appoint a commission to investigate land settlement policies in such others states as California, North Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. Manning was appointed chairman of the seven-member commission which included Coker and Mills. Hugh MacRae accompanied the members on their western trip in July. Learning from visits to farm colonies of 100 to 300 families in California and Wisconsin, the commissioners recommended in their report to the governor that the South Carolina legislature pass two bills and a bond issue. Using the California Land Settlement Act as a model, a State Land Ownership Board of South Carolina should be created with the authority to locate lands for planned colonies, which would be financed by a $300,000 loan at no more than 4½% interest from the Sinking Fund Commission. The legislature should also enact a statute similar to the Wisconsin Land Mortgage Association Act to facilitate the participation of individuals and corporations in the projects. Finally, the legislature should submit to the voters a $1,000,000 bond issue, which would be used as a revolving fund for loans to settlers, who would have up to thirty-six years to repay at 6% interst. To benefit the whole state the commission recommended that a

supervised group settlement be developed in each major agricultural section: truck farming in the lower counties; general farming in the coastal plain; and fruit and berry-growing in the sandhills.[18]

After serving the needs of the landless South Carolina farmers the settlements would welcome "men with a knowledge of special phases of agriculture, which our own people lack . . . from other states in this country and from England, Ireland, Scotland, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, France, and Germany, the countries from which the best citizens of the United States came . . ." the commission's invitation explicitly excluded "the anarchists, communists, or bolsheviki from the industrial centers of Russia, the Balkan States and Southern Europe."[19]

In spite of the endorsement of Governor McLeod and the support expressed for land settlement in public meetings and in magazine and newspaper articles, the legislature failed to pass the bills during its 1924 session. Three major factors contributed to their defeat: lack of money, partisan politics, and growing national support for immigration restriction. In March the Sinking Fund Commission reported that it had no money available in 1924 because of having to finance the construction of the State Office Building. Many legislators reacted negatively to the bills, believing that they were "a scheme to aid some of the large wealthy land owners in disposing of their lands," or that they were a part of "an effort to bring Governor Manning back into the politics of the state." Although these charges were refuted, it was difficult to keep "politics out of the state land schemes."[20]

Finally, national politics in 1924 worked against the proposals to bring in skilled European farmers. The Reed-Johnson Act of 1924 limited immigration annually to 2% of the number of each nationality in the Census of 1890. Although this law favored northern Europeans, it set a quota of about 165,000 for the coming year and required immigrants to obtain special visas overseas from an American counsel, so that their number could be counted before departure rather than on arrival. The Land Settlement Commission did persuade South Carolina Senator Nathaniel B. Dial to speak out in favor of an amendment endorsed by MacRae and introduced by North Carolina Senator Furnifold M. Simmons which would permit "a selective method" of immigration, with preference to agriculturalists. But Representative James F. Byrnes publicly criticized those in South Carolina who wanted to bring in European immigrants to replace black laborers. The failure of the **Wittekind** experiment showed, Byrnes argued, the folly of importing immigrants unfamiliar with the English language, cotton farming and southern labor conditions. "What will it profit us," he quoted, "if we grow a few more bales of cotton or operate a few more spindles and yet suffer the loss of our civilization?" During his unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate in which he lost to Coleman Blease Byrnes expressed what was probably a widely held view. He would "rather have one big black nigger (sic) on [his] cotton farm than half a dozen Italians." That statement may indicate why the proposals of the South Carolina

Land Settlement Commission and of Hugh MacRae did not win adequate legislative and popular support.[21]

By the mid-1920s most of the southerners who had earlier viewed immigration as a means of solving their labor problems changed their minds and supported the quota laws. The settlement of Europeans involved a substantial financial investment and posed a social risk. When plans for model agricultural communities were implemented during the 1930s, they were federally-funded and were for native-born whites. But if "Sambo" could not be replaced by an influx of white labor, he would still be kept in his place. The exploitation of black labor was the basis of the southern economy until the New Deal and World War II stimulated a revolution in southern agriculture and industry. Linked to the West in an expanding Sunbelt, which attracts capital and workers from the other regions of the United States and from abroad, the South bears today little resemblance to the "farm ownership in communities" envisioned by Hugh MacRae and David R. Coker, but it does offer new economic opportunities to both blacks and whites.[22]

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[1] The following articles have provided useful background information for my study of immigration to the Carolinas: Rowland T. Berthoff, "Southern Attitudes Toward Immigration, 1865-1914," **The Journal of Southern History**, 17, No. 3 (August, 1951), 328-60; Robrt L. Brandon, "The End of Immigration to the Cotton Fields," **The Mississippi Valley Historical Review**, 50, No. 4, (March, 1964), 591-611; Dan T. Carter, "Faithful Legacy: White Southerners and the Dilemma of Emancipation," **The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (1977)**, pp. 49-63; Bert James Lowenburg, "Efforts of the South to Encourage Immigration. 1865-1900," **The South Atlantic Quarterly**, 33, No. 4 (October, 1934), 363-85; Arnold Shankman, "This Meanacing Influx: Afro-Americans on Italian Immigration to the South, 1880-1915," **The Mississippi Quarterly**; 31, No. 1 (Winter, 1977-78), 67-88. Also of use were Henry Booker, "Efforts of the South to Attract Immigrants," Diss. University of Virginia 1965, and Jean Scarpaci, "Italian Immigration in Louisiana's Sugar Parishes: Recruitment, Labor Conditions, and Community Relations, 1880-1910," Diss. Rutgers University 1972.

[2] "To Encourage Immigration," in Walter L. Fleming, editor, **Documentary History of Reconstruction: Political, Military, Social, Religious, Educational & Industrial, 1865 to the Present Time**, (Clevland, Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906-07) 299-300; Lowenberg, p. 369; Bertoff, pp. 336-37; and Carter, pp. 59-60. Less than 3,000 of the 250.000 immigrants entering the United States in 1865-66 came to the cotton and cane fields; and of the 3,000 who settled in the southern states, most chose Tennessee and Virginia.

[3] "Negro Opposition to Immigration," in Fleming, **Documentary History of Reconstruction**, II, 310; Shankman, pp. 68, 73-75, 81, 86-88.

[4] State Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Immigration, **Handbook of South Carolina--Resources, Institutions and Industries of The State. A Summary of the Statistics of Agriculture, Manufactures, Geography, Climate, Geology and Physiography, Minerals and Mining, Education, Transportation, Commerce, Government, Etc.**, E.J. Watson, Commissioner, 1907 (Columbia, South Carolina: The State Paper Company, 1907), pp. 513, 516, 509-23, 322-23, 531; **Proceedings of the Convention Of Governors Held in the City of Richmond, Virginia, on April 12th and 13th, 1893. With**

**Papers Prepared by the Governors of Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia, in Regard to the Physical Resources of their Respective States** (Richmond: C.N. Williams, Printer, 1893), pp. 9-10, 67. In 1898, Italians established Homewood colony in Horry County, South Carolina, and successfully marketed strawberries and vegetables. See Mildred Louise Pettus, "European Immigration to South Carolina, 1881-1908," Master's Thesis University of South Carolina 1954, pp. 20-21.

[5] B.R. Tillman, U.S. Senator, Address Delivered by Invitation Before the South Carolina House of Representatives, January 24, 1908 (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1908), pp. 6, 13-14, 16, 3-23; and Tillman, quoted in Hugh MacRae, "Bringing Immigrants to the South," Address Delivered Before the North Carolina Society of New York, December 7, 1908, p. 10 (copy in Hugh MacRae Papers 21-H, Box: Volumes, folders Printed Material, Manuscript Department, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University).

[6] The best study to date of Commissioner E.J. Watson's efforts to recruit immigrants is Pettus' Master's thesis on "European Immigration to South Carolina," pp. 36-37. See also **Handbook of South Carolina** (1907), pp. 520-23; and **First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce, and Immigration of the State of South Carolina, in 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1908, in Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1905-09).**

[7] **Arnold Shankman, "Happyville, the Forgotten Colony," American Jewish Archives**, 30, No. 1 (April 1978), 3-19; Pettus, pp. 24-25; and **The Aiken Journal and Review**, May 25, June 1, 8, August 31, September 4, 7, November 6, 23, December 11, 14, 18, 1906; August 9, 23, 27, 30, September 3, 6, 13, October 4, 29, November 26, 1907. See **Blue Book of Southern Progress--1923** (Baltimore, MD.: 1923), pp. 57-59.

[8] R. Beverly Herbert, "Immigration to South Carolina," c. 1910; and another version, "Immigration to South Carolina," Paper read before the Kosmos Club in Columbia, c. 1920, enclosed in an August 24, 1923, letter from Herbert to David R. Coker, in the David R. Coker Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia. See also E.J. Watson, **Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce and Immigration of the State of South Carolina, 1908, in Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina**, Vol. I (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1909), p. 1041; and Pettus, p. 57.

[9] Herbert, "Immigration to South Carolina," version sent to Coker in 1923; S.M. Derrick, **Farm Tenure in South Carolina**, Bulletin of the University of South Carolina, No. 89 (August 1920), pp. 9-11, 21-22, 31-32. In 1910, blacks were 55.2% of South Carolina's population and 68.6% of its tenants. See W.W. Long to David R. Coker, February 25, 1924, and May 12, 1924, with copy of an article he wrote for the **Spartanburg Herald**; D.R. Coker, Confidential Crop Memorandum, May 31, 1923; and clipping, "Delta Not Alone in Problem of Labor," **The Commercial Advertiser**, May 14, 1923, David R. Coker Papers. See Elwood Mead, "Community Farming," **The New Republic**, 41, No. 533 (February 18, 1925), 329.

[10] Lester C. Lamon, "Document, W.T. Andrews Explains the Causes of Black Migration from the South," **The Journal of Negro History**, 63, No. 4 (Fall 1978), 365-72; Mead, pp. 329-30, 327-32, and in the same issue, editorial on "Remaking Farm Life," pp. 325-26. Roy V. Scott, "Land Utilization and American Railroads in the 20th Century: A Forgotten Phase of Agricultural History," Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, New Orleans, April 13, 1979, which was published as "Land Use and American Railroads in the Twentieth Century," **Agricultural History**, 53, No. 4 (October 1979), 683-703, provided useful information on the role of the railroads in sponsoring colonization.

[11] The following theses and paper were helpful to my research on Hugh MacRae: John Faris Corey, "The Colonization and Contributions of Emmigrants to Southeastern North Carolina by Hugh MacRae," Master's Thesis Appalachian State Teachers College 1957; Stanley Tebbs Prewitt, "Hugh MacRae's Agricultural Project: An Example of the Tensions between the Jeffersonian Ideal and the

Planners' Ethic," Honor's Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1974; Robert D. Darden, "The Economic and Social Signifigance of the Hugh MacRae Colonies," Paper for Rural Economics 14, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill September 1924, North Carolina Collection Louise R. Wilson Library, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. See also George Byrne, "Hugh MacRae's Pratical Application of Common Sense in Colonization," Reprinted from **Manufacturer Record**, Vol. 61, No. 22 (May 30, 1912), 8-13, in Box: Printed Materials (2); and Map of Eastern States Showing Location of Narrow Belt Along the South Atlantic Coast Designated by the United States Department of Agriculture as the "Great Winter Garden," in "Report on **Wilmington, North Carolina** and Tidewater Power Co. Furnishing Electric Transportation, Light, Power, and Gas to this City," November 1919, Compiled by Frank J. Buckley, 14 Wall St., New York City, Box: Printed Materials (1), folder 2, Hugh MacRae Papers.

[12] MacRae, pp. 9-11.

[13] Edwin Bjorkman, "Hugh MacRae: Builder of Human Happiness, A Study in Agricultural Engineering," Federal Writers' Project Papers, 1936-1940, Box 29, folder 316: 529, on Reel 3, microfilm copy, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, pp. 19-20, 1-31. In the Hugh MacRae Papers, see "How to Own a Truck Farm in the Eastern North Carolina Colonies," Carolina Trucking Developement Co., Wilmington, N.C.; "Prospering in the Eastern North Carolina Colonies"; "A Carolina Trucking Developement Co., telepeinek leirasa, Wilmington, N.C., Kozeleben, Eredeti feny kepeszeti folvetelekkel" (New York: Louis A. Rosswaag's Stuyvesant Press); "Polska Kolonija, W Marathon, North Carolina"; "Van Eeden-Kolonie in N. Carolina U.S.A." (Amsterdam: W. Versluys, 1912), in Box: Printed Material (2). See also in MacRae Papers, "Prospectus of the St. Helena Colony Company, March 20, 1908," Box: Printed Materials (1), folder 1; and "Price List Castle Haynes Colony Farms, Castle Haynes, North Carolina, February 2, 1914," "Price List St. Helena Farms, July 20, 1914," "Lista Dei Prezzu Delle Farme nella Colonia di St. Helena, St. Helena, North Carolina, 1 Novembre, 1913," and "De Van Eeden Kolonie," in Box: Printed Materials (1), folder 2.

[14] Corey, Chapter III on St. Helena, pp. 34-53.

[15] Ibid., pp. 9, 23-33, 54-57 (Chapter IV, Van Eeden); 58-71 (Chapter V, Castle Hayne); 72-73 (Chapter VI, Marathon), 74-77 (Chapter VII, Newberlin); 78 (Artesia); 79-83. See Bjorkman, pp. 7, 20-21; Muriel L. Wolff, "Castle Hayne," 7 pp., folder 311: 521, and "Life at Castle Hayne," 55 pp., folder 311: 522, Box 29, Federal Writer's Project Papers, 1936-1940, on Reel 3. Alvin Johnson, **Pioneer's Progress: An Autobiography** (New York: The Viking Press, 1952). Chapter 33 Van Eeden, pp. 357-65. "Real Estate Valuations in New Hanover Country," 1905 and 1923, enclosed in letter from Mary P. Bell to David R. Coker, September 12, 1923. "Acres Sold During Year 1920 - Artesia Colony," box: Printed Material (1), folder 1, Hugh MacRae Papers. See the following clipping in folders on Hugh MacRae in North Carolina Colection, Wilson Library: "The MacRae Colonies in North Carolina," **World Agriculture**, February 1921; J.R. Pillsbury, "More about the MacRae Colonies," **News and Observer**, October 4, 1921; Jonathan Daniels, "M'Rae Colony Declared Model," **News and Observer**, March 6, 1927; Allen Raymond, 'Castle Hayne Is Model Of Diversified Farming," **Wilmington Star**, June 9, 1930; Maude Waddell, " Hugh MacRae Colonists Prosper . . . ," **Charlotte Observer**, January 7, 1934. There are also folders of material on MacRae--correspondence, clippings, and a pamphlet in the Louis T. Moore Collection in the Wilmington, North Carolina, Public Library.

[16] Byrne; Hugh MacRae to David R. Coker, January 8, 1924, Coker Papers; Frank Bohn, "New South's Farmers Have A New Teacher," **New York Times**, May 16, 1926, clipping in folder on Hugh MacRae, North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library; Bjorkman, p. 26; "How to Own a Truck Farm in the Eastern North Carolina Colonies," p. 13; MacRae, p. 5; Corey, pp. 20, 29' and MacRae, "Human Engineering," Address Delivered Before the Southern Land Congress, November 11, 1918.

[17] Mead, p. 329; and "A Bill To Be Entitled An Act Creating a Farm Land Board and Defining Its Powers and To Provide Funds for the Purchase of Land Farms for Home Ownership in the State of

North Carolina," Introduced by Senator [D.F.] Giles, Second Substitute for S.B. No. 18; Session 1923, General Assembly of North Carolina, Box: Printed Materials (2), MacRae Papers. See also Special legislative Committee Astonished by the Success of the New Hanover Farm Colonies" and "Landless Man the Subject of Dinner Talks Last Evening," February 18, 1923, and "MacRae Lays Before the Danish Commissioner of Agriculture His Project," **Wilmington Star**, December 3, 1923. "Secure Data on Farming Colony," **News and Observer**, February 18, 1923, and untitled clipping, February 23, 1923, and "MacRae Wants Farmers of Northern Europe Brought to Eastern Part of State," **The Asheville Citizen**, June 6, 1924, folder on MacRae, North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library.

[18] **Land Settlement, Report of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission, 1923** (Columbia, S.C.: The State Company, 1923), pp. 3-5, 8-19; and **Journal of the House of Representatives of the First Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, Being the Regular Session, beginning Tuesday, January 9, 1923** (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1923), pp. 824-25, 865, 1219. The other four members of the commission were Dr. S.J. Derrick, Mr. A.F. McKissick, Mr. Bright Williamson, and Mr. T.S. Wilbur. See also Hugh MacRae, "Memorandum of Remarks Made At Meeting of Members of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission in Wilmington, North Carolina," enclosed in copy of a letter from MacRae to Richard I. Manning, September 21, 1923; and "foreward" and "Notes on Western Trip with South Carolina Land Settlement Commission," September 13, 1923, enclosed in a letter from MacRae to David R. Coker. February 7, 1934, Coker Papers. My research in the Coker Papers has been greatly facilitated by the excellent inventory of documents and index of correspondents compiled by Dr. David Carleton and Ms. Suzanne Krebsbach.

[19] **Land Settlement, Report**, pp. 6-7.

[20] "Annual Message by Governor MacLeod," **Journal of the House of Representatives of the Second Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, being the Regular Session, Beginning Tuesday, January 8, 1924** (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1924), pp. 54-55; also in this **Journal**, see pp. 604-05, 1249-50, 1331. For McLeod's later support of land settlement, see folder labeled Land Settlement Commission, Gov. McLeod & Richards Correspondence - State Boards and Commissions 1923-1929, Box F; and folder Material re Birmingham Reclamation Conference, 1925, Gov. McLeod Papers, General Subjects 1923-27, IX/9/6/5b, South Carolina Department of Archives and History. In regard to Richard I. Manning's role on the Land Settlement Commission, see Robert Milton Burts, **Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South Carolina** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1974), p. 208; Manning to David. R. Coker, March 4, and 8, 1924, and Coker to Manning, March 3 and 5, 1924, Coker Papers. Manning to The Secretary of the Interior, May 15, 1923; to L.M. Fisher, October 15, 1923; to Bernard Baruch, December 21, 1923, March 28, 1924, and March 30, 1925; to W.W. Long, April 25, 1925, Microfilm R633, 2 Sept. 1927-31 Jan. 1930, Richard Irvine Manning Papers, South Caroliniana Library. W.W. Long, Director of Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics at Clemson, was an enthusiastic advocate of land settlement. He served, along, with George McCutcheon, Professor of Economics, University of South Carolina, as an advisory member to the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission and went on the trips to the other states. See Long to Coker, November 17 and 30, 1923, January 9 and 15, February 21, and March 11, 1924; Long to Richard I. Manning, March 1, 1924; and Coker to Long, March ? [unreadable] and May 7, 1924, Coker Papers. See also Coker to Pierre H. Pike, May 7, 1924; "Little Interviews with a Farmer" [May 7, 1924]; "A Little Interview with a Farmer on Dairying" [c. May 24, 1924], Coker Papers. "South Carolina Makes a Strong Move to Benefit Tenant Farmers and Large Land Owners" and "Broad Plan for Colonization South and for Making Land Owners out of Farm Tenants," **Manufacturers Record**, 84 No. 22 (November 29, 1923): 52, 57-58.

[21] John Higham, **Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Navitism 1860-1920**, Corrected and with a new Preface (New York: Athenuem, 1968), pp. 316-24. David R. Coker to Senator N.B. Dial, April 7, 1924, to Senator E.D. Smith, April 14, 1924, and to Representative James F. Brynes, June 16, 1924; and Hugh MacRae to Coker, January 23, 1924, enclosing "Purposes" and "Principals" of the Selective Immigration League of America; MacRae and Coker, April 7, 1924, enclosing a copy of Senator Simmons' Amendment to bill (S. 2576) to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, April 2,

1924; N.B. Dial to Coker, Aril 3, 1924, and from James F. Byrnes, June 16, 1924, Coker Papers. See also "Restrictions of Immigration," Remarks of Hom. Nathaniel B. Dial of South Carolina In the Senate of the United States, Wednesday, April 9, 1924; "Resriticton of Immigration," Remarks of Hon. Ellision D. Smith of South Carolina In the Senate of the United States, April 9, 1924, urging the shutting of the door; and "Immigration Restriction," Speech of Hom. James F. Byrnes of South Carolina In the House of Representatives, Saturday, April 5, 1924, **Congressional Record**, April 1-14, 1924, pp. 5652-54 5960-62. See also Byrnes' comment against Italian immigrants, quoted in the **Yorkville Enquirer**, June 17, 1924, as quoted in Daniel W. Hollis, "Cole L. Blease and the Senatorial Campign of 1924," pp. 60, 53-68; and Winfred B. Moore, Jr. " 'Soul of the South': James F. Byrnes and the Racial Issue in American Politics, 1911-1941," pp. 42-52, in **The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association, 1978.**

[22] Frank Bohn, "New South's Farmers Have a New Teacher," **New York Times**, May 16, 1926; and for Hugh MacRae's work as president of Penderlea Homesteads, Inc., a homestead subsistence project funded by the National Industry Recovery Act and directed by the Department of the Interior, see "Community of Small Farms to be Created," December 17, 1933, and "Pender Homesteads Projects Outlined," **Charlotte Observer**, September 23, 1934; "MacRae Wants Farming 'Saved' Editors are Ready Aid Colonizer," **Kingston Daily Free Press**, November 5, 1935, MacRae Folder, North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library. See Also Record Group 96 Farmers Home Administration, Records of Cooperative Associations, 1935-54, North Carolina, Penderlea Farms Homestead Assn., Box No. 518, National Archives And Records Service. Washington, D.C.

## 90 THE SOUTH CAROLINA COUNCIL FOR THE COMMON GOOD

**Arnold Shankman**

Relatively little has been written about women in twentieth century South Carolina. Reasons for this are not difficult to uncover. Until recently archives have not aggressively collected the papers of contemporary South Carolina women, and those records that have been preserved often are incomplete. Moreover, South Carolina women have not been as prominent in political and social affairs as their peers elsewhere. Not until after World War II were Palmetto women elected to the state legislature, allowed to divorce, or permitted to serve on juries. Placed on a pedestal--perhaps even imprisoned on the pedestal--the South Carolina woman was rather limited in what she could achieve.

Despite this dismal view of the progress of South Carolina women, which, alas, is reasonably accurate, some Palmetto women were able to crusade for social improvements. The American Association of University Women, the South Carolina Federation of Women's Clubs, the state federation of business and professional women's clubs, and the South Carolina Home Demonstration Council all were active in the state by 1920. Each of these organizations and perhaps half a dozen others were eager to improve living conditions in South Carolina. Generally speaking, their membership was composed of the woman activist described in Anne Firor Scott's influential book, **The Southern Lady**. They tended to be middle class women with fewer tasks at home than their mothers had. Smaller families, time-saving devices in the kitchen, better sanitary conditions, canned food, readymade clothing and an abundance of inexpensive domestic workers all made it possible for an increasing number of white women to leave their homes and join voluntary associations.[1]

That social change was needed in South Carolina was quite apparent. The state had the dubious distinction of being one of the nation's leaders in poverty, poor school attendance, infant and maternal mortality, tuberculosis, and inadequate prison facilities. Perhaps worst of all, South Carolina ranked 44th in white literacy and 49th in black literacy in 1930. Fully 5% of South Carolina's white and 26% of her black population were illiterate. In some counties, such as Allendale, nearly 40% of black adults could not read or write. J. Strom Thurmond noted in 1936 that the state spent $40.65 on each school child and $211.49 on each prisoner. He believed that "the frightful surging billows of illiteracy [would] sweep our innocent ones into a sea of poverty, of crime, of infamy."[2]

South Carolina women's groups had often petitioned the legislature in the 1920s and early 1930s for progressive legislation with indifferent success. Several women concluded that their small organizations with modest memberships would have less political influence than one umbrella organization empowered to speak for all. It was the desire to unite women on issues of general concern that led to the formation of a new group on May 25, 1935, at the Columbia Hotel in the state capital. Mrs. C. Fred Laurence, president of the state federation of women's clubs, had summoned

six other women reperesenting various women's organizations to the meeting. It was decided to establish the Women's Council for the Common Good (Council).[3] The purpose of the new organization was to "attempt to arouse public opinion to the importance of the work it is striving to do and thus make [for] safer and rich[er] home life, promote safety on the highways, and curb the use of liquor, and assure all children school training."[4]

Two months later the Council adopted a constitution and dedicated itself to the 'betterment of living conditions in South Carolina." The new group was open to all women's clubs with state-wide memberships except for those that were political or religious in orientation. Later it was decided that religious groups would be eligible for membership.

With a treasury of $15.00 in 1936, of which $14.90 had to be spent on postage and other routine expenses, it was apparent that the Council could do little on its own. So Mrs. Laurence contacted President Shelton Phelps of Winthrop College, offering to co-sponsor the Institute of Public Affairs, which the college held to promote leadership training for women. Phelps, receptive to the offer, indicated that those state-funded summer institutes had been discontinued because of inadequate appropriations for home extension work. Immediately Mrs. Laurence mobilized women to lobby legislators for funds for the institute and other home extention programs. This effort was successful, and an institute was held in July, 1936, which featured such diverse speakers as Dr. Frank Graham of the University of North Carolina; and civil liberties advocate Marion Wright. Topics discussed included school attendance, tenancy, patriotism, economics and public opinion.[6]

Similar institutes held over the next decade provided women with information on problems before the state and served as pep rallies to inspire participants to action. Supplementing these institutes were weekly columns on the women's pages of the Columbia **State**, space donated by the paper for several years, which allowed the Council and its member organization to reach tens of thousands of readers all over South Carolina.[7]

Early goals of the Council included increased appropriations for adult education, a decent budget for the state library, better conditions for women in penitentiaries, free textbooks for school children, regulations requiring that all qualified school teachers have college degrees, reevaluation of laws regulating interest rates for installment buying, and providing destitute children with "mended" but usable clothing.[8] To some extent each of these proposals was enacted into law, and the Council took justifiable pride in its work in behalf of such legislation.

More controversial proposals, on the other hand, were less well received by the legislature. Speakers at Council meetings such as Dr. James Hayne often took as their topic the deplorable health conditions prevalent in the state. Infant mortality

and the presence of hereditary syphilis in children were of great concern to Council members. Therefore the Council favored new laws governing marriage, for its members blamed existing legislation for the prevalence of veneral diseases in South Carolina. Council members called for a three day waiting period and for a mandatory physical examination before a couple could get married. They also favored requiring a Wasserman test for all would-be brides so that South Carolina could be rid of "the scourge which is menacing our state more every day." They also favored laws prohibiting intoxicated men and women to marry. On marriage reform, despite sending more than 1200 letters to legislators and others, they achieved no victory. Local magistrates, hotel owners, and, amazingly enough, even a few members of the state board of health opposed changes in the existing law. Some of this opposition came from those who had made money from South Carolina's lax marriage laws; many noted that in several communities a fair bit of money was made from brides and grooms from North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee who came to South Carolina to marry. Others opposed the law because they were not persuaded that it would significantly reduce veneral disease rates. For more than two decades Council members would lobby for reform of existing marriage laws, but with no luck. Bills were pigeonholed, buried in committees, or passed by one branch of the legislature but ignored by the other. Once, when a bill was passed, it was vetoed by the governor.[9]

Controversy was also evident when Council members made it known that they favored federal aid to education. These women were upset when they saw statistics showing that in some counties nearly 90% of those enrolled in first grade never completed high school. Some even thought that an infusion of money in school systems could remedy this problem. As early a 1939 Mary Frayser, one of the Council's most active members, noted that "South Carolina is rich in children but poor in per capita [sic] wealth." To her, aid from Washington was the most practical way for the state properly to be able to harvest her "most valuable crop [which] is children." Maude Massey Rogers, another influential member, agreed and confided to a friend, "I'm not one of those who fear Federal supervision will take away some of our precious 'state's rights.' " Others hoped that federal funds could also be used for public and school libraries.[10]

South Carolina solons demonstrated relatively little interest in securing federal funds for education, but they did not object to--and even encouraged--efforts of Council women to work for federal and state legislation to ensure that grits were enriched and to remove taxes on margarine. In the process of making grits valuable nutrients were lost, and this popular breakfast food was of limited nutritional value. Enrichment of pearl grits, which would cost but 8¢ per 100 pounds, restored vitamins and made this corn product a more nutritious food. South Carolina enacted a law providing for the enrichment of locally produced grits and corn meal, but since the state imported most of its grits from elsewhere, the law was of limited value. During her term as president of the Council Christine South Gee attended a

conference in Alabama sponsored by the National Research Council on the Enrichment of Cereal Foods. "The purpose of my being invited," Mrs. Gee declared, "was to help spread the gospel of enrichment in which South Carolina has blazed a trail." In 1945 the Council waged a campaign to urge women to demand that supermarkets stock only enriched grits. More than a decade later, in the late 1950s, the Council was upset to learn that the federal school lunch program featured unenriched white flour, corn meal, and rice, and it presuaded South Carolina congressmen to sponsor a bill to provide for enrichment of school lunch products.[11]

Even more popular were Council efforts to get rid of a federal tax levied on margarine which dated back to 1886. Because of pressure from dairy states, colored oleomargarine was subjected to a 10¢ per pound tax, and uncolored margarine, which had little eye appeal to consumers, was taxed at the rate of ¼¢ per pound. The matter was more than of passing importance to South Carolinians since cotton seed oil was used by many margarine manufacturers. Council members such as Mrs. Laurence believed that "something ought to be done while the nation is so food conscious and the need for cheap foods for all the people is so pressing." She found it impossible to "understand the seeming indifference of the consumer public to let this injustice exist so long." Council members were not indifferent about the matter. As early as 1938 they had considered this question and invited Dr. J.S. Abbott, director of research for the National Association of Margarine Manufacturers, to address one of their meetings. He convinced the women that the government tax limited Southern production of cotton seed oil and unnecessarily burdened margarine consumers. Council members urged the public to write members of Congress to sponsor legislation to get rid of the hated tax. They also solicited funds for a lobbying effort to promote passage of a pro-margarine bill. Over and over Council members reminded consumers that margarine was "a palatable fat, necessary to a well rounded diet for [the] American people." Eventually the tax was repealed, and Council members boasted that South Carolina women had done more than their peers from any other state to repeal the margarine tax.[12]

Much of the work done to repeal the margarine tax was done during World War II, which was a very trying time for Council members. The Council was lucky to survive the war. Many members got so involved in war-related activites that they had little time for Council meetings. Christiné Gee, then president of the Council, recollected in 1961 that during the war she often presided at meetings with as few as six members. Her determination not to head a dying organization was largely responsible for increasing Council membership from six to fourteen organizations during the war years. Assisting her was Maude Massey Rogers, who argued that the Council should not be disbanded until after the war. "It seems to me," Mrs. Rogers insisted, "that we need to keep 'tied together' now more than ever."[13]

The way that the Council survived was to get involved in the war effort. Council members lobbied for increased federal funds for schools located near army bases,

promoted food conservation, and gave advice to counties seeking to establish consumer information centers. Mary Frayser was sent to scores of counties to organize local chapters of the Council, to meet with existing groups, and to provide information on how women's groups could do their part to win the war. The Council also made changes in its organization and opened its membership to county groups dedicated to promoting the common good of the state. The word "women" was removed from the official name of the Council, but because of force of habit, it was frequently used in promotional literature for several more years. By 1945 the Council was in good shape and had a record number of members, including for the first time representatives from Catholic and Jewish organizations.[14]

After the war the Council increasingly became interested in issues relating to women, but the status of women had long been of concern. Back in the 1930s Council members had been upset that virtually no women had been appointed to county boards of public welfare; women had not even been consulted when plans were being made for the construction of a women's prison. Council members were also displeased that employment for single women was restricted, and that married women, especially teachers, were expected to give up their jobs so more men could be employed. In 1941 Mrs. Laurence confessed that "we think in South Carolina that we have equal rights with men, but we do not." Mary Frayser was even more blunt in 1945 when she told of a conversation with a prominent doctor who "told me that A.M. that he didn't think the women of S.C. had an ounce of influence in the state."[15] Surely this was something of an overstatement, but it was true that in 1945 Palmetto women were not being elected to the legislature, were prohibited from serving on juries,[16] and could not legally divorce thier husbands.

Council records for the years immediately after World War II were haphazardly preserved, but information that does exist shows increasing concern in improving the status of women. In the 1950s Council members repeatedly endorsed passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and revision of the state constitution to allow for jury service for women. Sara V. Liverance, who was largely responsible for women getting the right to serve on state juries, once noted of the Equal Rights Amendment that it was "nothing new and radical, for it goes back to the forming of the original Council."[17] Not until the 1960s was the constitution amended to allow for jury service for women. The Equal Rights Amendment was never ratified by the legislature.

Interestingly enough, interest in women's rights was accompanied by a desire on the part of the Council to admit men's organizations to membership. The Council was now called the South Carolina Council for the Common Good, and it revised its constitution to permit admission of men. The American Cancer Society, the Society for Crippled Children, and the South Carolina Library Association did join the Council, but these groups invariably sent women representatives to Council meetings. Men were never active in the Council; visiting speakers were the only men normally present at its meetings.[18]

In addition to the Equal Rights Amendment, marriage law reform, and jury service for women, issues of concern for the Council in the 1950s and 1960s included combatting juvenile delinquency, adopting a new state constitution, reforming adoption laws, studying the value of nuclear power, establishing a state nursing home for cancer patients, and calling for a national divorce law. Members also showed interest in world affairs and consistently supported efforts to promote the humanitarian activities of the United Nations. With financial assistance from foundations, seminars were sometimes held on these and other issues. State politicians gladly addressed Council meetings, and newspaper coverage was given to Council activites.[19]

Although on most matters the Council was quite progressive, on one issue, race relations, it was paternalistic. There is no evidence that blacks ever participated in Council meetings or that their presence was particularly desired. Several Council members such as Mary Frayser and Christine Gee were enlightened paternalists, but only Alice Norwood Spearman Wright, who frequently attended Council meetings, was a civil rights crusader. In the early years of the Council, members successfully lobbied for the establishemnt of industrial schools for blacks, and its members genuinely hoped to better the condition of South Carolina Negroes. In 1943 Mrs. Gee even attended a meeting that helped pave the way for the establishment of the Southern Regional Council. Council members, however were cautious about discussing civil rights. They resented Northern criticism of Southern racial practices and admitted that Dixie's black and white leaders needed to meet to discuss common problems. Council members insisted that all such meetings "be handled with the greatest **good** judgement, delicacy and insight. There must be freedom from publicity in our deliberation." Nonetheless, Council members seldom themselves showed delicacy in their statements. For example, during World War II the Council's forthright stand for eradication of syphilis was based in part on the realization that many blacks were being "turned down for military service because of veneral diseases." Therefore white men were forced "to make the quota for the armed forces. We must see that these negroes are treated and can perform . . . needed military service."[20]

In 1948 the Council championed an educational requirement for voters. The reason for this was to prevent "illiterate negroes [from being] admitted to the polls." Since Negro exclusion from the Democratic primary had been outlawed, Ruth Roettinger, chairman of the Council's Committee on County Government, feared that there might be "a heavy vote by negroes who are illiterate and thus an easy prey to corrupt political machines.' Miss Roettinger did not seem to object to having a seventh grade educational requirement apply to both blacks and whites voting in primaries, but otherwise she showed little sensitivity to the needs of blacks. Sensitivity was also lacking on the part of the other Council members, who as late as the 1960s, refused to capitalize "**Negro**" in their correspondence or in official Council documents. The civil rights movement seems to have been ignored by many

Council members except in a negative sense. For example, legislators were warned to reform laws to let women serve on juries before a federal court ordered such a change on the grounds that it violated the civil rights of black women.[21] It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the Council was composed of insensitive racists, but it is true that Council members could have done more to help South Carolina solve its racial problems.

In defense of the Council, it might be noted that one possible reason for its lack of involvement in civil rights is that during the 1960s the organization was itself facing serious problems. Membership was declining, the treasury seldom had more than $350.00, and attendance at meetings was dismal. In 1960 the Winthrop Alumnae Association, one of the charter members of the Council, dropped its membership because of lack of funds. Three years later the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the South Carolina Council of Parents and Teachers' Associations discontinued membership. In the spring of 1968 Mrs. Augusta Wolff reported that only one of thirteen organizations invited to join the Council accepted her invitation. Even worse, Council meetings and seminars were poorly attended. In 1970, when the Council received money from the Sears Roebuck Foundation to hold a seminar, Mrs. Wolff sadly reported to Clyde Ware of Sears, "Reservations are coming in very slowly. Do hope there will be more there than me and thee." Dora McNeill wondered if Council members were so involved on other activites that they had no time for its meetings. She sadly confessed in 1968 that it was so hard to get the executive committee together that decisions often had to be made through mail referendums. This meant that heads of member organizations had less opportunity to communicate face to face with one another. Mrs. Bee Chochran agreed and wrote Sara Liverance that "direct communication [often] might mean the difference between sucess and failure of a project."[22]

The situation did not improve in the 1970s. In 1973 the Council lacked the funds needed to print its annual bulletin. Moreover, several of the leaders of the Council were the same women who had organized the group in 1935. To be sure, there were some new faces at annual meetings, but many young women seemed uninterested in the Council. In 1976 one meeting had to be cancelled for lack of attendance, and it became impossible to find qualified members to fill Council offices. Meetings seldom had more than ten in attendance, and it was apparent to all that the Council was becoming less and less effective. In 1977 Dixie Baxter wrote other Council members that "our organization had faltered to the point of collapsing." She therefore proposed that a meeting be held to decide whether it would be best to dissolve the Council. On April 2, 1977, that meeting was held and those present voted to disband. The organization accepted the invitation of Ronald J. Chepesiuk, Winthrop College archivist, to deposit its records at Winthrop. The balance of the Council treasury was donated to the ERA-South Carolina. The South Carolina Council for the Common Good thereby ended its existence.[23]

During its forty-two year existence the South Carolina Council for the Common

Good brought about several needed changes to the state. Its members "wanted the extension of government further into the areas of education, health, labor, and social welfare." Like the women described by J. Stanley Lemons in his book, **The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s**, the Council was founded to promote progressivism.[24] By our standards some of the Council's achievements, such as enrichment of grits or establishing training schools, may seem modest achievements, but considering conditions in South Carolina in the 1930s they represented major improvements for the Palmetto state. Admittedly the race question received inadequate attention from many Council members, but perhaps it is unreasonable to expect that middle and upper class women in South Carolina would be passionate advocates of intergration. After a quarter of a century of successful activities the Council became somewhat stodgy and failed to attract enough new blood to maintain its vitality. Nonetheless, even in its waning years the Council fought a good fight for such causes as jury service for women and the Equal Rights Amendment. All in all, the Palemtto State today is a better place to live because of the work of the South Carolina Council for the Common Good.

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[1] Anne Firor Scott, **The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830-1930** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 135-36.

[2] Thurmond, "Regular School Attendance--South Carolina's Urgent Need," in **Third Institute on Public Affairs Conducted at Winthrop College, July 9, 10, 11, 1936** (Rock Hill: London Printing, 1936), pp. 5-6, 9; see also Dr. Robert Seibels, "Maternal Mortality in South Carolina," in **ibid.**, pp. 10-12.

[3] At various times the group was also called the South Carolina Women's Council for the Common Good and the South Carolina Council for the Common Good.

[4] Copy of minutes of meeting of Women's Council for the Common Good, May 25, 1935, Mary Frayser Papers, Winthrop College, hereafter cited as Council Minutes, Frayser Papers; Jessie Laurence, "Women's Council for the Common Good," **South Carolina Magazine** 3 (Summer 1940), 28, 38.

[5] 1935 Consititution of Council, Frayser Papers.

[6] February ?, 1936, fragment of letter from Laurence to Phelps; Phelps to Laurence, February 26, March 2, 1936; Laurence to Council Partners, March 3, 1936; program of Third Institute on Public Affairs, all in Winthrop College Records, W 427-5, Box 4, folder 41, Winthrop College Archives; minutes of 25th anniversary of South Carolina Council for the Common Good, April 25, 1961, South Carolina Council for the Common Good Papers, Winthrop College, hereafter cited as Council Papers.

[7] See, for example, Columbia **State**, March 5, 12, April 30, 1939.

[8] Minutes of Council, February 3, June 12, 1937, February 11, October 4, November 3, 1938, February 7, 1939; report of Emma Roper, educational chairman of Council, October 31, 1941, all in Frayser Papers.

[9] Minutes of Council, February 3, 1937, February 7, 1939, January 26, 1940; health program of Council for 1945-46; Mrs. Paul Leonard, report of president of Council, October 31, 1941; health program of Council for 1945-46; unsigned report on pre-marital and pre-natal bills before legislature (1945 or 1946), all in Frayser Papers.

[10] Columbia **State**, March 12, April 30, 1939; letter from Frayser printed in **ibid.**, March 5, 1939; minutes of Council, February 7, 1939, April 25, 1942; Rogers to Gee, December 9, 1942; 1942-43 legislative program of South Carolina chapter of American Association of University Women, all in Frayser Papers.

[11] Form letter from Mrs. W.R. Wallace, 1942?, "Buy Only Enriched Grits" (Mimeo), February 20, 1945; form letter from J. Roy Jones, Septmber 19, 1945; form letter from Council, 1946?; Ransome Williams to Mrs. W.R. Wallace, July 27, 1947; Wallace to Governor Williams, August 15, 1947, all in Frayser; all in Frayser papers; letter on school lunches from South Carolina Home Economics Association, November 8, 1958, copy of bill intoduced by Senator Olin Johnston on enrichment of foods, January 23, 1959, both in Council Papers.

[12] Council minutes, February 3, 1937, October, 4, 1938, April 25, June 30, 1942; Laurence to Gee, December 22, 1942; copy of resolution of Council for June 1941, all in Frayser papers; Columbia **State**, August 10, 1941; mimeograph of letter of Mrs. Laurence to Columbia **State**, June 30, 1942, Jessie Laurence Papers, Winthrop College; minutes of Council, April 25, 1961, Council Papers.

[13] Council minutes, September 30, October 31, 1941, April 25, 1942; report of Mrs. Leonard, 1941, Ada Moser to Frayser, February 22, 1941; Frayser to Ruth McInnes, June 24, 1942; report on defense organization (1941?); revised consitution of Council, October 31, 1941; Rogers to Gee, November 28, 1942, all in Frayser Papers.

[14] Mrs. Samuel Shellman to Gee, July 6, 1944; Frayser Papers; Easley **Progress**, July 10, 1941; minutes of Council, April 25, 1961, Council Papers.

[15] Council minutes, June 12, 1937, February 7, 1939; legislative program of Council for 1940; Frayser to [Lucille Wallace?], February 10, 1945, all Frayser papers; letter from Mrs. Laurence in Columbia **State**, August 10, 1941.

[16] At least one woman served on a Union County jury in 1925 because local officials seemed unaware of the law. Copy of summons for Mrs. H.B. Jennings, February 13, 1925; unidentified Union County newspaper clipping for 1925; J.L. Sibley Jennings to writer, August 22, 1981, all in possession of writer. Some women in Anderson County may have also been "illegal jurors". See W.D. Workman, Jr., "Women Jurors Barred from State Courts by Law and Constitution," Greenville **News**, February 2, 1958. The above information came to my attention after I wrote, "A Jury of Her Peers: The South Carolina Woman and her Campaign for Jury Service," **South Carolina Historical Magazine** 81 (April 1980), 102-21.

[17] Liverance quoted in Council minutes, April 7, 1973; Council papers; see also Shankman, "Jury of Her Peers," **passim**.

[18] "We Move in New Directions," form letter of Council sent to members, 1952; Council minutes, January 19, 1952, both in Frayser Papers; Council minutes, October 16, 1970, Council Papers.

[19] Council minutes, September 25, 1956, January 15, February 24, November 20, 1958, February 20 May 12, 1959, February 10, April 25, 1961, January 17, 1962, April 5, October 28, 1964, January 27, 1965, April 22, November 11, 1967, April 16, 1970, April 7, 1973, April 6, November 2, 1974, Council papers; Columbia **State**, April 26, 1951, February 14, 1957, January 16, 1958.

[20] Christine Gee, report of Council president, October 25, 1942-October 4, 1943; statement of Corrie Plyer in Council minutes, April 29, 1942; Council minutes, October 17, 1942, October 5, 1943, all in Frayser papers.

[21] Ruth Roettinger, "Now is the Time," January 22, 1948, Frayser Papers; Mrs. Paul Leonard, Report of the Legislative Committee for 1964, Council Papers.

[22] Council minutes, May 26, 1960, October 23, 1963; report of Dora McNeill, April 20, 1968; report of Augusta Wolff, 1969?, report of legislation committee, April 19, 1969; Cochran to Liverance, October 7, 1968; Estellene Walker to Wolff, May 5, 1970; Clyde Ware to Ruby Carven, February 10, 1970; Wolff to Ware, October 2, 1970, all in Council Papers.

[23] Council minutes, April 7, 1973, April 2, 1977; report of Cochran, April 16, 1970; Baxter to Dear Friend, March 23, 1977; Corneila Harris to Baxter, March 29, 1977, all in Council Papers.

[24] J. Stanley Lemons, **The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s** (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. ix.

# JOHN SAUNDERS, A LOYALIST CAPTAIN IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1780-1782

**Kenneth Donovan**

A fourth generation American Loyalist and one of the few distinguished Virginians who fought for the British during the American Revolution, John Saunders was born June 1, 1753, in Princess Anne County, Virginia, the only son of Jonathan and Elizabeth Saunders. Descended from an English royalist family, John Saunders' great grandfather, the immigrant Jonathan Saunders, acquired a large landed estate in Princess Anne County and was ordained the Church of England Minister for Lynnhaven Parish of the same county in 1695.[1] By the time the Revolution began in Virginia, John Saunders had inherited a large plantation of over eight hundred acres in the vicinity of Norfolk. Saunders was among the most wealthy Virginia Loyalists, for he was one of only eight native-born Americans to have claimed over *L*5,000 for losses suffered in the Revolution.[2]

John Saunders was only twelve years old when his father died in 1765 at the age of thirty-nine. Jacob Ellegood, Saunders' brother-in-law and owner of a large adjacent plantation, became Saunders' guardian for the six years of his minority from 1765 to 1771. Besides maintaining the estate, Ellegood provided *L*442 for Saunders' education from 1769 to 1775, for which he was later reimbursed by Saunders after the war.[4] A statement of guardianship in 1775 noted that "Jacob Ellegood was obliged to borrow money which he had interest on for years [and that he] had not charged anything as yet for his trouble in attending on the estate and seeing the produce got to the market."[5] Ellegood, who later described himself as "the first native of America who raised a regimental corps during the war for the defence and support of his majesty's government," doubtless influenced the young boy.[6] Because Ellegood was Saunders' guardian for six years and paid for his education for another four until he reached the age of twenty-two, their relationship appears to have been more father-son than brothers-in-law. The date of John Saunders' birth was recorded in a family Bible which in 1834 was in the possession of Ellegood.[7] Following in the footsteps of his father, who had served as county lieutenant for Princess Anne, Ellegood became the colonel of militia for the county. As colonel of militia, he seems to have had some responsibility for recruitment because Governor Lord Dunmore wrote to Ellegood "to request him to take part with the British Government" immediately upon the outbreak of hositlites.[8]

John Saunders appears to have decided for the Loyalist cause well before the Revolutionary War erupted in Virginia. In July, 1774, the young Virginian manifested his anti-Whig sentiments at a meeting in Princess Anne County when "he alone raised his voice in opposition" to the proposal to send delegates to a Whig convention at Williamsburg.[9] Despite Saunders' objection, delegates were chosen to attend the convention which was to be held in August, 1775. Saunders also refused to sign any of the patriotic resolutions passed by the meeting.[10]

The Whigs continued their meetings in the summer of 1775 and eventually formed a Virginian Provinical Association. Although Saunders usually attended these meetings, he refused to sanction any resolutions which they adopted. Saunders remained adamant in his opposition throughout 1775; he rejected the Continental Association on the grounds that its method of procedure was illegal. Deciding to "deal gently with him" because of his youth, the county committee offered Sanders an opportunity to retract his refusal. In spite of the persuasion of his friends, the young student declared himself to be a Loyalist. Saunders, Benjamin Dingly Gray, and Mitchell Phillips were brought before the county committee and branded as public enemies. Gray had been a non-associator, while Philips had used his influence as a militia captain to deter men from signing the Association.[11] The contempt of John Saunders "for the revolutionary party in his county aroused such ill-feeling" that he and two Loyalist friends, Gray and Phillips, "were not only regarded as inimical to the liberties of America, but their neighbours were recommended to cease from supplying them with necessities of all kinds, including food."[12] Consequently, John Saunders, who previously "had the proud reputation of being the finest host," became an outcast among the people of his own county.[13]

John Saunders joined Lord Dunmore at the height of his ascendancy on November 16, 1775, one day after the Governor's forces had defeated a patriot militia at Kemp's Landing.[14] According to Saunders, Lord Dunmore, "being anxious to support His Majesty's just rights, which were then openly and avowedly attacked," proclaimed martial law on November 7 and summoned all citizens to help him maintain his authority. "Conceiving it to be my bounden duty, I did not hesitate a moment, but immediately left a valuable establishment and obeyed the call."[15] Saunders raised a troop of cavalry at his own expense and was appointed a captain on November 25 in the Queen's Own Loyal Virginia Regiment, commanded by his brother-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Ellegood.[16]

Dunmore's ascendancy was short lived because the Governor's forces were defeated at the Great Bridge on December 9, 1775. The patriot victory proved decisive; most of Dunmore's erstwhile supporters cast off their superficial loyalism. The more genuine Loyalists, Saunders included, departed for New York in July, 1776. When Saunders returned to Virginia in 1780, he commanded three troops of regimental cavalry for special service under General Alexander Leslie.[17] Unfortunately for Saunders, he did not have much to return to, as his property had been confiscated and even some of his former slaves had been imprisoned as tories.[18]

The officers and militia of the Queen's Own Loyal Virginia Regiment were incorporated into the Queen's Rangers, a Loyalist corps, shortly after their arrival in New York. The officers of the Virginia Regiment had been permitted to maintain their rank in the new corps, and thus Saunders was appointed captain in the infantry division of the Queen's Rangers in August, 1776.[19]

In October, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton ordered a detachment of the Queen's Rangers to proceed with General Leslie on an expedition for the pacification of Virginia. Captain Saunders' troop of regimental dragoons was selected to sail with Leslie. Although the unit was not up to strength, Saunders hoped to recruit more men in his native county of Princess Anne. Accompanying Saunders were his officers, Lieutenant John Wilson, Cornet Thomas Meritt, Quartermaster Stephen Jarvis, and sixteen troopers.[20] Saunders and his men were destined not to rejoin the Queen's Rangers until active operations had ended.

In terms of British strategy, General Leslie had been expected to remain in Virginia for the purpose of creating a diversion in favour of Lord Cornwallis. With this diversion in mind, Leslie's forces began to establish British outposts in some of the seaboard counties of Virginia. Captain Saunders and three troops of regimental cavalry under his command were instructed to set up a post in Saunder's native county of Princess Anne. Saunders hardly expected his fellow Virginians to join immediately the King's standard. In a letter to Colonel John Graves Simcoe, the commander of the Queen's Rangers, Saunders stated that he wanted to march through Princess Anne "for the purpose of taking some of the most violent leaders of the rebels in that county." The removal of partisan leaders was a preparatory move for an eventual recruitment of a Loyalist militia. Shortly after his advance through Princess Anne, Saunders was granted permission to occupy the post at Kemp's Landing because of his "intimate knowledge of the people, and of the county."[21] Whatever Saunder's intentions concerning the recruitment of a miltitia in Virginia, they were interrupted by a recall of Leslie's men to join Cornwallis in the Carolinas, and thus the British left Virginia on November 19, less than a month after arrival in the Commonwealth.

## II

Upon arriving at Charleston, South Carolina, Colonel Nisbett Balfour, the British commander, instructed to proceed northward to Georgetown. According to Saunders, Colonel Balfour "ordered my officers and my men up to Georgetown; as he told me that he had not authority to permit the return of myself and party to the regiment, I found it necessary to go to Winnsboro (one hundred and eighty miles) where Lord Cornwallis was encamped, to solicit his leave."[22] With Cornwallis' approval, Balfour ordered Saunders to proceed to Moncks Corner on January 16, 1781. Lieutenant-Colonel George Campbell, the commander of the Loyalist corps at Georgetown, the King's American Regiment, was to meet Saunders at Moncks Corner and to escort him to the post. Balfour instructed Saunders to be at the Corner by "daybreak on Monday morning, as the 3rd Regt. wait your arrival."[23] The next day Saunders and his men were prepared to embark in the **Romulous** when an express arrived with the news of General Banastre Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens. The Americans, commanded by General Daniel Morgan, routed the British and wound-

ed, captured, or killed at least 600 of Tarleton's men. The American victory, noted Saunders, "induced Colonel Balfour to countermand the embarkation and to detain us till the impression made by this unfortunate event should be done away."[24]

Balfour assigned new instructions to Saunders on January 24 and requested Campbell to meet Saunders at the Lower Ferry on the Santee.Campbell was destined not to rendezvous with Saunders, for he was captured by Brigadier General Francis Marion on the night of January 24 in a surprise attack against Georgetown.[25] On the day of Campbell's capture the British commander informed him that he appreciated the necessity of the dragoons on Georgetown and he congratulated Campbell on having recently defeated an enemy privateer.[26] The following day Balfour expressed his concern for the circumstances at Georgetown; he believed that Captain Saunders' dragoons would provide an experienced reinforcement. Balfour stated: "I have directed Capt. Saunders with his party of the Queen's Rangers to return to you, that officer will therefore take on him the command of all the cavalry in your district and I must request your assistance to him in carrying on the recruiting service."[27]

Colonel Balfour had thus sent Captain Saunders to Georgetown believing that he would recruit a Loyalist militia. According to Stephen Jarvis, who served as Saunders' quartermaster from August, 1780, to March, 1781, Saunders intended to increase his company by recruitment in the Georgetown district.[28] Jarvis, however, "was ordered to remain at Charleston to oversee 3 or 4 Tailors who were employed to make clothing for the men and other recruits as they might be wanted." Saunders had requested Jarvis to enlist as many men as possible in the Charleston area, but this venture proved impossible, for Saunders had not provided Jarvis with any funds to offer as a bounty to potential recruits.[29]

Within two weeks of his arrival in Georgetown, Captain Saunders was unofficially appointed commander of the post in a dispatch issued February 8, 1781. Saunders was to be in charge only while Major Grant, the former commander, was absent.[30] The condition attached to Saunders' command proved to be a mere formality, as Major Grant did not return to Georgetown. Stephen Jarvis, who delivered the message of the change in command from Charleston, described Captain Saunders' new post in dismal terms. The garrison was in "great confusion":

> The men belonging to Captain Saunders Troop much dissatisfied, complained much of the inattention of the Officers, and in short were nearly in a state of Mutiny. They were men who had served in the Regiment for many years with much credit to themselves, and from what I noticed I was fearful of what really took place, many of them deserted to the enemy.[31]

## III

One of the foremost obstacles encountered by the British in their attempt to raise a Loyalist militia in the Southern Colonies involved the conduct of the army and its treatment of the civilian population. In his study of the importance of the Loyalists in British planning, Paul Smith noted that "Pillaging and plundering were more widespread in the South than in any other area in America."[32] Throughout the winter and spring of 1781 Balfour's most consistent theme in his correspondence with Saunders was the behaviour of the garrison and its relationship with the cilvilian population. In the dispatch of February 8, 1781, appointing Saunders as commander of Georgetown, Balfour stressed the importance of getting men mounted but "without doing harsh things or imposing disagreeably upon the inhabitants." In a postscript the Colonel emphasized that horses were to be assigned a value if taken from the townspeople.[33]

At best, the British achieved limited success in their attempts to raise a Loyalist militia in South Carolina. Major difficulties plagued the recruiting effort. Small arms and cavalry horses were constantly in short supply, and the British commanders were placed in the precarious position of having to obtain horses from the local inhabitants, yet maintain good relations. Mounted troops were essential to prevent the rebels from coercing the Loyalists in the back country. Despite numerous difficulties, Balfour had reported to Cornwallis in mid-July, 1780, that fifteen hundred men could be counted on to march with the army.[34] The potential strength of the Loyalist militia impressed Balfour, for he maintained an optimistic attitude towards the recruitment of a local militia in his letters to Saunders.

The Loyalists of the Little Peedee region were among the few sections of South Carolina that maintained themselves without constant military aid from the British. The posts of Georgetown and Wilmington supplied these Loyalists with ammunition, and they also received aid from neighboring Loyalists in North Carolina. The Little Peedee Loyalists acted as a neutralizing force against many of the manoeuvres of the rebels of the Cheraw district and prevented them from giving assistance to the partisan leader, Brigadier-General Francis Marion. These Loyalists often went to Georgetown and performed valuable service for the British.[35] In November, 1780, "Marion would have succeeded in capturing Georgetown if two hundred loyalists from the Little Peedee had not arrived the day before he attacked."[36] Since Marion's assault on Georgetown only preceded Saunders' arrival by two months, it is reasonable to conclude that the British hopes of recruiting a Loyalist militia in the Georgetown area were far from illusionary.

In early December, 1780, Marion established his headquarters at Snow's Island in the midst of the Peedee. Marion seldom moved out of the Gergetown district during the remainder of the war, for it was at Georgetown that he hoped to secure supplies of ammunition, clothing, and salt which he desperately required.[37] During his

command at Georgetown from early February to late June, 1781, Saunders and Marion became bitter adversaries in a war of wit and guerilla actions.

At Marion's request Saunders began negotiations for a partial exchange of prisoners on February 12, 1781. In a message to Marion Saunders stated: "I am authorised to offer in exchange for Sergeants Burt and Hudgins of the Queen's Rangers Dragoons and Joseph Sherwood, John Farrington and William Moore, privates in the King's American Regiment, and 2 Sergeants and 3 privates in Charleston."[38] Saunders' letter may have been delayed because Balfour informed Saunders on February 13 that both Marion and Light Horse Harry Lee had moved out of the area. Balfour assumed that Saunders could now take more offensive action, as "the small party I hope that remain will not prevent your getting a little more possesion of the country." Balfour promised to "send more ammunition by the very first water conveyance."[39] Two days later Saunders received orders to prepare to march with as many men as posible. Balfour was quite explicit in emphasizing the need for "conciliating conduct with respect to the Gentlemen of the Country." To ensure a peaceful solution of "civil matters", Balfour and Cornwallis commended to Saunders the conduct of Colonel James Cassells, who was to "decide all matters in dispute amongst the inhabitants."[40]

Throughout the winter of 1781 the hope of recruiting Loyalist militia remained conspicuous in the orders emanating from Charleston. Despite Balfour's expectations, Saunders had not encountered any of Marion's remaining 'small party". Obviously disappointed that an opportunity had been missed to defeat the rebels, Balfour wrote to Saunders on February 19: "I am sorry that you missed Marion's people, one stroke at them would be much of service, and give spirits to our friends."[41] Within the same letter the Colonel forwarded Lord Francis Rawdon's instructions for the commander at Georgetown.

Saunders was ordered to march every available man to the Lower Ferry on the Santee and then proceed to Nelson's Ferry where they would receive further instructions plus provisions and ammunition. In Balfour's estimation the march would take at least five days, and thus he cautioned Saunders to guard against poor discipline among "the men and officers. And as the inhabitants on the road have given up their horses for the good of the service I am to require, that no officers do take or force any horse from an inhabitant."[42] Any officers that disobeyed these retrictions were to be reported for later punishment. In a later dispatch of the same day Balfour reiterated that he was under "strict instructions from Lord Cornwallis" to punish any offenders against the people.[43] But it must be kept in mind that Cornwallis and Balfour had a perfectly good reason for not wanting to molest the inhabitants on the road to Nelson's Ferry. Because of the poor navigation on the Wateree River, the British had to convey their goods by the overland route from Lower Ferry to Nelson's Ferry and then on to Camden.[44] In order to keep the inland post at Camden supplied with rum, salt, ammunition, and clothing, the overland

route had to be protected; a hostile countryside along the route to Camden would only hamper efforts to transport supplies.

February, 1781, proved to be a most exasperating month for the new commander at Georgetown; conditions at the post became alarming enough to warrant a request from Saunders to be relieved of his command. Writing on February 26, Saunders reported that "3 nights ago" he had dispatched Cornet Thomas Merritt and ten privates to secure stray cattle which he "had brought in from the other side of the Black River."[45] This small detachment was surprised by a force under the command of Peter Horry, a colonel of Marion's brigade, at White's Bridge near Georgetown.[46] According to Saunders his men were defeated because of the "superiority in goodness of horses and numbers" of the rebels. Of the eleven men sent out, they were "killed, wounded or taken except for 1 officer and 1 private", which Saunders considered to be "an unfortunate affair . . . not a disgraceful one." Saunders nevertheless felt responsible for the loss of the patrol and he informed Balfour: "I am willing to deliver my service yet beg leave to mention to you that my [illegible] and inclination point to that of the field as long as you judge it expedient."[47] Colonel Horry's relatively small victory seemed to infuse new spirit into the patriot cause and "had a more decisive effect than could have been expected at the time."[48]

## IV

Conditions had steadily deteriorated at Georgetown during the first month of Saunders' command. Not only had Marion reinforced his militia, but Georgetown had experienced a wave of desertions to the enemy. Because of poor morale of the garrison and the increased rebel activity, Balfour ordered Saunders not to send out small forces on patrol: "The detaching [of] any small force is by no means proper, at a time when these dispicable banditti have been taught from the bad behaviour of our own people at that post."[49]

Stephen Jarvis described the garrison at Georgetown in despairing terms at the beginning of February, 1781. Desertions were not uncommon among the garrison, and Jarvis believed that the post was on the verge of a "state of mutiny."[50] By the end of February Saunders, disillusioned with his command, requested a position of more active service, and permission was granted for him to return to Charleston. Balfour wrote:

> In respect to the command there when you was entrusted with it, I suppose it might have been on a more intensive scale, and that cavalry might have been employed in more considerable numbers in the field . . . You have therefore my leave to return to Charleston, if you continue in the same opinion respecting your command.[51]

Discouraged with mere patrols and guerilla warfare, Saunders wished to rejoin the Queen's Rangers; the regiment had arrived in Virginia on January 4, 1781, under the command of Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold.[52] Balfour asked Saunders to remain at Georgetown until conditions improved, but he assured Saunders "that the first good opportunity that offers, you shall not be detained from joining your regiment but until that happens we are really hard put to it, for cavalry."[53]

Even as late as April Colonel Balfour was still hopeful that a Loyalist militia could be raised in the Georgetown area. Apparently, Cornwallis had not yet become completely disenchanted with the Loyalists, for he empowered Balfour to raise a troop of provincial light dragoons. Balfour suggested to Saunders on April 2 that two of his men, Lieutenant John Wilson and Cornet Thomas Merritt, who had been "both recommended as good and active officers", could command the new troop. The Colonel continued: "If you agree with me in opinion that a troope could be raised in or near Georgetown I should have no hesitation in making the appointment."[54]

The British position in South Carolina had deteriorated steadily during the preceding eight months; the military plans formulated in Charleston no longer bore marks of optimism and assurance concerning the Loyalists. Balfour considered it "vain to attempt" recruitment in most parts of the country,[55] but Georgetown continued to be a centre of optimsim in an otherwise bleak picture. What were the sources of this continuing optimism? Balfour hinted at them in two separate letters to Saunders in the spring of 1781.

Initially Balfour was encouraged in his belief that a militia could be recruited in the Georgetown district by a man named Jones. On April 2 Balfour informed Saunders that he promised to make Jones a Cornet because "he thinks he can raise his men." In a report that he had just received from Lord Rawdon Balfour also enclosed the good news that Colonel Welbore Doyle and the New York Volunteers had destroyed Marion's baggage at Snow's Island. Writing in an elated tone, the Colonel added: "It is now time to chase these gentry from the country, if a little exertion is made . . . I would hope the Loyalist Militia of the other side [of Lynch's Creek] will assist in driving them off."[56]

Another factor which undoubtedly encouraged Balfour's belief that a Loyalist militia could be recruited was Captain Campbell's successful recruitment of a provincial troop in mid-March, 1781. Stephen Jarvis, Saunders' quartermaster, had been continuously stationed at Charleston. In March, 1781, Jarvis "received a very flattering letter" from Captain Saunders approving of Jarvis's acceptance of an offer of a Lieutenancy from Captain Campbell in his new troop.[57] On March 5 Balfour explained to Saunders that "Captain Campbell fears he will not succeed in his recruiting business at Georgetown," and thus the British commander gave Campbell permission to leave the post in order to complete his troop at

Charleston.[58] Balfour seems to have interpreted Campbell's move to Charleston as a mere augmentation of an almost completed force. Jarvis supported this view; he reported that Campbell soon reached his quota of twenty-five men by the use of plenty of money at Charleston.[59] Futhermore, Campbell had completed pratically all of his recruiting within Georgetown itself;[60] recruitment in the surrounding countryside had not even been attempted on a large scale. A combination of a number of factors thus induced Balfour to believe that a provincial troop might be raised in the Georgetown district in the spring of 1781.

On April 6 Saunders delivered the death blow to the illusion of Loyalist aid. In a letter to Balfour Saunders described the policy of Loyalist recruitment as an act of fultility:

> The raising of Provincial Cavalry at this place and its vicinity is a subject I have often thought of and have mentioned it several times to Colonel Cassels and Colonel Gordon who agree perfectly with me that it is impossible to be done here. I do not believe that even a half dozen could be recruited in this whole district.[61]

Saunders allowed one exception for the vicinity of Georgetown: "I have been told that the most likely place would be at the loyal settlement on [the] Peedee." As for Jones' belief tht he could raise a provincial corps in Georgetown, Saunders concluded: "I rather think Mr. Jones too sanguine." This letter of April 6 had considerable effect; two days later orders were received from Charleston to cease all attempts to raise a provincial cavalry.

## V

South Carolina appeared to be under firm British control in the early part of 1781, but the appearance of things was not quite the reality. The harassing action of men like Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and John Rutledge were successful to such a degree that before long it was "doubtful that the British controlled ground beyond that upon which they stood."[62] Saunders' correspondence to Balfour emphasized that the Georgetown district was no different from the rest of South Carolina because the British faced an unfriendly, if not hostile countryside. Gradually becoming more daring, Marion and Lee were openly attacking British outposts by mid- April, 1781. On April 16, Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, encamped on the Peedee, warned Saunders of a possible attack on Georgetown. Lee was supposed to have joined Marion with three hundred men, but the "country folks of course say 4 or 500." Watson advised Saunders to secure all the salt and ammunition in the town "for Marion had neither at present"; the British Lieutenant-Colonel feared that Marion and Lee's combined forces would attempt to seize the

stores at Georgetown.[63]

Watson's report of enemy troop movements were confirmed three days later when it was learned that the rebels had crossed the Peedee in force. General Nathaniel Greene was marching towards Camden with a large army of fifteen hundred men, all Continentals except for two hundred and fifty North Carolina militia.[64] Receiving news of Greene's approach, Balfour impressed upon Saunders "the neccessity of keeping to your post and being extremely alert."[65] The following day, April 20, Balfour informed Sir Henry Clinton, the commander-in-chief at New York, that some of Greene's light troops had passed the Peedee. "The object of this movement there is every reason to believe is Camden which, at present, is but weak, Lord Rawdon having detached Lieut-Col. Watson, with 2 battalions from that post." Balfour also added that Greene's movement "may considerably change Lord Cornwallis's views who is now at Wilmington."[66] Meanwhile, Rawdon prepared for his defence at Camden against Greene's anticipated attack.

With time of the essence, Balfour ordered to proceed to Rawdon's aid by the 'best, safest, and most expeditious" route.[67] But Watson was in a desperate situation because he was located on the east side of the Waccamaw River and had no means to transport his men and equipment across to proceed to Camden. On April 19 Watson sent an urgent message to Saunders requesting "that instantly upon the receipt of this you will collect every kind of canoe, flat, rowing or sailing boat that can be got and let them be mored in the river under cover of the Galley, you will . . . bring them to Cogdales at Wacamaw . . . so that she [the Galley] can cover our embarkation at daybreak."[68] Watson acknowledged two days later that the mission had succeeded. Most of Watson's horses and cattle had also been transported across the river by flatboats.[69]

Having crossed the Waccamaw, Watson arrived at Screen's landing on April 24 and decided to send a reinforcement of forty men to Captain Saunders. According to Watson's frank appraisal of the detachment, they "were not fit for severe duty," but they were capable and willing to fight.[70] Without further delay, Watson proceeded to Camden. On April 21 word reached the American commander, General Greene, of the imminent arrival of Colonel Watson and five hundred men. Two days later, however, Greene received no more reliable information concerning Watson's movements.[71] It had proved impossible to move an army of over five hundred men, encumbered with its baggage, from the Waccamaw River to Camden within a week. Greene could rest assured on April 23; Watson would not arrive at Camden for another fifteen days, and thus Rawdon was left to his own fate.[72] Although Greene's force outnumbered his own by six hundred, Rawdon decided to attack, and on the morning of April 25 his forces met Greene's at Hobkirk's Hill and won the field of battle.[73]

In the first week of May, 1781, Colonel Balfour gave a pessimistic description of

the British military position in a letter to Sir Henry Clinton. Colonel Balfour realized that Rawdon's defeat over Green had not been decisive. "Notwithstanding this brilliant success," Balfour wrote to Sir Henry Clinton, "I must inform Your Excellency that the general state of the country is most distressing." The letter continued with a bleak description of the British posts: Augusta and Ninety-Six were under heavy attack and communication by land to Savannah no longer existed. In concluding, the Colonel added: "Indeed I should betray the duty I owe Your Excellency, did I not represent the Defection of this province so universal that I know of no mode short of depopulation, to retain it."[74]

Balfour's description was not only correct, but almost prophetic. Although British prospects had imporved after Hobkirk's Hill, Greene was on the eve of sweeping the British from the Carolinas, excepting only Charleston. After a realistic appraisal, Rawdon decided for drastic action and thus abandoned Camden on May 9, 1781.[75] Besides being cut off from food and forage by partisan bands, Rawdon had been disappointed by Watson's detachment, which had joined him at Camden on May 7, because it was "much reduced in Number, thro' Casualties, Sickness and a Reinforcement which he had left at Georgetown."[76]

On May 8, the day prior to Rawdon's abandonment of Camden, Balfour offered the command of Charleston to Captain Saunders. "I am now to propose to you," wrote Balfour, "the superintending and commanding [of] all the cavalry that we have from this garrison on different parts of the province." Balfour obviously had confidence in Saunders' leadership; the Colonel stressed that cavalry was to be the "principal defence" and he promised Saunders more men "upon any plan you might think advisable." Saunders was requested to proceed immediately to Charleston, as there were others seeking the command. Captain Gray was to become the new commander of Georgetown in Saunders' absence.[77]

Unfortunately for Saunders, Charleston, British headquarters for the war in the South, was in an extremely weakened state. Five days after he had abandoned Camden Rawdon reported to Cornwallis that Colonel Balfour had met him at Nelson's Ferry and described the conditions at Charleston. The old works at the fort had been levelled to make way for new ones, but they had not yet been constructed. Equally important, Balfour has stressed "that his Garrison was inadequate to oppose any Force of consequence, and that the disaffection of the Towns People shewed itself in a thousand instances."[78] Balfour's description of Charleston did not augur well for the future of Saunders' proposed new command. In the end, Saunders did not accept the offer of promotion to command Charleston, probably because Balfour remained as commander longer than anticipated.

Shortly after Balfour had met Rawdon on May 14 at Nelson's Ferry, a detatchment of Balfour's men had been dispatched to Dorchester, located fifteen miles from Charleston, under the command of Stephen Jarvis.[79] Jarvis was met at Dor-

chester by a militia under the command of Alexander Chesney, a South Carolina Loyalist.[80] Captain Saunders also arrived from Georgetown with a portion of his troop and took command of the assembled forces. Saunders subsequently received orders to proceed to William Snipes' plantation to disperse a force under his command.[81] Snipes was a major of the Horse Shoe Company of the Colleton County Regiment of South Carolina.[82]

The one and only serious condemnation of Saunders' character during his entire military career resulted from this attack on Snipes' plantation. The British came upon the rebel force at sunrise, and in the ensuing engagement Snipes escaped, but twenty of his men were killed. According to Jarvis:

> Only one man was taken prisoner and he was ordered to be killed by Captain Saunders. The most disgraceful thing I ever heard of a British officer. The poor fellow was severely hacked, but whether he died of his wounds or not I do not know. I once pulled out my pistol to put the poor fellow out of his misery but I had not the power to discharge.[83]

Saunders' order to have this soldier killed can be interpreted as an act of exasperation as a result of recent British defeats. By May 14 Saunders was aware that Greene's army had captured or destroyed the once-formidable British chain of posts which included Camden, Watson, Motte, Granby, Nelson's Ferry, and Orangeburg. Greene had almost complete control of South Carolina except for Charleston, Savannah, Georgetown, and Ninety-Six.[84]

Saunders was still at Dorchester when he received a letter from Balfour commending his command of the successful encounter at Snipes' plantation. Balfour's letter of June 5 was not only over-optimistic, but full of false hopes. Balfour stated: "The cutting up these few, will have excellent effect, and we only want a few more dragoons with enterprising officers to clear the country. The cavalry of this Corps will be mounted from the horses you took at Snipes." Balfour also assured Saunders that he and Lord Rawdon were "extremely sensible of your activity and ability."[85] Fifteen days later Saunders ordered his men to evacuate Georgetown; the garrison escaped by sea to Charleston on the first night of General Marion's approach.[86] Another post had succumbed to the American onslaught; two months after Hobkirk's Hill the British retained only Charleston and Ninety-Six in South Carolina.[87]

After arriving at Charleston on or near June 21, 1781, Saunders and his troop were sent to Dorchester, where they remained until the last major battle was fought in South Carolina at Eutaw Springs on September 8, 1781. One of the most fierce engagements of the war, the battle was extremely costly in casualties in proportion to the number of men that fought. Although there was no decisive victory for either

side, the results of the engagement were more favourable to Greene, because it forced the British to retreat to the immediate vicinity of Charleston."

Sixteen days after the battle of Eutaw Springs Balfour ordered Saunders to proceed northward in the last letter of the Saunders' manuscript for 1781. The Colonel stated: "You will immediately make every possible inquiry respecting Lord Cornwalis' movements as I expect he may come near to you in which case you will join him with all possible expedition if practicable."[89] Balfour advised Saunders to remain in or near Georgetown because Greene was reported to be at Camden. But Cornwallis never returned to South Carolina after he marched into Virginia on April 23, 1781. He continued on to Yorktown, where his army was eventually forced to capitulate on October 19, 1781. Peace was more than a year away, however, and the troops of both sides continued to fight, although there were no major battles. Saunders remained at Charleston until April, 1782, when he sailed for New York and took command of the remnant of his regiment saved from the surrender at Yorktown.[90] Thus ended the active military career of Captain John Saunders, who remained in command of the Queen's Rangers until the return of Major Armstrong from captivity.[91]

John Saunders was a fourth generation American, yet he fought against his fellow colonists for approximately six years in the first American Civil War. As with most Loyalists who took up arms against the Revolution, there was no turning back. John Saunders had fully committed himself in November, 1776, when he had raised a company of men and joined Lord Dunmore; he had no choice but to leave Virginia in July, 1776. A combination of conviction and circumstances thus forced Saunders to fight faithfully for the British in the Revolution.

Saunders had returned to the South at a time when British power was in decline. As early as June, 1780, the British posts were constantly endangered by partisan leaders and their guerilla tactics. Saunders and his dragoons had been a regular fighting unit and they were unprepared for the guerilla-style warfare of the Georgetown district. Consequently, Saunders became disillusioned with his command at Georgetown and requested a position of more active service.

The Saunders' manuscript provides a view of the Revolutionary War in the South from the losing side. There are only two letters in the manuscript which Balfour wrote to Saunders from June to December, 1781, because Saunders and his troop, as with all British forces in South Carolina, had been forced to retreat to Charleston in the latter half of 1781.

One related theme to the general military situation included the recruitment of a Loyalist militia. Saunders demonstrated his despair in the spring of 1781 when he informed Balfour that the attempt to recruit a Loyalist militia was futile. Yet, Saunders continued to fight and continued to receive commendations of his conduct

from Balfour and Rawdon. The trust these officers had in Saunders' ability was shown in May, 1781, when he was offered the command of Charleston, the British headquarters in the South.

John Saunders was an American colonist, but he had proved himself to be a loyal British subject. The two were not incompatible for Saunders. He fought against the Revolution for what he believed to be the best interests of the American colonies. As a wealthy young man he had gone to war and fought with the British to protect the colonies from revolution. Few Loyalist military commanders gained the confidence and respect of the British officers as had Saunders. John Saunders well deserved the praise of the Loyalist Claims Commissioners who had described him as a "man of very extraordinary merit."

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[1] Charles F. McIntosh, "Genealogy - Saunders, Princess Anne County, Virginia", **The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography**, XXXII (January, 1924), p. 92; L. Sabine, **Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution, with an Historical Essay** (Boston, 1864), II, p. 256; I.S. Harrell, **Loyalism in Virginia** (Durham, 1926), p. 49.

[2] Wallace Brown, **The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants** (Providence, 1966), p. 184.

[3] McIntosh, "Genealogy . . .," p. 95.

[4] J. Ellegood, Frederiction, 3 July 1793, to J. Saunders, MSS John Saunders, Harriet Irving Library, University of New Brunswick, Frederiction, New Brunswick, Canada. Hereafter cited as the Saunders' Papers. John Saunders eventually became a New Brunswick Supreme Court Justice. See Kenneth Donovan, "The Origin and Establishment of the New Brunswick Courts," **Journal of the New Brunswick Museum** (Saint John, N.B., 1980), pp. 57-64.

[5] Statement of Guardianship of Mr. John Saunders, Orphan of Elizabeth Saunders, to Jacob Ellegood, his guardian, 1775, Saunders' Papers.

[6] W.O. Raymond, "Loyalist in Arms, 1775-1783," **Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society** (Saint John, N.B., 1904), p. 199.

[7] Alfred Jones, ed., "The Journal of Alexander Chesney, A South Carolina Loyalist in the Revolution and After," **Ohio State University Bulletin**, XXVI (October, 1921), p. 108.

[8] Hugh E. Egerton, **The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists 1783 to 1785** (Oxford, 1915), p. 71.

[9] Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney . . .", p. 109.

[10] H.J. Eckenrode, **The Revolution in Virginia** (Boston, 1916), p. 106.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Alfred Jones, "A Letter Regarding the Queen's Rangers", **The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography**, XXX (October, 1922), p. 373.

[13] W.S. MacNutt, **New Brunswick, A History: 1784-1867** (Toronto, 1963), p. 72.

[14] Jones, "A Letter Regarding . . .", p. 373.

[15] J.W. Lawrence, **The Judges of New Brunswick and their Times** (n.p., 1907), p. 100. See the **Journal of the Legislative Council of the Province of New Brunswick, Fourth Session of the Fourth General Assembly, July 5, 1808**, p. 331. for other examples of Saunders' profession to be a loyal subject after he had emigrated to New Brunswick.

[16] C.J. Ingles, **The Queen's Rangers in the Revolutionary War**, ed. H.M. Jackson (Montreal, 1956), p. 256; Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney . . . ", p. 109.

[17] Ingles, **The Queen's Rangers . . .**, p. 165; Keith B. Berwick, "Moderates in Crisis: The Trials of Leadership in Revolutionary Virginia" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1959), p. 47.

[18] Charles F. McIntosh, ed., "Saunders", **The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography**, XXXIII (January, 1925), p. 85; "Tory Prisoners Now in the Publick Goal May 6, 1776," **The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography**, XV (April, 1908), p. 414.

[19] Raymond, "Loyalist in Arms 1775-1783", p. 199; W.O. Raymond, "A.D. 1775-1783 Roll of Officers of the British American or Loyalist Corps", **Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society** (Saint John, 1904), p. 246.

[20] Ingles, **The Queen's Rangers . . .**, pp. 155-58; D.B. Read, **The Life and Times of General John Graves Simcoe** (Toronto, 1890), p. 72.

[21] John Graves Simcoe, **Simcoe's Military Journal** (Toronto, 1962), p. 139.

[22] Ibid.

[23] N. Balfour, Charleston, 16 January 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[24] Simcoe, **Military Journal**, p. 139.

[25] Robert D. Bass, **Swamp Fox. The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion** (New York, 1959), pp. 135-36; George C. Rogers, **The History of Georgetown County, South Carolina** (Columbia, S.C., 1970), p. 137; Russel F. Weigley, **The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782** (Columbia, S.C., 1970), p. 55.

[26] N. Balfour, Charleston, January 24, 1781, to Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, Saunders' Papers.

[27] Ibid., January 25, 1781.

[28] Ingles, **The Queen's Rangers . . .**, p. 258.

[29] Stephen Jarvis, "The Narrative of Colonel Stephen Jarvis", **Loyalist Narratives from Upper Canada**, ed. James J. Talman (Toronto, 1946), pp. 195-96.

[30] N. Balfour, Charleston, February 8, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[31] Jarvis, "The Narrative . . . ", p. 197.

[32] Paul H. Smith, **Loyalists and Redcoats** (Williamsburg, 1964), p. 140.

[33] N. Balfour, Charleston, February 8, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. For British sensitivity

regarding procurement in the South Carolina countryside, whether confiscations from rebels or purchases from Loyalists, see R. Arthur Bowler, **Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783** (New Jersey, 1975), pp. 86-87.

[34] N. Balfour, Charleston, July 17, 1780, to Lord Cornwallis, cited in Smith, **Loyalists and Redcoats**, p. 139, note # 37.

[35] "Colonel Robert Gray's Observations on the War in Carolina", **The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine**, II (July, 1910), pp. 149-50.

[36] Robert W. Barnwell, "Loyalists in South Carolina, 1765-1785," (Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1941).

[37] William D. James, **A Sketch of the Life of Brigadier General Francis Marion and A History of His Brigade from its Rise in June 1780 until Disbanded in December 1782** (Marietta, Georgia, 1948), [copyright 1821], p. 65.

[38] J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 12, 1781, to F. Marion, Saunders' Papers. Some of Saunders' letters to Marion have been published in R.W. Gibbes, **Documentary History of the American Revolution Consisting of Letters and Papers Relating to the Contest for Liberty, Chiefly in South Carolina in 1781 and 1782** (Columbia, S.C., 1853). See also Edward McCrady, **History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783** (New Yrok, 1902), p. 151.

[39] N. Balfour, Charleston, February 13, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[40] Ibid., February 15, 1781.

[41] Ibid., February 19, 1781.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] James, **A Sketch of the Life of Marion . . .** , p. 94.

[45] J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 26, 1781, to N. Balfour, Saunders' Papers. Saunders' letter to Balfour is a draft which is contained on the back page of the letter which Saunders had received from Stephen Jarvis on February 20, 1781.

[46] James, **A Sketch in the Life of Marion . . .** , p. 93.

[47] J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 26, 1781, to N. Balfour, Saunders' Papers.

[48] James, **A Sketch in the Life of Marion . . .** , p. 93.

[49] N. Balfour, Charleston, February 24, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[50] Jarvis, "The Narrative . . . ", p. 197.

[51] N. Balfour, Charleston, March 4, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. See J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 26, 1781, to N. Balfour, ibid., for Saunders' request to leave Georgetown.

[52] Ingles, **The Queen's Rangers . . .** , p. 171.

[53] N. Balfour, Charleston, March 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[54] Ibid., April 2, 1781.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Jarvis, "The Narrative . . . ", p. 200.

[58] N. Balfour, Charleston, March 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[59] Jarvis, "The Narrative . . . ", p. 201.

[60] N. Balfour, Charleston, March 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[61] J. Saunders, Georgetown, April 6, 1781, to N. Balfour, ibid.

[62] John R. Alden, **The South in the Revolution, 1763-1789** (Louisiana, 1957), p. 242.

[63] Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Great Peedee, Hickory Grove, April 16, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[64] Howard H. Peckham, **The War for Independence, A Military History** (Chicago, 1965), p. 160.

[65] N. Balfour, Charleston, April 19, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[66] N. Balfour, Charleston, April 20, 1718, to Sir Henry Clinton in Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., **An Exact Reprint of Six Rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy**, I (London, 1888), pp. 418-19.

[67] N. Balfour, Charleston, April 19, 1781, to Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Saunders' Papers.

[68] Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Waccamaw, April 19, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[69] Ibid., Lawrel Hill, April 21, 1781, to J. Saunders, ibid.

[70] Ibid., Screens Landing, April 24, 1781, to J. Saunders, ibid.

[71] Christopher Ward, **The War of the Revolution**, ed. John Alden (New York, 1952), p. 801.

[72] F. Rawdon, Monks Corner, May 24, 1781, to Lord Cornwallis in Stevens, **Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy**, I, p. 481.

[73] Francis V. Greene, **The Revolutionary War and the Military Policy of the United States** (New York, 1911), p. 246.

[74] N. Balfour, Charleston, May 6, 1781, to Sir H. Clinton, in Stevens, **Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy**, I, pp. 472-73.

[75] Ward, **The War of the Revolution**, p. 811.

[76] F. Rawdon, Monks Corner, May 24, 1781, to Lord Cornwallis, in Stevens, **Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, I, p. 481.**

[77] **N. Balfour, Charleston, May 8, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. For a description of Charleston during the British occupation, see George Smith McCowen, Jr., The British Occupation of Charleston, 1780-82** (Columbia, S.C., 1972).

[78] F. Rawdon, Monks Corner, May 24, 1781, to Lord Cornwallis, in Stevens, **Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy**, I, p. 484.

[79] Jarvis, "The Narrative . . .", p. 202.

[80] Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney", p. 24.

[81] Simcoe, **Military Journal**, p. 143.

[82] Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney", p. 24.

[83] Jarvis, "The Narrative . . .", pp. 202-02. See Jerome Nadelhalft, "The Havoc of War and its Aftermath in Revolutionary South Carolina", **Histoire Sociale**, XII (May, 1979), p. 98, who maintains that the war in the Georgetown district and the interior "may have been bloodier and more cruel than any place else in America."

[84] Ward, **The War of the Revolution**, p. 813.

[85] N. Balfour, Charleston, June 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[86] Historians are confused on the date of the fall of Georgetown. According to George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, **Rebels and Redcoats**, (Cleveland and New York, 1957), p. 458, the post was abandoned on May 29. But Jedidiah Morse, **Anals of the American Revolution** (New York, 1968), [copyright 1824], p. 35, believed that the post was surrendered on May 20. Ward, **The War of the Revolution**, p. 813, and Alden, **The South in the Revolution**, pp. 263-64, agree that the British garrison fled from Georgetown on June 20.

[87] Alden, **The South in the Revolution**, pp. 263-64.

[88] Ward, **The War of the Revolution**, p. 834.

[89] N. Balfour, Charleston, September 24, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers.

[90] Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney", p. 110.

[91] Ingles, **The Queen's Rangers**, p. 265. See also, W.R. Riddell, **The Life of John Graves Simcoe** (Toronto, 1892), p. 65.

## Appendix

### Captain Saunders' Troop.[1]

Captain .....John Saunders.
Lieutenant .....John Wilson.
Lieutenant .....Thomas Merritt.
Quarter-Master .....Richard Payne.

#### SERGEANTS

John Brit — James Hill — Theobald Franks

#### CORPORALS

John Higgens, Sr. — John Haney

#### TRUMPETER

John Porter

#### FARRIER

Jacob Iden

#### PRIVATES

Samuel Arbuckle
Richard Brown
James Campbell
Robert Carson
Jacob Delieu
Jacob Inglis
John Leighton
John McConnel
John Maize
John Sparks
Thomas Shannon
John Barrett
Richard Steers
Jonathan Blair
Humphrey Cockran
William Cornwall
Jesse Creekmore
Matthew Gallant
Lewis Florence
David Lindsay
David Mitchel
Anthony Manuel
William Surrels
Samuel Bates
John Stevens
John Newbury
John Barry
Joseph Cole
Makepeace Coleby
John Doherty
Isaac Horton
John Higgins, Jr.
William Mitchel
John Monsoe
Frederick Pickart
Barney Slack
Henry Seamore
John Costeloe
Thomas Whaley

[1] George H. Locke, "The Queen's Rangers" (Toronto, 1923).

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